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History is replete with examples of innovations that have proved essential to 
victory in war. Few innovations have provided the consistent and often decisive 
impact that air power has delivered in conflict. Across its relatively short history, 
the concept of air power has maintained a resiliency of innovation across the 
doctrinal, strategic, organizational, and technological levels. However, warfare 
itself has witnessed significant changes over the course of the last century. No 
longer is the classical, conventional state-on-state conflict the principal method of 
combating one’s enemies. In its place, irregular warfare (IW) has arguably 
become the norm in conflict today. However, we have yet to see air power 
applied to modern-era irregular conflicts with the same level of success achieved 
in past conflicts. This thesis examines the use of air power in IW in order to 
answer the following questions: What organizational forms are associated with 
the successful use of air power in irregular warfare? What technologies? What 
concepts of operations? What level of coherence between strategic and 
operational/tactical execution is associated with the successful use of air power 
in IW? And finally, what should the future role of air power in IW be? 
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1. The Innovation of Air Power 
Orville and Wilbur Wright tested the first powered aircraft out on the 
coastal sand dunes of Kill Devil Hills in North Carolina on December 17, 1903. 
Their success formed the foundation of a technology that is still seeing 
innovations to this very day. Barely a decade after the first flight, aircraft were 
used extensively during the combat operations of World War I. Whether acting as 
the supported force or the supporting force, air power has contributed to nearly 
every conflict since the Wright brothers’ pioneering powered flight. 
While air power is barely a century old, the origins of conflict are nearly as 
old as man himself. As soon as there were interactions between individuals or 
groups with differing interests, there were also conflicts between the opposing 
parties. It was Carl von Clausewitz who pointed out that “war is an act of violence 
meant to force the enemy to do our will.”1 As conflict became inherent to 
interactions between competing parties, so did the perpetual desire to gain 
advantage over the opposition. The relentless drive for the upper hand in conflict 
has consistently manifested itself among militaries and warfare in the form of 
innovation. Whether doctrinal, strategic, organizational, or technological, such 
innovations provide the edge that creates advantage in conflict.     
History is replete with examples of innovations that have proved essential 
to victory in war. Conversely, the history of conflict is littered with examples 
where failure to innovate proved the principal cause of defeat. Many innovations, 
while initially key to victory, quickly became obsolete. As an innovation, air 
power, and particularly its use in conflict, is well documented in history, given that 
it is merely a century old. Few innovations have provided the consistent and 
often decisive impact that air power has delivered in conflict. Across its relatively 
                                            
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Oxford University Press, 2007), 31. 
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short history, the concept of air power has maintained a resiliency of innovation 
across the doctrinal, strategic, organizational, and technological levels. Much of 
the credit lies at the hands of air power pioneers such as Billy Mitchell, Giulio 
Douhet, Claire Chennault, Hap Arnold, and Jimmy Doolittle, among others. 
These leaders laid the firm foundations upon which classical air doctrine and 
strategy were built. As a testament to their brilliance, their works provided the 
methods by which air power fundamentally transformed warfare into a three-
dimensional struggle.  
While past success and failure provide no guarantee for future realization, 
air power has a history of innovation and application that has delivered a 
consistent, if not always decisive, impact on warfare. While nations aim to 
structure their forces in anticipation of future conflicts, history reflects that often 
innovations of air power occur in the midst of conflict, out of battlefield necessity. 
Today, however, they must fight with the force they have. Although forces may 
be in development, this process takes time and these desired forces may not be 
immediately available. To that end, this force must be operationalized for current 
conflicts while still being structured for perceived future threats. This delicate 
tactical/strategic balance is often difficult to achieve. 
2. Air Power in Irregular Warfare 
It should come as no surprise that warfare has witnessed significant 
changes over the course of the last century. No longer is the classical, 
conventional state-on-state conflict the principal method of combating one’s 
enemies. In its place, irregular warfare (IW) has arguably become the norm in 
conflict today. For the purposes of this thesis, we will define IW as the effort to 
impose our will on an adversary through non-customary ways.2 This is not to say 
that there will no longer be large-scale state-on-state conflict, but rather that 
asymmetric and indirect warfare has risen as the predominant means. The use of 
                                            
2 This definition for irregular warfare is derived from dictionary definition of “irregular” and the 
Clausewitzian definition of “war.”  It is explained in detail in Chapter II. 
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air power in IW is not without precedent. There is a rich history of using air power 
in IW, from which much can be learned. With modern warfare fundamentally 
changed, we have yet to see air power applied to modern-era irregular conflicts 
with the same level of success achieved in past conflicts. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the use of air power in IW, with the following three 
questions at its foundation: 
• What roles has air power, to include airborne and heli-borne 
operations, played in IW? 
• What types of air power have been most effective in IW? 
• What are the characteristics that distinguish the successful uses of 
air power in IW from unsuccessful ones? 
Building upon these three questions, we will further investigate examples of air 
power in IW to determine: 
• What organizational forms are associated with the successful use 
of air power in irregular warfare?  What technologies?  What 
concepts of operations? 
• What level of coherence between strategic and operational/tactical 
execution is associated with the successful use of air power in IW? 
Exploring these questions will allow us to frame our search for an answer to the 
strategically-oriented question:  What should the future role of air power in IW 
be? 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will begin with a comprehensive literature review to discuss the 
evolution of air power doctrine and theory throughout the last 100 years. The 
review will cover both conventional and irregular doctrine and theory, addressing 
how they reflect on modern IW air power. Leveraging bodies of knowledge that 
are both modern and historical, this review will provide the background for the 
remaining chapters that will survey the uses of air power in IW. Combined with 
the historical background, we will compare documented uses of air power in IW 
to existing doctrine and theory.   
 4 
Following this review, this thesis will then use a heuristic methodology to 
explore the use of air power in specific irregular conflicts. The heuristic analysis 
will encompass the organizational, technological, doctrinal, and strategic 
dimensions of air power and how they contributed to or detracted from overall 
operational success. Additional analysis will be centered on how the attributes 
were adopted/diffused by air forces for use in future conflicts. Attention will also 
be paid to the difference between conventional air forces that execute 
conventional missions in support of irregular forces, and the actual irregular use 
of air power. In order to make this study more manageable, the authors have 
chosen to divide the past century up into four significant periods. Chapter III will 
discuss early uses, from the dawn of flight through the interwar period. Chapter 
IV focuses on World War II through the Korean War. Chapter V features 
vignettes covering the Vietnam War to Kosovo. And finally, Chapter VI will 
discuss IW from 9/11 to the present. Following this series of vignettes, the 
authors will provide critical analysis in order to answer the questions at hand and 





A. AIR POWER AND IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Since the dawn of aviation, air power has played an essential role in 
conventional warfare. In fact, most modern air power doctrine and strategy is 
derived from these conventional roots of aviation. Scattered amidst this 
conventional use of air power is also the less recognized unconventional and 
specialist use of air power. While there is some doctrine associated with the use 
of air power in irregular conflicts, it remains loosely defined in the modern era.  
There are countless definitions for irregular warfare (IW). Joint Publication 
1-02 defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.”3 Current Air Force doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, 
states that “irregular warfare encompasses a variety of operations where the 
nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war . . . 
counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 
counterinsurgency, and stability operations.”4  In its purest form, the dictionary 
defines the term “irregular” in its adjective form as “not being or acting in accord 
with laws, rules, or established custom.”5 Combined with the Clausewitzian 
definition of war as “an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will,” 
IW can be defined as the effort to impose our will on the adversary through non-
customary ways and means.6 The term “violence” is the obvious omission from 
                                            
3 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 
1-02, Washington, DC, 2010, 189. 
4, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, Air Force Doctrine Document 
(AFDD) 1, 2011, 23. 
5 Merriam-Webster online dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com (accessed August 9, 
2012). 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Oxford University Press, 2007), 31. 
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this definition. While violence is fundamental to warfare and is often a part of IW, 
there are countless situations where violence is not present and it is therefore 
excluded from the definition used here.  
The most recent version of AFDD 1 defines air power as “the ability to 
project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, 
space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.”7 
Alexander de Seversky, the Russian naval aviator turned American military 
theorist, defined air power as “the ability of a nation to assert its will via the air 
medium.”8 It was Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, however, who defined air power 
simply as “the ability to do something in the air.”9 For the purpose of this thesis, 
we will use the Billy Mitchell definition. This unrestrained, all-encompassing, but 
still remarkably simple definition lends itself to the study of air power as it applies 
to warfare without being hampered by the many conventional paradigms 
advocated over the years. Using this definition, air power includes, but is not 
limited to, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); close air support; 
strategic attack interdiction; mobility (air-land and airdrop); and air-to-air combat, 
as well as both airborne and air assault operations from fixed wing, rotary wing 
and lighter-than-air craft. 
Understanding the role of air power in irregular warfare begins with a firm 
grasp of how air power is applied within the conventional realm. Building upon 
this knowledge, combined with the key differences between conventional and 
irregular warfare, the role of air power in IW can be illuminated. Of note is that 
much like warfare generally, air operations can be conducted across the 
spectrum of intensity from limited/unconventional war to total/conventional war. 
The roles of air power are not mutually exclusive, however, and air power can be 
                                            
7 AFDD 1, 11. 
8 Alexander P. de Seversky, “What is Air Power?” in The Paths of Heaven: The Impact of Air 
Power: National Security and World Politics, ed. Eugene M. Emme (Princeton, NJ: D. Van 
Nostrand Company Inc., 1959), 201.  
9 Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell 
Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), xi. 
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used in an irregular manner during conventional conflict just as it can be used 
conventionally during an unconventional or irregular conflict. With this in mind, it 
is critical to note the difference between conventional air forces that execute 
conventional missions in support of irregular forces, and the use of air power in 
irregular ways. This thesis will focus on the latter, wherein lies the true strategic 
utility of air power in IW. As a result, much of the subject matter covered in this 
thesis will fall within the broad definition of special operations provided by 
Dr. John Arquilla as, “that class of military (or paramilitary) actions that fall 
outside the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time periods.”10  
From Billy Mitchell and the early proponents of air power, to the doctrine 
writers of the present day, an overarching theme persists:  Air power is strategic. 
To advocates of this view, the argument that air power provides not only tactical, 
but also strategic advantage is beyond reproach. Nevertheless, the methods of 
applying air power to gain the strategic advantage have been the subject of much 
discussion over the years. Early air power theorists would argue that the strategic 
attack and offensive capabilities of air power provide a panacea that has 
fundamentally altered warfare. This thesis examines the strategic advantage of 
air power as it is applied to irregular conflict in the effort to illuminate its defining 
characteristics. 
B. AIR POWER DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, ORGANIZATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
From Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet to John Boyd and John Warden, 
conventional air power theory has a rich and storied history with dramatic 
impacts on the doctrine, strategy, organization, and technology of air power 
throughout history. Scattered between and among the large conventional 
conflicts where these theories have proved their worth, lies the myriad of other 
conflicts and operations that don’t necessarily fit the mold. It is within these 
                                            
10 John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times 
(Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1996), xv. 
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conflicts and operations that this thesis will explore these often small, but 
seemingly always irregular, wars. 
1. From the Dawn of Flight through Interwar Period  
The Air Service, United States Army led the way in the development of 
powered flight with the first military aircraft sale in 1909.11 As early performance 
limitations were overcome through more robust airframe designs and more 
powerful engines, aviators began experimenting with carrying weapons in the 
form of bombs and machine guns. Naval aviation also came into service with the 
first ship-borne takeoff from the USS Birmingham in November 1910.12 However, 
despite these innovations pioneered by the Air Service it was the Italians who 
were first to employ the aircraft in combat during their campaign in North Africa. 
The first recorded combat flight flown by the Italians was a 
reconnaissance mission in Libya on October 23, 1911.13 The Italians initially 
deployed nine aircraft in support of their invasion of Libya and the aircrews 
quickly began to rack up a number of first-time events from the aerial dimension. 
Captain Carlo Piazza and his five pilots immediately recognized the force 
multiplying advantage of the aircraft over what by now was the conventional use 
of balloons for observation. Captain Piazza’s crews in a single flight were able to 
cover hundreds of square miles more than a balloon tethered in just one place.14 
The Italians laid claim to several additional aviation firsts in combat, including 
leaflet drops for propaganda, artillery spotting, night-bombing and 
reconnaissance, as well as radio communications. The first pilots to be wounded 
and killed in an aircraft as well as the first pilot to be shot down and taken 
                                            
11 Walter J. Boyne, The Influence of Air Power upon History (New York: Pelican Publishing 
Company Inc., 2003), 35. 
12 Boyne, The Influence of Air Power, 36. 
13 John F. O’Connell, The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20th Century:  Part One (1914–
1939) (New York: iUniverse, Inc, 2007), 1. 
14 Boyne, The Influence of Air Power, 37. 
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prisoner were all Italian.15 These men were all pioneers, and within their historical 
context were just as unconventional as the tactics, techniques and procedures 
they were developing. 
The Italian artilleryman and author, General Gulio Douhet was one of the 
earliest air power thinkers. As the commander of one of Italy’s first air units he 
was instrumental in formulating early air power theory and authored the first air 
power employment manual, Rules for the Use of Aircraft in War.16 Douhet 
believed that air power could be used not just to influence, but also to actually 
determine the course of the ground war.17 According to Douhet, aircraft are 
purely offensive and unstoppable by defenses. He also argued that in order to be 
successful, air forces must be independent of other forces and “armed, 
structured, and deployed for the decisive strategic role.”18  
During the course of the First World War, air power was largely accepted 
and even conventionalized into the larger force. Despite this, there were still 
several instances of air power being utilized in a special or unconventional 
manner. Walter Boyne notes “reconnaissance pilots were also tasked for special 
operations that included landing and picking up agents behind enemy lines at 
night.”19 This was quite an endeavor in the age pre-dating night vision goggles, 
let alone the most basic flight instrumentation or even aircraft lighting. In addition 
to these operations, aircraft were also used during the Arab Revolt in support of 
the Arab insurgency against the Turks. 
T. E. Lawrence is perhaps one of the most famous insurgents of WWI. 
Known as Emir Dynamite, Lawrence embraced technology, in a campaign 
                                            
15 Boyne, The Influence of Air Power, 38. 
16 Boyne, The Influence of Air Power, 137. 
17 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann 
Inc., 1942), viii. 
18 Douhet, The Command of the Air, viii. 
19 Boyne, The Influence of Air Power, 69. 
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against the Turks.20 Developing tactics utilizing armored cars and supporting 
aircraft, Lawrence operated throughout the Arabian Peninsula.21,22  
Although initial air power employment was reconnaissance based, uses 
branched out into artillery spotting; attacking behind enemy lines; and eventually 
the pursuit airplane was developed to counter enemy aerial attacks.23 Douhet 
picks up here after the conclusion of the First World War and expands on air 
power theory from a post-war perspective. Douhet foresaw a revolution in how 
wars would be fought based upon the freedom of action air power created. 
Central to this idea was the ability to attack beyond an opponent’s land and sea 
defensive forces, against targets limited only by the borders of the nations 
engaged in the war. Because of this, Douhet also saw a blurring of the line 
between civilians and combatants who would never be safe from the enemy 
unless opposing air forces were completely destroyed.24 Douhet favored 
attacking the enemy’s air forces before they even left the ground and likened 
attacks on the enemy’s industrial base to destroying a bird’s eggs in the nest 
before they have the chance to become airborne and escape.25   
The key component to the ability to act with freedom in the air was 
Douhet’s concept of command of the air, what we would today refer to as air 
superiority. He defined command of the air as “to be in a position to prevent the 
enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.”26  
According to Douhet, command of the air is crucial but is not won by 
engaging in air battles. Rather, it is achieved by bombing attacks to eliminate the 
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enemy’s ability to resist. This reflects a strategy to defeat an enemy’s air force 
before it has the opportunity to become airborne. Targets should include enemy 
infrastructure such as industry, communications, and transportation, but above 
all, the will of the people “in an initial and overwhelming attack” including the use 
of chemical weapons.27 The battlefield advantage achieved through command of 
the air is both necessary and sufficient in order to secure victory on the ground. 
Douhet believed that the outcome of future wars would be determined by air, and 
that “it was impossible to defend against a bombing attack.”28  When questioned 
on how to defend from an aerial attack, Douhet’s response was simply, “by 
attacking.”29 He believed that all a nation could do was to prepare for the “the 
offensives the enemy inflicts upon us, while striving to put all our resources to 
work to inflict even heavier ones upon him.”30 Douhet also believed that an 
independent air arm was instrumental in protecting the nation, a theory that 
General Mitchell was simultaneously championing in the United States. “National 
defense can be assured only by an Independent Air Force of adequate power.”31 
Although well known for his calls for an independent air force, Douhet also 
recognized the importance of putting certain aerial forces, those integral to army 
and navy operations, directly under the control of those services. These auxiliary 
aviation units were to be financed, organized, and employed solely by the service 
that they actively support.32 In his 1942 book, Victory Through Air Power, 
Alexander de Seversky echoed some of Douhet’s thoughts. De Seversky states 
that although “certain airplane auxiliaries should reasonably be integrated with 
the land and sea forces, as part and parcel of those military branches. That, 
however, does not affect the broader question of a self-sufficient Air Force.”33 
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Both men believed that the independent air arm was crucial in order to field a 
strategically viable force, yet recognized the tactical advantage of forces working 
directly with the other services. This concept was also reflected in the earlier 
theories of Billy Mitchell. There is a certain tactical utility in having air forces 
closely integrated with ground troops and it is within this tactical utility where we 
find much of the utility of air power in IW. 
Although Douhet and de Seversky agreed on several key points, such as 
the independent air arm, the two thinkers did not agree on everything. Douhet 
believed that combat power could be added to a bomber, thereby harvesting the 
best of both worlds in one aircraft. De Seversky argued, however, this simply did 
not agree with the experiences during WWII. Consequently, de Seversky would 
disagree with Douhet that these battleplanes should be the foundation of the air 
force. Rather, de Seversky suggests that the “backbone of the air force” should 
be a “combat plane to which bombing power is added.”34 This distinction is 
significant because it gives the “combat bomber” the ability to counter “pure 
combat planes” while still being able to conduct the bombing mission. 
Regardless, neither man saw beyond strategic attack/large scale conflict 
applications and the support operations of air power to carry such missions out. 
Douhet also firmly grasped the importance of civil aviation to maintain the 
foundation for military aviation to springboard from during times of war. 
Supported by his theory that “war is fought by masses of men and machines; and 
masses, whether of men or machines, are composed of the average and not of 
the extreme,” Douhet viewed civilian aviation as a more than adequate 
complement to the military forces.35 Nowhere was civil aviation more important 
than Nazi Germany at the outset of WWII. Denied a military air force by the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Germans developed a robust civil aviation program 
which almost immediately translated into a military capability for combat 
operations. 
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Douhet believed that demoralizing the enemy’s civilian population was 
absolutely central to achieving victory. However, he saw air power as a direct 
action tool and not an instrument to be applied indirectly.36 “There is only one 
attitude to adopt in aerial warfare – namely, an intense and violent offensive, 
even at the risk of enduring the same thing from the enemy. The one effective 
method of defending one’s own territory from an offensive by air is to destroy the 
enemy’s air power with the greatest possible speed.”37 While Douhet made 
significant contributions to conventional air power theory, his belief that “future 
wars will be total in character and scope”38 is largely shortsighted in terms of 
unconventional and irregular warfare. 
Rivaled only by Douhet, the British air commander Hugh Trenchard had a 
profound impact on air power theory, as well as the views of BGen Mitchell 
himself. Mitchell and Trenchard spent a great deal of time together during WWI. 
While other theorists focused on breaking an enemy’s ability to fight, Trenchard 
focused on breaking the enemy’s will. 
The object of war was to force an enemy to bend to one’s will, 
accomplished by breaking either his will or his capability to fight. 
Armies were generally condemned to concentrate on the latter by 
seeking battle. Hugh Trenchard, the first chief of the [Royal Air 
Force (RAF)] and its commander from 1919 to 1930, focused 
instead on the ‘will’ portion of that equation.39   
Trenchard proposed the use of air power as a strategic weapon designed 
to “break the morale of factory workers by targeting enemy industry and, by 
extension, the population as a whole.”40  While the theories of Hugh Trenchard 
were never published, as were those of the well-known airmen Mitchell and 
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Douhet, his teachings were perpetuated through doctrine manuals of the RAF 
and institutionalized at the RAF Staff College. It was at the Staff College where 
most of the World War II RAF officers were educated. One of Trenchard’s lasting 
legacies in the RAF was his insistence on the use of air power as an offensive 
weapon.41  Trenchard believed in the psychological effects of bombing, and 
much like Douhet, believed in attacking the morale of the enemy population.   
Trenchard did not advocate the bombing of German population 
centers with the intention of causing a popular revolt (the concept 
put forward by his contemporary in Italy, Gen Giulio Douhet). 
Rather, Trenchard implied that the act of bombardment in 
general—and the destruction of selected German factories in 
particular—would have a devastating effect on the morale of the 
workers and, by extension, the German people as a whole.42   
One of the greatest successes during the time of Hugh Trenchard was the 
establishment of the RAF which combined the air forces of the Royal Naval Air 
Service (RNAS) and the Army’s Royal Flying Corps (RFC). Likely considered a 
“Holy Grail” by many early air power theorists, Hugh Trenchard played a vital role 
in the establishment and early leadership of the RAF, which was formally 
established in April 1918. While Mitchell and Douhet both adamantly advocated 
air force independence, Hugh Trenchard was the only one to command such a 
force.43 
Like many of his counterparts, Trenchard had ground level experience in 
IW, specifically throughout the Boer War, the South African conflict where the 
Boers used guerrilla style tactics against the British. It was during this conflict that 
Trenchard received a bullet through a lung, leaving him with a dry-sticks voice 
and earning him the nickname ‘Boom.’44 Trenchard also pioneered the use of air 
forces in irregular ways. As a firm believer in the use of air power as an offensive 
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weapon, Trenchard lobbied that air forces could be utilized instead of land or 
naval forces to execute missions with a much lower cost in blood and treasure. 
During the 1920s, he did just that throughout the British territories in the Middle 
East and Northwest Frontier. In these regions the army was sidelined in favor of 
the Royal Air Force to “police vast, remote areas.”45 Trenchard’s air forces would 
keep “errant communities” in line by first delivering warning leaflets dropped by 
air followed by bombings “against a high-value target like crops or herds of 
animals.”46  During the interwar years, it was this imperial role that helped the 
RAF survive.47  Trenchard realized that the British forces were stretched thin 
after WWI and, in order to maintain its independence, the RAF had to prove its 
mettle. The result was the concept of air control. While the concept of an 
independent air service is deeply rooted in conventional air power theory, it is 
rather ironic that it was the IW mission of air control that kept the RAF as an 
independent service during the interwar years.  
Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell is best known today for his 
passionate zeal for air power and ceaseless quest for the establishment of the 
Air Force as a separate military service equal to its Army and Navy counterparts. 
At the time of Mitchell’s service, the Air Force was merely the Army Air Service, 
the precursor to the Army Air Corps established later in 1926 and finally, the U.S. 
Air Force in 1947. While the notion of air force autonomy and independent air 
operations is often considered Mitchell’s most significant contribution, we often 
fail to credit him with establishing many of the doctrinal roots of the present day 
U.S. Air Force and having greater effect than any other single individual.48  
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Mitchell developed many of his early doctrinal theories regarding air power 
while serving as the combat air commander for American forces during WWI. In 
September 1918, Mitchell commanded the First Army Air Service where he 
coordinated the air support for General John “Black Jack” Pershing’s successful 
attack on the German positions in the French town of Saint Mihiel. The air attack 
included American, French, British, and Italian squadrons composed of 
701 pursuit, 323 day-bombardment, 91 night-bombardment, and 366 observation 
aircraft.49 This experience confirmed Mitchell’s belief in Trenchard’s theory of 
using aircraft in an offensive manner and the desire and need for air 
supremacy.50 
While Mitchell’s experiences leading air forces in WWI are well 
documented, rarely is his prior Army experience mentioned. After war erupted 
with Spain in 1898, a young Billy Mitchell enlisted in the Signal Corps at the age 
of 18. “Arriving in Cuba in time to witness the surrender of the Spanish garrison, 
Mitchell remained in occupation duty for seven months before transferring to the 
Philippines.”51 The Philippine-American conflict which was also referred to as the 
Philippine Insurrection was truly an irregular conflict characterized by widespread 
guerilla and insurgent conflict. Mitchell was no stranger to IW, which likely 
structured some of his earlier, more tactical air power theories. Mitchell’s early air 
power theories were also a direct reflection of his WWI experiences.  “Mitchell 
proposed using airpower as a major contributor to a land or sea campaign—not 
as a substitute for them.”52 Based on his experiences, Mitchell advocated dividing 
air forces into tactical and strategic aviation units. Tactical aviation units would be 
composed of squadrons operating alongside other army units, attached to the 
division, corps, or army they supported. “Strategical” aviation units would consist 
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of independent “bombardment and pursuit formations” operating in the style of a 
modern day cavalry. These units would serve to carry the war well into the 
enemy’s country.”53 While the strategic bombing function of air power was 
present in Mitchell’s early theories, so was a focus on tactical aviation and 
support for ground troops.  
Despite the longevity of his contributions, Mitchell’s doctrinal theories were 
not static. Over the course of his career, his air power views changed 
dramatically.54 Army leadership largely ignored Mitchell’s early calls for the 
strategic use of aviation. The obvious indifference of Army senior commanders 
might offer the best explanation for why Mitchell seemed to become much more 
outspoken for an independent air force in his later writings and even called for a 
“reduced emphasis on surface warfare.”55  His later appeals for strategic aviation 
were clearly Douhetian in nature, placing greater emphasis on strategic over 
tactical.56  The central difference between the views of Mitchell and Douhet were 
Mitchell’s insistence on the “need to combine bombardment attacks with fighter 
offense for the control of the air.”57 Douhet commonly bucked the theory of fighter 
offense, relying solely on “a screening formation of slow, heavily armed combat 
planes.”58 Mitchell’s theories always emphasized the crucial role of air supremacy 
and the role of the bomber in particular. This foundation in a bomber air force 
was necessary at the time to distinguish the Air Force from the Army and Navy 
while lobbying for the creation of the independent air service.59 Many key early 
U.S. Air Force figures were among Mitchell’s disciples, including the only General 
of the Air Force, Henry “Hap” Arnold, General Ira Eaker, and the first Air Force 
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Chief of Staff, Carl Spaatz. With the support of these key men, Mitchell’s theories 
were cemented into current U.S. Air Force doctrine which still prevails today. 
The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) originated as the Air Service Field 
Officer’s School in 1920 and was later labeled the Air Service Tactical School 
before becoming the ACTS in 1926.60  The task of these schools was to develop 
the air power doctrine that would come to define the U.S. Air Force and its 
predecessors even to present day. ACTS began with a four-part strategy to 
develop an independent air arm by creating responsibilities for the air service or 
stealing roles and missions from the existing services.  
Specifically, the strategy sought to (1) redefine America as an 
airpower rather than a maritime nation; (2) demonstrate and 
publicize the versatility of airpower in peacetime roles; (3) create 
both a corporate Air Corps identity through political maneuvering 
and an independent air force through legislation; and (4) perhaps 
most importantly, develop a unique theory of air warfare—
unescorted high-altitude precision daylight bombardment (HAPDB) 
against the key nodes of an enemy’s industrial infrastructure.61  
While one could ultimately judge the ACTS as a success based on the 
end result, “an independent service with an independent mission,” its true impact 
was the development of air doctrine that guided the force during both the intra-
war years and WWII and remains woven in the fabric of the AF in the present 
day.  
2. World War II through the Korean War 
The years encompassing World War II through the Korean War were a 
period of great growth in the use of air power and development of the doctrine 
governing its use. While history frequently recounts the strategic use of air power 
during this time period, it rarely considers the tactical use of air power to support 
IW which deserves the same level of accolades. Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold and 
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Ira Eaker were just two of many air power acolytes, and both were legendary 
aviators in their own right. Arnold joined the Air Corps when it had but one aircraft 
in its inventory. He was a student of the Wright brothers, earned the 29th pilot 
license to be issued and was the recipient of the Mackay Trophy twice. Arnold 
would go on to become Chief of the Air Corps and was later promoted to General 
of the Army (5 Star), the commanding general of all air forces during WWII. 
Arnold later became the only General of the Air Force (5 Star) making him the 
only General in history to hold the rank of 5 Star General in two separate 
services. Eaker was also a distinguished aviator and winner of the Mackay 
Trophy himself. He was the primary pilot of the Question Mark during its record-
setting endurance flight. Both men collaborated in writing Winged Warfare, an 
authoritative source on air power doctrine, organization and technology, in 1941. 
These two forefathers of military aviation, along with BGen Mitchell saw 
the airplane as the principal innovative weapon of their time.62 Generals Arnold 
and Eaker accomplished something that Mitchell did not, however. Unlike 
Mitchell, they lived to command air forces in World War II. Billy Mitchell was 
relatively young when he died in 1936 at age 56, preceding WWII and the 
actualization of many developments in air power that he championed religiously. 
Hap Arnold did not pass until 1950 when he was 63, while Eaker passed in 1987 
at the seasoned age of 91. As a result, Arnold and Eaker provided continuity for 
the doctrine and theory developed during WWI and the interwar years. Their 
contributions combined theory with available technology to significantly influence 
modern air power theory, with particular influence on operations in WWII. 
Arnold and Eaker divided aircraft designs into five basic types:  fighters, 
bombers, reconnaissance/observation, transport/cargo, and trainers.63 Of these 
five, because of its purely offensive nature, the bomber was considered central to 
the design of an air force. “Battles and wars are won by a vigorous offensive and 
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seldom, if ever, by the defensive.”64 In spite of this, they also recognized the 
important roles of fighters, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft. They identified 
transport aircraft as providing essential support for ground forces including re-
supply, aeromedical evacuation and transport of heavy equipment.65  Among 
others, these ideas represented a rather rapid expansion of air power theory and 
more importantly, actual integration of theory in operations. While Arnold and 
Eaker wrote Winged Warfare prior to the American entry into WWII, their ideas 
were clearly reflected in the actual operations and organization of air forces in 
WWII not to mention the modern day U.S. Air Force. 
Arnold and Eaker challenged the traditional focus on pilots and offensive 
aircraft. They recognized that not only was the technology important, but the 
crews who flew and maintained these aircraft were critical as well. The pilot is the 
primary crew position but other crew positions such as the bombardier, engineer, 
navigator, radio operator, machine gunner, and observer are essential to mission 
success. Arnold and Eaker also cite the importance of quality support and 
maintenance personnel who serve at a ratio of ten men on the ground to every 
one man in the air.66 General Arnold structured crews as well as support 
functions for critical missions. In what was designated as the U.S. Army Air 
Corps Classified Project Nine, Arnold authorized the formation of a force to 
support the British General Orde Wingate’s Chindits, in a brutal behind-the-lines 
ground campaign in Burma. “Wingate has made innovations in ground warfare; I 
want some in the air. Wingate’s troops walked into Burma. From now on I want 
them to fly in and to fly out.”67 With these marching orders, Arnold authorized 
 
 
                                            
64 Arnold, Winged Warfare, 8. 
65 Arnold, Winged Warfare, 17. 
66 Arnold, Winged Warfare, 32–47. 
67 Henry H. Arnold quoted in, A.H. Peterson, G.C. Reinhardt and E.E. Conger ed., 
Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: Chindit 
Operations in Burma (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1963), 3. 
 21 
Lieutenant Colonels Phil Cochran and John Alison to build what would later 
become the First Air Commando Group using “any equipment necessary to the 
job.”68  
During the course of World War II, air power was expanded to include not 
just forces in the air, but also forces delivered through the air, airborne 
operations. Leaders began to fully realize both the tactical and strategic 
advantages of air power. Many uses of air power began to take a remarkably 
irregular flavor. WWII saw great exploration and use of gliders, dirigibles, and 
airborne soldiers. The utility of parachute troops (air dropped) and air infantry (air 
landed) had been overlooked by the Americans while the Germans and Russians 
perfected the tactic in the early days of WWII. However, with the startling 
success of the German assault on Holland on May 10, 1940 with such troops, the 
Americans took notice and finally began training of a parachute platoon which 
rapidly expanded into a battalion.69  Many irregular uses of air power were 
developed and implemented by both the Americans and Germans during WWII. 
In addition to supporting the Chindits with Project 9, air power was used to 
support the infiltration, exfiltration, and support of Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) backed partisan resistance movements in Europe. For their part, the 
Germans made use of parachute troops and gliders in innovative and irregular 
ways. 
Throughout the early years of air power, organization was constantly 
evolving, laying the foundation of the force employed today. In 1941, the Army 
Air Corps was split in two groups, one comprising combat operations and the 
other training and supply. The chain of command under combat operations 
flowed from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the “Commanding General of the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, thence to the Air District Commanders 
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and the Commanding Generals of the Overseas Departments.”70 This differed 
from the support side where the Chief of Air Corps served directly below the 
Chief of Staff. The GHQ Air Force is comprised of four air districts which divide 
up the continental United States. Underneath each district is the first tactical air 
unit, the wing which “as the largest air fighting unit which one commander can 
efficiently control and directly supervise,” is roughly the size of an army brigade.71 
Under each wing are two or three groups, either composite (both pursuit and 
bombardment) or heterogeneous. The group “is both a tactical and an 
administrative unit” and can be compared to a regiment. Finally, the squadron is 
the “basic flying combat unit” equivalent to a battalion. Squadrons are organized 
based on their aircraft types that include “transport, fighter, light, medium, and 
heavy bombardment, and reconnaissance.”72 This structure is the foundation for 
the Air Expeditionary Force today, although some necessary modifications have 
been made. The numbered expeditionary air force is the largest component of an 
air and space expeditionary task force (AETF). The size of an AETF may vary, 
utilizing, in size order, air expeditionary wings (AEW), air expeditionary groups 
(AEG), and air expeditionary squadrons (AES). Modern AEGs are composite 
groups, with a blend of assets organized for maximum combat effectiveness.73 
To this day, one of the most powerful air power tenets is the concept of 
unity of command. Unity of command is a lesson that Arnold and Eaker pulled 
from abroad. The Germans demonstrated excellent use of this concept when 
formulating a task force to invade Norway in 1940. They designated a single joint 
force commander (JFC), outside of the standing services, over the expeditionary 
force comprised of what was determined as the proper mix of air, ground, and 
sea forces.74 The air component was commanded by a single leader under the 
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JFC. This concept holds true today and is at the very core of how air forces are 
employed both at home and abroad. AFDD 1 states: 
Many airpower capabilities are limited in number; dividing or 
parceling out airpower into “penny-packets” violate the tenet of 
synergy and principle of mass. To preserve unity of effort, JFCs 
normally vest a single air commander with control of all airpower 
capabilities.75 
In Winged Warfare, Arnold and Eaker also address the concept of air 
tactics. They define air tactics “as the employment of air units in battle…Tactics 
come into play only after strategy has run its course.”76 They go on to divide air 
operations into two separate categories, “independent air force operations and 
co-operative, air-ground, or air-naval operations …Co-operative aviation 
concerns itself with the winning of a battle. Independent air force operations with 
the winning of a war.”77 This idea supports the strategic role an air force plays 
and helps form the foundation for the independent air arm most nations as 
described in AFDD 1 today, “Airpower is an inherently strategic force ... [and it’s] 
unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by Airmen.”78 
Co-operative aviation functions include observation aircraft, artillery 
spotting, command missions, mechanized force support, parachute troops/air 
infantry, air transport, and pursuit. Arnold and Eaker recognized observation 
aircraft as crucial component to support the ground-based army. “There probably 
is not a senior commander of land troops in the world today who would enter a 
battle without his observation aviation.”79 This is a sentiment that rings even more 
true today as seen in the insatiable demand for airborne intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. However, although Arnold and Eaker 
would agree on this point, they cautioned that there were some dangers in air co-
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operation. The most significant danger was that ground commanders might take 
to air support too enthusiastically. At first glance, this may not seem like a 
danger, but upon closer inspection it is clear that an overly enthusiastic ground 
commander may distract air forces from their first priority that “is not co-operative 
in character. The first priority missions are the destruction of opposing air forces, 
and vital enemy objectives beyond the range or theater of influence of land 
forces.”80 Again, this clearly illustrates how air force leadership understands the 
strategic nature of air power and the priorities of air forces to be in the current 
era. Today’s force is largely postured to support these strategic missions versus 
the more typical IW scenarios and requirements that have become almost 
regular in nature. 
Arnold and Eaker asserted that the “first phase in the war will be the air 
phase … [consisting] of independent air force operations, [including] propaganda 
missions; reconnaissance missions; anti-air force operations; and bombing 
missions against vital targets.”81 Although described in terms of total war 
between nations these missions are not without application to irregular warfare. 
During the course of the Polish offensive, the Germans made use of the Fieseler 
Storch, a latter-day short-take-off-landing (STOL) aircraft, to give commanders 
and their staff access to the ground battle lines. These aircraft were designed to 
land in areas otherwise inaccessible to aircraft, “city streets … rough terrain, 
plowed fields,” and the like.82 The Storch was also instrumental in the special 
operations mission to rescue Mussolini from his prison atop the Gran Sasso 
Mountain.  
Arnold and Eaker outline several key components to the strategy of air 
force operations: correct thinking; possible adversaries; organization; and 
training. They defined strategy as follows: 
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Strategy is the art of war; it concerns those principles which a 
nation employs to overcome an adversary not yet on the 
battlefield…Air strategy is the method by which a nation expresses 
its will through the employment of air forces. The principles of air 
strategy will dictate the creation of an air force, the type of its 
equipment, its composition, size, and the time and direction of its 
employment.83 
This definition compares well with the current definition of strategy as outlaid in 
AFDD 1. 
Strategy defines how operations should be conducted to 
accomplish national policy objectives. Strategy is the continuous 
process of matching ends, ways, and means to accomplish desired 
goals within acceptable levels of risk. Strategy originates in policy 
and addresses broad objectives, along with the designs and plans 
for achieving them.84 
Arnold and Eaker believed that all of the fields above must be considered 
together and applied during each of the three phases of air strategy:  “the 
strategy of preparation, the strategy of fighting and strategy in peace 
negotiation.”85 
Preparation is crucial to success in war. The time required for modern 
mobilization necessitates that it no longer occurs at the same time as a 
declaration of war, but rather our air forces must be at fighting strength prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities. “Unless developed before the emergency occurs, it will 
be of little value afterwards.”86 
Air strategy during the war dictates that we must be able to strike a “death 
blow” to our enemy anywhere he is present, be it his air force, industrial, or 
logistics bases.87 Again, this is doctrine that is upheld today: 
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Airpower (sic) can simultaneously strike directly at the adversary’s 
centers of gravity, vital centers, critical vulnerabilities, and 
strategy…Airpower can be used to rapidly express the national will 
wherever and whenever necessary.88 
 Strategy must also be applied in times of peace. Historically, following a 
prolonged conflict, the United States has drawn down its fighting forces. This is 
contrary to what Arnold and Eaker argue. “Correct [post-war] strategy indicates 
that it is unwise to dismantle or destroy all military establishments immediately 
upon the declaration of a given peace … The snake under the heel must be kept 
under heel, lest he come to life again at sunrise.”89 
Eventually, during the course of WWII, leaders such as Major General 
James H. Doolittle recognized that there was more to air power than just 
strategic bombing. After taking command of the Eight Air Force from Brigadier 
General Eaker, Doolittle recognized the inadequacy of the doctrinal idea of 
invincible bombers. Rather than focusing on protecting the bomber force, 
Doolittle directed the fighters under his command to focus on destroying German 
fighters. This subtle shift in doctrine unlocked the “secret of air superiority, a 
pragmatic recognition of first things first.”90 Doolittle’s goal of achieving true air 
superiority was instrumental in the outcome of WWII in Europe and the role air 
power played there. In the case of the Pacific theater, air power and nuclear 
weapons ultimately determined the course of the war. The successes in both 
theaters cemented air power theorists’ belief in these variations on the ACTS 
strategies. In the end, the strategic bombardment doctrine developed by the 
ACTS far outlived the school at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. With the 
advent of the atomic bomb and the rising threat of the Cold War, this doctrine 
took root, becoming the focus for American air power and continues to live as a 
foundation of AF doctrine today. 
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The United States was caught largely off-guard by the Korean War. 
Following World War II, both air and ground forces were rapidly demobilized as 
U.S. air power theory focused on nuclear attack as the principal means of 
strategic bombardment. The investment in irregular capabilities developed by the 
Carpetbaggers and the Number 1 Air Commando Group were lost when both 
organizations were disbanded and decommissioned following WWII. Just as in 
the RAF, the USAF placed “far greater importance and priority [to] ‘strategic’ air 
than to ‘tactical’ air.”91 The Air Force even went so far as to abolish “all joint 
boards charged with writing doctrine.”92 The Air Force discarded joint 
relationships in favor of becoming a dominant service founded on nuclear 
deterrence and strategic bombing in the form of Strategic Air Command (SAC). 
This new command began in 1946 and was led from 1948 until 1957 by one 
man, General Curtis E. LeMay. As the commander of SAC and later as the Vice 
Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Air Force,93 LeMay would set the tone for 
development of U.S. doctrine for many years to come. 
Caught off guard and unprepared, the newly established U.S. Air Force 
faced a problem that couldn’t be solved with nuclear weapons. Despite this, the 
Korean War was largely void of air power used in irregular ways and none of the 
previous Air Commando units were reactivated.94 The Korean War was not 
without innovation though. The use of the Air Force Fairchild C-119 marked the 
first time paratroopers were dropped from a tail-loading aircraft.95 This change 
substantially reducing aircraft loading and exit times allowing a much closer 
grouping of paratroopers on the ground. Korea also marked the first time “[large] 
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quantities of heavy support weapons and vehicles had been parachuted in one 
operation.”96 Also among the largely conventional operations of the Korean War 
were several isolated irregular uses of air power.  
During WWII, the U.S. trained more than a quarter million pilots, many of 
which remained in the Guard or Reserve following the war. Among these pilots 
was Brigadier General Harry “Heinie” Aderholt, the officer often credited with 
being the first modern day Air Commando. After a period of time flying 
conventional airlift in Korea with the C-47, Aderholt was recruited to establish a 
special missions detachment with around a dozen pilots and six planes to 
supporting a “highly classified project involving clandestine operations deep 
inside North Korea.”97 Airborne troops were also used in Korea to drop “small 
parties of sabotage troops who cut railways or shot up designated enemy troop 
centres (sic) on much the same lines as the SAS [Special Air Service] had done 
in the Western Desert or the SOE had done in France.”98 For a capability that 
would be considered irregular even today, the C-47s were modified to hold two 
75 gallon napalm bombs under the belly of the transport to drop bombs on 
lucrative targets found after dropping agents from the aircraft.99 
Similar to the events that transpired in WWII, air forces created a very 
versatile and functional irregular capability using available technologies in the 
midst of a conflict. The air forces were extremely capable and effective in their 
close relationship held with those they were supporting. However, in a 
troublesome trend that continues to the present day, the Korean irregular forces 
were deactivated in 1956 much like they were at the conclusion of WWII.  
                                            
96 Weeks, Assault from the Sky, 132. 
97 Warren A. Trest, Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America’s Secret Air Wars 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 29–30. 
98 Weeks, Assault from the Sky, 132. 
99 Trest, Air Commando One, 33. 
 29 
3. From the Vietnam War through the Kosovo Conflict 
Two of the most commonly referenced modern air power theorists are 
Colonels John Boyd and John Warden. While their teachings are vastly different, 
Boyd and Warden came together along with many other strategic air power 
theories in their belief in “the goal of defeating one’s adversary by strategic 
paralysis.”100  A commonly accepted definition of strategic paralysis defines it as 
“a military option with physical, mental, and moral dimensions that intends to 
disable rather than destroy the enemy.”101 These two conventional theorists 
represented a fundamental shift in air power thought, a shift that was proven 
effective in Desert Storm. While not formalized until much later, Billy Mitchell was 
a believer in strategic paralysis, “in 1919 he asserted that aerial bombardment’s 
greatest value lay in ‘hitting an enemy’s great nerve centers at the very beginning 
of the war so as to paralyze them to the greatest extent possible.’”102  Current Air 
Force doctrine puts significant emphasis on striking  
rapidly and unexpectedly across all of these critical points adds a 
significant impact to an enemy’s will in addition to the physical blow. 
This capability allows airpower to achieve effects well beyond the 
tactical effects of individual actions, at a tempo that disrupts the 
adversary’s decision cycle.103 
Colonel John Boyd was an F-86 Sabre fighter pilot in the Korean War. It 
was there during his experiences in the infamous MiG Alley, that Boyd 
“developed his first intuitive appreciation for the efficacy of what he would later 
refer to as ‘fast transient maneuvers.’”104  Known as a “thinking fighter pilot,” 
(emphasis original) Boyd “changed the way every air force in the world flies and 
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fights.”105 Boyd publicized his theories in a series of briefings that he gave 
detailing research conducted after his retirement. In his briefing entitled 
Destruction and Creation, Boyd originated the concept of “fast transients... 
[which] suggests that to win battle a pilot needs to operate at a faster tempo than 
his enemy.”106 Under this concept, a pilot must “operate inside his adversary’s 
time scale” to stay a step or two ahead.107 The sequence of presentations 
entitled Patterns of Conflict detailed Boyd’s lasting and most famous legacy, the 
OODA Loop. Initially born from the perspective of fighter style air combat, Boyd’s 
model is expanded to all human behavior. Perhaps the greatest testimonial to 
Boyd’s theories is something that few air power theorists realize:  much of it also 
applies to ground combat. The sum of his theories results in a better decision 
process running faster than the enemy decisions. With his OODA Loop, Boyd 
contends “that one can depict all rational human behavior—individual or 
organizational—as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks: observation, 
orientation, decision, and action.”108 Boyd called it, “unraveling the 
competition.”109  His theory attacked the ability of an adversary to process 
information which made it universal in applicability and quintessential to strategic 
paralysis.    
While of similar thought, the theory of Colonel John Warden focused more 
on constructing a conventional campaign plan. Col Warden published his theory 
in The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, which is “very simply, a philosophical 
and theoretical framework for conceptualizing, planning, and executing an air 
campaign.”110  Warden’s central theme was “that airpower possesses a unique 
capacity to achieve the strategic ends of war with maximum effectiveness and 
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minimum cost.”111 Warden constructed a model based on enemy centers of 
gravity (COG) that formed in five concentric rings.  “The most crucial element of 
the system—the innermost ring—is leadership. Extending outward from the 
center, in descending importance to the overall functioning of the system, are the 
rings of organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces.”112  
Warden theorized that an attack on one ring affected the other rings and 
since leadership was the most important, “destruction or neutralization of the 
leadership COG(s) produces total physical paralysis of the system.”113  Although 
the leadership COG is critical, attacking the outer rings serves a purpose as well, 
these attacks produce “partial physical paralysis but unbearable psychological 
pressure upon the leadership.”114 The lasting impact of Warden’s theory lies in its 
ability to address the “very complex philosophy and theory associated with air 
war at the operational level.”115   
While many air theories focus on either the strategic or tactical levels of 
warfare, Warden provides operational level theory for planning air campaigns. 
However, in order for Warden’s theory to be effective, the enemy COGs must be 
visible in order to be attack. This is often not the case in an insurgency. In his 
essay, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict:  A Short Journey to 
Confusion,” Dennis Drew argues that one of the fundamental differences from 
conventional warfare and major weapons brought to bear during an insurgency is 
time. The longer an insurgent can draw out a conflict, the more the counter-
insurgent appears to be out of control. Time is the insurgent’s friend and the 
counter-insurgent’s enemy.  
Continuing a common trend of the past 200 years, today there is a 
significant effort to make war as short and decisive as possible. This concept has 
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shaped the development of technology, strategy and tactics throughout the 
modern Western world.116 Drew goes on to highlight four other fundamental 
differences between conventional war and insurgencies:  a dual military/civilian 
focus; the insurgent’s use of guerilla tactics as the primary means of combat; the 
insurgent lives off the land and the people versus a conventional logistics train; 
the people become the center of gravity for both sides of the conflict.117 All of 
these fundamental differences call into question the efficacy of conventional air 
power strategy when applied to this unconventional/IW operation. Specifically, 
strategic bombing has little effectiveness against an enemy whose supply line 
cannot be interdicted, whose center of gravity cannot be destroyed through 
firepower, and whose strength lays in his ability to continue to resist over time.118 
Very little professional writing of this period addresses the concept of 
unconventional war and the insurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya, and 
Vietnam. However, one document of note is a French analysis of their efforts in 
Vietnam. Included within this document are Vietminh reports describing how 
“their tactics could obviate superior enemy airpower (sic) and the difficulty of 
interdicting an enemy who required few supplies and relied on a very primitive 
and easily repairable logistic transportation system.”119 This was a lesson that the 
Americans were not prepared to apply to their air power strategy.  
Despite the Huk Rebellion, Malayan insurgency, and France’s efforts in 
Vietnam, during the 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States continued to 
pay little attention to IW and air power’s role. The focus for the new service was 
maintaining independence as the newest military service. Strategic bombing, 
deep interdiction, and nuclear weapons were the cornerstone of this effort. The 
Korean War was a conventional distraction and the Air Force, much like the U.S. 
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Army remained focused on the conventionally oriented European Soviet 
threat.120 Even when the Military Assistance Group – Vietnam began in 1955, the 
U.S. Air Force still “had no formal involvement” until 1961.121 Farm Gate formed 
on October 5, 1961, with 155 personnel with 16 aircraft; Douglas RB-26s, 
Douglas SC-47s, and North American T-28s. Operations Mule Train and Ranch 
Hand shortly followed this operation in January 1962. These operations utilized 
Fairchild C-123s for mobility and Agent Orange missions.122 
During this period, the U.S. Air Force finally began to recognize 
insurgency/counterinsurgency and established the 4400th Combat Crew Training 
Squadron (CCTS), otherwise known as Jungle Jim. Followed by the Special Air 
Warfare Center in 1962, this was simply not enough to shift the conventional 
doctrinal focus. The Air Force’s basic doctrine manual simply did not address 
counterinsurgency until 1964 and then only devoted two pages to the subject, a 
further indication of the continued focus on strategic bombing and nuclear 
doctrine.123 
However, there were other ongoing irregular efforts. Claire Chennault’s 
Civil Air Transport (CAT), born out of the Flying Tigers unit during WWII, carried 
on the tradition of airborne mercenaries that started as early as 1912 during the 
Balkan Wars. This tradition was and is a constant in conflicts throughout all time 
since. Mercenaries of various nationalities flew during the Mexican Revolution 
(1913), the Spanish Civil War (1936–1937), Chennault’s Flying Tigers in China 
(1940s), in the Congo (1964), throughout Southeast Asia (1960s-1970s), and 
even present-day within Afghanistan. 
Throughout the 1940s, Chennault’s CAT supported the Chinese 
Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and when his forces fled to Taiwan, CAT 
followed. In an effort to remain in business, Chennault requested outside 
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financial assistance and received it, from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Over the next year this relationship grew and the CIA eventually bought the 
company outright.124 CAT continued to support the Nationalists on behalf of 
Chiang Kai-shek until eyes turned towards Korea. CAT pilots once again proved 
their mettle during over 15,000 combat missions in support of operations there.125 
CAT also supported the French in Indochina before being re-branded as Air 
America. Bird Air and Continental Airlines, operating as Continental Air Services, 
would join Air America flying throughout Laos and Vietnam.126 These operations 
within the context of the Vietnam War solidified the importance of contract air 
when conducting irregular warfare, a contribution we see even in the recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4. 9/11 to the Present 
The strategy and doctrinal concepts that pervade air forces today are 
rooted in the theories developed by Mitchell, Douhet, Trenchard, Arnold, and 
Eaker. However, most of these concepts were established with the threat of total 
war on the horizon. Although some of the concepts may be applied today, most 
fail to recognize the threat of irregular warfare. As Dennis Drew explains, “if 
airpower (sic) dominates ‘conventional’ warfare, then countries [or other non-
state actors] that cannot field superior air forces must employ ‘unconventional’ 
means to gain military success.”127 Arguably, Operation Desert Storm could be 
considered the last truly conventional war and decades prior to that, WWII; 
therefore, it follows that future conflicts are more likely to be unconventional in 
nature as well. Irregular has become the new regular. Since unconventional 
tactics are best conquered with unconventional tactics, air forces should develop 
doctrine and strategy to reflect this. 
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Today’s Air Force doctrine does address irregular warfare in the recently 
relabeled AFDD 3-24, Irregular Warfare. However, this document stands 
unchanged in content from its August 2007 release as AFDD 2-3 and is largely a 
re-hash of concepts addressed Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency and 
predominately discusses the use of conventional assets in an IW setting. This 
failure to adequately address the issue of air power in irregular warfare is 
indicative of the continued focus on air power’s traditional strategic utility. 
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United 
States demonstrated the great flexibility of its conventional air forces. Special 
Forces and CIA teams in Afghanistan were fully supported by air, through aerial 
resupply and highly effective close air support. This was a successful 
demonstration of how a largely conventional, centrally controlled air force could 
effectively support an irregular warfare operation. While a testament to the 
flexibility and skill of modern day airmen, this was largely an example of 
conventional air power using conventional tactics in support of an unconventional 
mission on the ground.  
The success of air power in the initial stages of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) has imbued the Air Force with a false sense of security, much 
like nuclear weapons did at the conclusion of WWII. The one-size-fits-all 
approach to air power is a very tempting proposal for the organization for air 
forces. The draw of this mentality is even more pronounced in a time of fiscal 
austerity which often occurs in a post war drawdown. The missions in 
Afghanistan and later Iraq quickly conventionalized as more and more forces 
were deployed into the respective theaters of operations. While the Air Force 
once again performed well, it was for the most part, not engaged in irregular 
warfare. One repercussion of the largely conventional air force in-theater was the 
expansion of contract air forces. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
contract air business exploded. Companies such as DynCorp International, 
Avenge Inc, Flightworks Inc, and Presidential Airways have all reaped the benefit 
of the increased requirements for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
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(ISR) as well as combat airland and airdrop platforms that the air force cannot 
meet with its current assets. 
The full impact of post 9/11 conflicts on air power doctrine, strategy, 
organization and technology remains to be seen. Just like the developments and 
advances of WWI and the Interwar years were not fully realized until WWII, the 
lessons learned in recent conflicts may not fully materialize until the next conflict. 
The goal of the ensuing chapters will be the analysis of those lessons in historical 
context.  
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III. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE – FROM THE 
DAWN OF FLIGHT THROUGH THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
Since the dawn of aviation at the beginning of the 20th century, airmen 
have been seeking innovative ways to employ air power in the pursuit of military 
superiority on the battlefield. However, even before then, air warfare in the form 
of balloons and airships was a discussion item during conferences in The Hague 
as early as 1899.128 H.G. Wells was also prophetic in his 1908 novel, The War in 
the Air, where he wrote about various flying machines competing in aerial combat 
for control of the skies. As pioneers of heavier-than-air flight, the Wright brothers 
first produced an aircraft for the military in 1908. This technological advancement 
would revolutionize how war, both large and small, would be fought in the years 
to come. As military commanders struggled to learn how to best utilize these 
technological marvels, airmen found themselves scattered across the globe 
participating in irregular conflicts and developing tactics, techniques, and 
procedures literally on the fly. This early use of air power saw airmen as pioneers 
during insurgencies, mercenaries, and even as air advisors during the Interwar 
Years.  
A. THE DAWN OF FLIGHT 
The Air Service, United States Army was established in 1907, as a section 
within the Signal Corps. The first sale of a military aircraft, the Wright Military 
Flyer, followed in 1909.129 However, at this time only three Army officers were 
selected to train on the aircraft. Two of them were re-assigned back to their 
original branches shortly after a training accident left the aircraft badly damaged 
and requiring extensive repairs. This left Lt Benjamin Foulois as the only 
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assigned aviator in the Army and he was not even qualified to fly the aircraft.130 
As the only pilot in the U.S. Army, and teaching himself to fly the Army’s only 
aircraft, Foulois could certainly count his assignment as being outside that of the 
conventional army of that time. 
With the aircraft unable to carry much more than its pilot and observer, 
conventional wisdom was that the aircraft would be of little use beyond that as a 
reconnaissance and communication platform.131 Nevertheless, once this 
performance limitation was overcome through more robust airframe designs and 
more powerful engines, aviators began experimenting with carrying weapons in 
the form of bombs and machine guns. This period also witnessed the birth of 
naval aviation. The first ship-borne takeoff occurred off of the USS Birmingham in 
November 1910 and the first landing on the USS Pennsylvania followed in 
January 1911.132 However, despite these innovations within the U.S. services, it 
was the Italians who were the first to employ the aircraft in combat during their 
campaign in North Africa. 
On October 23, 1911, the first recorded combat flight was a 
reconnaissance mission in Libya, then still as a nominal part of the Ottoman 
Empire, but about to be conquered by Italy.133 The Italians initially deployed nine 
aircraft in support of their invasion of Libya. While in Libya, Italian aircrews 
quickly began to rack up a number of first time events from the aerial dimension. 
Captain Carlo Piazza and his five pilots immediately recognized the force 
multiplying advantage of the aircraft over what by that time was the conventional 
use of balloons for observation. Captain Piazza’s crews in a single flight were 
able to cover hundreds of square miles more than a balloon tethered in just one 
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place.134 During these reconnaissance flights, the Italian aircraft were also the 
first to be damaged in combat. Captain Riccardo Moizo sustained three hits to his 
aircraft’s wing while observing a 6000-man enemy encampment.135 
The Italians continued to lead the world in combat innovations throughout 
the following year of operations throughout North Africa. Second Lieutenant 
Giulio Gavotti was the first to drop bombs from an aircraft in combat when he 
dropped four grapefruit sized bombs on two enemy positions, one in Ain Zara 
and the other three in the Oasis of Jagiura. Reports of Gavotti’s accomplishment 
spread rapidly and influenced other airmen around the globe as they struggled to 
explore the possible roles and contributions of air power to the battlefield.136 
While the U.S. continued to have difficulty with its military aviation program, the 
Italians laid claim to several additional aviation firsts in combat, including leaflet 
drops for propaganda, artillery spotting, night-bombing and reconnaissance, as 
well as radio communications. The first pilots to be wounded and killed in an 
aircraft as well as the first pilot to be shot down and taken prisoner were all 
Italian.137 These men were all pioneers, and within their historical context were 
just as unconventional as the tactics, techniques and procedures they were 
developing.  
1. Mercenaries of the Air 
Even though, by today’s standards, the Italian use of air power in Libya 
would be considered purely conventional in support of a conventional state-on-
state conflict, it was still unconventional for the time and they were successfully 
leading the world in innovation. Not every nation was as successful. The United 
States Army first fielded a Wright “Type B” aircraft along the Texas-Mexico 
border in 1911 within General William Carter’s maneuver division. The fledgling 
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aviators experienced two landing accidents, one resulting in the death of a 
student pilot. The accident evoked an emotional response in General Carter and 
he immediately discontinued flight operations and ordered the aircraft redeployed 
from the front. The United States Army’s first foray into the air ended in failure,138 
and the U.S. was notably behind its European competitors.139 However, this is 
not to say that there was no innovation occurring within the Western Hemisphere. 
One needs only to look towards the Mexican Revolution from 1910–1920 for 
several examples of air power being used during IW in the form of an ongoing 
insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
In 1911, the Mexican government, led by President Porfirio Diaz was 
overthrown and replaced by Francisco Madero. Madero was then overthrown 
and replaced by Victoriano Huerta. The rebels Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata 
along with General Venustiano Carranza opposed Huerta himself. The resultant 
tumultuous climate in Mexico attracted many adventure seeking pilots to work for 
both the federales and the rebels in the burgeoning insurgency.140 John Hector 
Worden was among these airmen, although he came to work for the Mexican 
government in a rather indirect manner. 
Worden was a civilian pilot, as most pilots were at the time in the U.S., 
and was sent to Mexico City as a salesman for the Moisant Company. During his 
time in Mexico City, the Mexicans convinced Worden to conduct several 
patrols/scouting missions as part of his demonstration. He stayed on as an 
honorary captain in the Mexican Federal Army, becoming one of the first aviators 
to have any experience in counterinsurgency from the air.141 One of the tactics 
that he developed was to perform reconnaissance flights in support of train 
movements across the rugged Mexican countryside. By flying and observing the 
railroad tracks ahead of a government train, the train was able to reverse course 
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and evade an ambush laid by the insurgents. The government was then able to 
dispatch troops to disperse the rebels and protect the area in question.142  
Of course, the federales were not alone in realizing the potential role of air 
power. The rebels employed their own mercenaries as well, to include men such 
as Dean Ivan Lamb and Didier Masson.143,144 Lamb became famous when he 
exchanged pistol shots with Phil Rader during which is largely considered the 
first aerial dogfight. The two men jousted in the sky each attempting to gain the 
superior firing position from which he could inflict damage dealt from the barrel of 
his revolver. Rader scored the only hit in the contest. Both men continued to fire 
until they were out of ammunition and eventually banked away from each other to 
return to their respective bases.145  
For his part, Masson made a valiant attempt at aerial bombing with a 
Martin biplane specially modified with an adjustable bombsight and bomb rack. 
However, during five separate bombing runs, Masson and his bombardier failed 
to hit any of their target gunboats. During his final attempt his engine failed over 
enemy waters and he skillfully glided back across the Guaymas Bay to land in 
friendly territory.146 Although he was unsuccessful before his aircraft was 
damaged beyond repair, Masson still paved the way for future air power 
innovations around the world.  
Around the same time as the Mexican Revolution, but on the other side of 
the Atlantic, aircraft saw service in the First Balkan War as well.147 In this case, 
for the first time in history, all of the conflict participants fielded aircraft, including 
Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria who were battling to expel the occupying Turks 
from the Balkans. However, much like the Mexicans, the Bulgarians were forced 
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to hire mercenaries as well. In this case, French and Russian pilots were used to 
crew aircraft obtained through French channels.148 Much like the Italians’ use of 
air power in Libya, air power in the Balkans was quite conventional by today’s 
definition, but there were still unconventional innovations with respect to aerial 
bombing. A Russian pilot known as N. de Sakoff was among the mercenaries 
hired by the Bulgarians to conduct reconnaissance and bombing missions on 
their behalf.149 
Sakoff’s most daring and notorious mission was a bombing raid on the 
Turkish-occupied Fort Bezhani. During the course of this raid, with no wingman 
or bombardier to support him, Sakoff made three passes at altitudes below 500 
feet, exposed to the gunfire of the fort’s defenders. After releasing six bombs, 
successfully wreaking havoc on the fort below, he was forced to land when his 
fuel tank had been shot and drained dry. Fortunately, the local Greeks were 
amicable and assisted in the repair and refueling of the aircraft, enabling Sakoff 
to make a quick departure for his home base. Sakoff’s post-mission reports of the 
bombing and status of the forces at the fort motivated the Greeks to attack 
victoriously, expelling the Turks from the region.150 
Shortly after the dawn of aviation, nations were struggling to learn how to 
best integrate air forces into their overall war strategies. As a result, many 
nations were forced to employ mercenaries to make up for the shortfall in the 
capabilities of their own forces. One lesson to be learned here is that in order to 
be successfully employed, air power must be capable of flexing to the demands 
of the current conflict. The flexibility of air power is in fact one of the primary 
tenets of today’s U.S. Air Force. Today, however, this flexibility is taken to 
represent the ability to use multi-role aircraft to execute multiple missions. The 
ability to execute some missions is partially compromised in order to sustain the 
ability to conduct others. The modern interpretation of flexibility is based on 
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technology rather than tactics. As will be discussed later in this thesis, this often 
means a less than ideal match between mission set and aircraft. Particularly, 
expensive to operate 4th generation fighters are often used to execute missions 
which could be accomplished by simpler and less expensive (in procurement, 
training, and operations) airframes. 
2. The Pancho Villa Expedition 
During the early morning hours of March 9th, 1916, in an expression of his 
anger over U.S. involvement in the Mexican Revolution, Francisco “Pancho” Villa 
led a group of more than 400 rebels to attack the New Mexico border town of 
Columbus killing many U.S. citizens.151  Even though taken by surprise, the 
soldiers at the Army Camp Furlong managed to kill 70–100 of Villa’s men.152 
Afterwards, President Woodrow Wilson chose General John Pershing to lead the 
expedition to bring Villa and his rebels to justice. To support Pershing, the 1st 
Aero Squadron from the U.S. Army Air Service was dispatched from Fort Sam 
Houston, Texas thereby marking the first time an American armed service 
employed air power in a small-war setting.153 The squadron came from Fort Sam 
Houston, Texas with ten officers and eighty enlisted men to operate eight Curtiss 
JN-3 “Jenny” aircraft.154 The aircraft became the eyes for General Pershing and 
his army, and were directed by the secretary of war to be used purely for 
observation.155 In the time span of just five months from March to August 1916, 
the “1st Aero Squadron flew 540 sorties, covered over nineteen thousand miles, 
and logged over 340 hours in support of Pershing’s troops on the ground.”156 
Maintenance for the Jennys was poor and when combined with the extreme 
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weather and flying conditions, took its toll on the aircraft. Towards the end of the 
conflict, there were only two barely serviceable aircraft remaining. These two 
aircraft were in such disrepair, they were destroyed when replaced with arrival of 
eight new Curtiss R-2S aircraft.157 
While the observation mission would soon become a very conventional 
use of air power, the 1st Aero Squadron cut their teeth on the expedition to find 
Pancho Villa. Many aviators would later use this same experience to develop 
tactics used in WWI. This was likely General Pershing’s first experience with air 
power. Carl A. Spaatz who would later serve as the first chief of staff of the U.S. 
Air Force served with the squadron during the expedition. This experience 
showed airman the advantages of direct relationships supporting ground 
commanders and the extreme importance of good aircraft and dependable 
maintenance. 
B. WORLD WAR I 
During the course of the First World War, air power began to be largely 
accepted and even conventionalized into the larger force. This theme will repeat 
throughout this thesis, irregular forces often carry out missions that are outside 
the conventional realm. These missions are later conventionalized and adopted 
by regular forces. The irregular warfare concept is very contextual, or dependent 
on the current circumstances. Despite this, there were still several instances of 
air power being utilized in a special or unconventional manner. One such use of 
air power involved airdropping baskets of pigeons into German controlled 
territories, which “encouraged daring civilians to fill in military questionnaires and 
return them attached to the bird’s leg. The average rate of return was 40%, of 
which half had useful military information.”158 Reconnaissance aircraft and their 
pilots were often the method of choice to insert agents in enemy territory. 
Although the landing zones were surveyed by daylight, these special operations 
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were certainly risky since they were conducted at night and often involved 
landing to either drop off or pick up an agent behind enemy lines.159  This was 
quite an endeavor in an age pre-dating night vision goggles let alone the most 
basic flight instrumentation or even aircraft lighting. In an effort to reduce the risk 
of capture for the aircrew, agents were often dropped via parachute rather than 
off-loaded at a landing zone. To facilitate this insertion technique, and counter 
the hesitant agent, aircraft were modified with both floors and seats that could be 
released by the pilot in flight.160 
1. Insurgencies 
Aircraft were also used during the Arab Revolt in support of the Arab insurgency 
against the Turks. The British combined armored cars and aircraft used as 
observation platforms providing a historical version of ISR to “isolate the Turkish 
headquarters and cause the disintegration of the Turkish front.”161 Much of this 
campaign is contributed to none other than T.E. Lawrence. 
T. E. Lawrence is perhaps one of the most famous insurgents of WWI. 
Lawrence understood the limitations of technology and used it to execute a 
devastating guerrilla campaign against the Turks.162 During this campaign 
Lawrence pioneered the use of the armored car relying on support from aircraft 
to strike and harass the Turks along their lines of logistics and supply. Using 
these tactics, Lawrence effectively conquered the region from the Arabian 
Peninsula all the way to Damascus.163,164  
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Once again, air power was also a component of the conflict in the Balkans 
during the Second Balkan War. In the beginning, the Great Powers involved 
provided their own air forces while the Balkan combatants struggled to raise 
forces of their own. One case in point is the Turks who requested and received 
assistance from the Germans. In a brilliant deception operation, the Germans 
sent over volunteer pilots along with aircraft disassembled and shipped as “Red 
Cross supplies and ‘circus equipment’. Bombs for the German units went through 
as medical supplies.”165 As allies of the Turks, the Germans, represented by 
Captain Erich Serno laid the foundation for the Ottoman Air Force in their image. 
The Turks were largely supported by German flyers while they constituted their 
ranks with native pilots and as a result they dressed and organized in German 
fashion. “By the end of the war the Ottoman Air Force was a modest but viable 
service, and perhaps the best developed in the Balkans.”166  
2. Dirigibles 
The existence of lighter-than-air balloons pre-dates the first powered flight 
by over a century, as they can be traced back to flight in the late 1700’s.167  The 
use of balloons was mostly limited to different forms of observation where their 
lack of mobility significantly limited their utility. These balloons were initially 
tethered but when they were later released, their maneuverability was highly 
dependent on atmospheric conditions such as the wind. Dirigibles changed this. 
The term dirigible indicates that the balloon was capable of being directed.168 At 
the same time powered aircraft were seeing great leaps in technology and 
capability, airships saw similar advances. Most were placed in either ‘rigid’ or 
‘non-rigid’ categories referring to the existence of a metal or wood framework to 
maintain its shape as opposed to a non-rigid, inflated, balloon-like structure. Most 
of the early advances in dirigibles were pioneered by the Germans, particularly 
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Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin and his Zeppelin Airship Company, although at 
the outset of WWI Germany had very few airships.   
When Germany invaded Belgium [in August of 1914] she owned 
three commercial airships and six primitive military dirigibles. By the 
end of the war she had built eighty-eight Zeppelins, each larger and 
more efficient than the last. As the Allies kept improving their 
antiaircraft weapons and planes, the Germans were forced to make 
bigger and faster airships. Their last one 750 feet long, with a 
capacity of almost 70,000 cubic meters, was capable of flying as 
high as five miles.169  
The Germans used their airships to drop bombs over England with the first 
successful bombings coming around Christmas 1914. The Germans launched 
nearly as many airship bombing raids over Britain as they did winged aircraft 
bombing raids. While the aircraft raids were much more effective in overall 
damage, the psychological effect of the Zeppelin raids was noteworthy. “It cannot 
be denied that the moral effect of these silent attacks from zeppelins drifting with 
engines stopped over the heart of a great city was very considerable.”170  
The Allies were decidedly slow to develop a dirigible capability. Where the 
Germans focused on the rigid bodied Zeppelins, the Allies used mostly non-rigid 
airships. In the U.S., the Army Air Service was focused on powered aircraft and 
paid little attention to dirigibles. In fact it was the U.S. Navy that first fielded an 
airship which it bought in June of 1915.171 While airships quickly became a much 
conventionalized capability, the U.S. Navy used them with great success for both 
convoy escort and German submarine detection. By the end of 1918, it was 
common practice for a U.S. Navy dirigible to stay airborne for up to 2 ½ days, 
casting little doubt on the claim that “no ship or convoy escorted by an airship 
was ever attacked by a submarine.”172 
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Amid the rapid conventionalization of dirigible use, there were still several 
truly irregular uses of this air power capability. Faced with the problem of 
bombing Britain from Zeppelins through a dense layer of clouds, the Germans 
developed what became known as a “spy car.”173  
[They] first experimented with a butter tub. The tub was hooked 
onto a steel cable 1000 feet long and lowered by a hand windlass 
from the bombing compartment. Before long, Zeppelins could fly 
high above dense clouds and yet bomb with deadly aim: a little 
observation basket, connected to the control car by telephone, 
would be swinging in clear skies a mile below the airship.174     
Perhaps the greatest irregular usage of dirigibles during the First World War was 
again at the hands of the German Zeppelins. The German commander in East 
Africa, von Lettow-Vorbeck, “was holding out successfully against strong attack 
from British forces but he was running short of supplies and there was no certain 
sea route by which he could obtain relief.”175 The German High Command 
determined that the only feasible way to resupply the German forces in East 
Africa was via airship. Zeppelin L-59, at 750 feet long with a diameter of 80 feet 
would make the trip from Bulgaria (a German Ally country) to East Africa where it 
would resupply troops and then be cannibalized for its materials. The Zeppelin 
carried “fifty tons of equipment including 311,900 boxes of ammunition, 230 
machine-gun belts, thirty machine guns, sixty-one bags of medical supplies, two 
sewing machines, and a case of cognac.”176 After travelling nearly 2800 miles 
from their departure point and just 200 miles from their destination, the crew of L-
59 received a message directing them to return the base in Bulgaria. British 
Intelligence had created a false report indicating that von Lettow-Vorbeck had 
surrendered. The report was so convincing that Berlin accepted it and relayed 
instructions to the Zeppelin.177 The crew rapidly dumped 11,000 pounds of cargo 
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and ballast, including the cognac, and returned to Bulgaria via the Mediterranean 
while dodging British ships and searchlights that were warned of their transit.178 
By the time L-59 landed, it had nearly completed a resupply mission for the 
history books. The German Zeppelin had been airborne for ninety-five continuous 
hours and covered 4225 miles non-stop.179    
One of the major lessons learned from the Great War was the importance 
and difficulty in “matching men and weapons and doctrine, [a point which is] 
always a prime problem in innovation.”180 This lesson is one many air forces 
continue to learn today. Nations are often compelled to go to war with the forces 
fielded in an attempt to predict the nature of future conflicts. Unfortunately, as a 
result, rather than using a tack hammer for a delicate job, e.g. IW, nations 
attempt to tackle the task delicately with a sledgehammer, tool designed for a 
wider application of force, e.g., conventional warfare. Although this can certainly 
be done, the results are generally not as polished if the right tool was used for 
the right job. 
C. INTERWAR YEARS 
1. Colonial Air Control 
One of the greatest theories that emerged from WWI was “the belief that 
offensive airpower through the form of bomber aircraft would dominate future 
wars, to the extent that it alone could decide the outcome.”181 The re-focus of 
warfare against “the heart of the enemy homeland and population” was contrary 
to the prevailing doctrine at the time and would challenge the dominance of 
armies’ and navies’ “Clausewitzian wisdom” for some time.182 This was the 
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setting for early air power theorists such as Trenchard, Douhet, and Mitchell as 
they extolled the ideals of the independent air force.   
Following the conclusion of WWI, air power continued in the limelight as 
the colonial powers sought to maintain control over their widespread realms. 
During this period the British successfully defeated an insurgency in Somaliland 
led by the Mad Mullah, Sayyid Muhammed. In this case, aircraft supported 
reconnaissance and bombing missions and enabled the ground forces to expel 
the Mullah and defeat the rebels at the cost of a mere £77,000.183 Seeking to 
extend the utility and legitimacy of an independent air force, Trenchard put his 
theory of substitution, or air control, to the test. The heart of the concept was to 
replace land and/or naval forces with air power that could achieve the same 
goals “effectively at far less cost in terms of casualties and cash.”184  
Errant communities were given a warning, sometimes by notes 
dropped from the air. If they remained refractory, bombing attacks 
would be conducted, usually against a high-value target like crops 
or herds of animals, often at prewarned times. Attacks could be 
sustained if necessary, in effect ‘blockading” a village.185 
Building upon this success and the amazingly low cost, the British applied this 
new theory throughout their empire to settle what had become expensive 
rebellions in Iraq, Transjordan, and India.186 Notably, air control was not always a 
great success. When terrain and demographics allowed, as in Iraq, the theory 
could be applied judiciously. However, “when rugged terrain and/or nomadic 
peoples made targets difficult to find and attack,” success was more elusive.187 
One notable example of this was T.E. Lawrence’s unsuccessful attempt to 
replicate his efforts in Arabia among the Pashtuns in the mountains of Waziristan 
in the 1920s. 
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In addition to the British experience, the French employed colonial air 
control as a component of their campaign in Morocco. French air squadrons used 
airdrop tactics to resupply isolated small garrisons throughout the inhospitable 
terrain of the Rif region.188 The French also pioneered the use of former bombers 
specially modified to serve as aerial medevac platforms. Using these aircraft to 
gain access to landing zones near the front lines, they were able to get their sick 
and wounded to hospitals in under an hour.189 However, despite these 
successes, air power was not sufficient to end the war on its own. In Morocco, as 
in Syria against the Druze rebels, the French were only “able to conclude the war 
by massive use of conventional forces and firepower.”190 
2. Air Advisors 
Finally, in the years leading up to the Second World War, China became 
entangled in a violent struggle against the Japanese. As a state on state conflict, 
the Sino-Japanese War would most certainly be considered conventional. 
However, just like in previous conflicts, there were irregular and special 
components; in this case they were characterized by the rise of the air advisor. 
During the years leading up to the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese had 
enlisted several former U.S. Army Air Corps pilots as well as advisors from Italy 
to train the struggling Chinese Air Force (CAF). In 1937, Chiang Kai-shek’s wife 
recruited Claire Chennault to inspect the CAF and report on their readiness.191 
Chennault had not even finished his report before the Japanese attacked and 
quickly achieved air superiority over the ill-prepared Chinese.192 In response, 
Chennault recruited aviators from around the world to form the 14th Volunteer 
Bombardment Squadron and set about training his men in contemporary 
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tactics.193 Within a year of full-scale conflict, the Russians joined the fight by 
providing both aircraft and air advisors as well.194 Eventually, Chennault was able 
to garner further support from the United States in the form of the American 
Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the Flying Tigers.195 Despite the 
courageous efforts of this volunteer force, the Japanese would continue to 
dominate the skies over China. The AVG would fight valiantly on behalf of the 
Chinese until the band of mercenary pilots was disbanded on July 4, 1942.196 
D. CONCLUSION 
Air power was anything but conventional during its introduction to the 
battlefield from the first military aircraft in 1908 to the start of WWII in 1939. 
Through intrepid experimentation and trials by fire on the battlefield, airmen 
developed and revolutionized the tactics, techniques, and procedures for 
employing air power. As armies, and insurgents, discovered their utility, aircraft 
played a significant role in several irregular and small wars around the world. 
This early use of air power saw airmen as pioneers during insurgencies, 
mercenaries of the air, and even as advisors to foreign air forces during the 
Interwar Years. The British and other colonial powers would utilize the strategy of 
air control until the collapse of their empires. Even as the use of aircraft became 
accepted and somewhat conventionalized during the course of WWI, airmen 
continued to fly on the cutting edge, conducting the first special operations night 
infiltration and exfiltration behind enemy lines. The technological advancement of 
the aircraft and the airmen exploring their employment in irregular warfare would 
revolutionize how war, both large and small, would be fought for years to come. 
When viewed from the perspective of the current era, many of the roles 
and missions of air power from this time period would be considered regular. But 
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viewed in the context from which they occurred they are decidedly irregular. As a 
result, air power’s character is extremely contextual, that is relative to the time 
period during which it occurs. While it was common for irregular capabilities to 
become conventionalized, there were still cases where the basic air power 
capability was used in a manner that was truly innovative for its time. 
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IV. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: WORLD WAR II 
THROUGH THE KOREAN WAR 
A. WORLD WAR II 
By the beginning of WWII, much had changed since the advent of 
powered flight and its first large-scale use in WWI. Change was nearly constant 
as WWII progressed. Still in its infancy, air power was in a state of continuous 
adaptation. Many would argue that it was not until WWII that air power began to 
achieve its full potential. While the regular use of air power was extensive, during 
this time the irregular use of air power formed an adequate complement to its 
more publicized counterpart. While the irregular use of air power came in many 
different forms, much of it was designed to enter into a territory by force. The 
current Joint Publication (JP) 3–18 defines forcible entry as “a joint military 
operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of 
an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable the 
conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation.”197 The JP 
describes the three types of forcible entry operations:  amphibious assault 
operations, airborne assault operations, and air-assault operations. Much of this 
chapter will deal with the latter two.  
Airborne forces parachute into the objective area to attack and 
eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives. 
Airborne forces may also be employed from a lodgment in 
additional joint combat operations appropriate to their training and 
equipment . . . air assault forces execute forcible entries using 
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from 
land-based facilities and naval platforms. These forces can rapidly 
project combat power throughout the depth of an operational 
area.198  
The common ground between the two is often the end goal, “a forcible 
entry may be designed as a coup de main that will achieve decisive results. 
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Often conducted by small forces conducting short duration, limited objective 
attacks against opponents with modest but still lethal capabilities, these 
operations are seldom studied in detail but may be the most likely type of forcible 
entry in the near future.”199  
1. Airborne 
Modern air forces owe many things to the air power proponents that cut 
their teeth on the capability prior to WWII. Few credit air power pioneers like Billy 
Mitchell and Giulio Douhet with the development of airborne operations, a 
capability traditionally dominated by land forces. But it was Billy Mitchell who in 
1918 conjured up an idea to break the deadlock of trench warfare in WWI. As 
commander of the First Army Air Service in France, Mitchell recommended flying 
“over the obstacle and [landing] a force behind it, using aeroplanes to carry the 
force and parachutes, a significant idea, to land them in action. This suggestion 
was the first real milestone in airborne history, for it was the first time that a 
suggestion for the use of the parachute as a means of military movement was 
made.”200  The assault plan, that likely would have included a force of nearly 
15,000 men, was vetoed by General Pershing, Commanding General of the 
American Expeditionary Force shortly before the peace of the Armistice ruled it 
out.201,202 At the time, Mitchell unsuccessfully pitched a different proposition to 
Pershing. While his request was tactical in nature, it was ahead of its time, as the 
Germans would later accomplish it with great success. Mitchell proposed in the 
spring of 1919 that Pershing “should assign one of the infantry divisions 
permanently to the Air Service” where they would be equipped with parachutes 
and be dropped behind German lines.203 Similar to Mitchell and his theories for 
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airborne operations, Giulio Douhet had significant influence on Italian airborne 
operations. Following Douhet’s lead, in 1927 “Italy became the first country to try 
practical military parachuting using an improved form of escape parachute 
supplied to balloon observers and aircrew.”204 While the most significant 
development of airborne capabilities in the 1920’s and 1930’s was by the 
Russians, it was the Germans who fully embraced the concept and by 1936 had 
already established a parachute school to develop equipment and training 
methods.205  
In June 1938 Adolf Hitler, Führer of Nazi Germany directed General Kurt 
Student to establish a new airborne division as a part of the Luftwaffe (Air Force). 
Hitler’s, plans for these irregular forces were evident when he elected to place 
the division under the Luftwaffe. General Student, who was born in 1890, was a 
decorated WWI fighter pilot before becoming an officer in the German infantry. 
His very diverse background came full circle when he returned to the German Air 
Force to “take over the task of organizing and training the airborne troops.”206  
General Student’s multi-service background made him ideal to command the 
airborne forces. While placing airborne forces under the control of the Luftwaffe 
might seem backwards to most military force structures, the cohesiveness of this 
force structure later proved critical to the success of several German airborne 
(and glider-borne) operations. Placing airborne forces under the control of the 
Luftwaffe “ensured the minimum of friction between the providers of the transport 
fleet and the men who would use them.”207 The German airborne forces included 
the Fliegerdivision (paratroopers), Sturmregiment (glider borne assault), and 
Luftlandedivision (infantry) which was from the Army. While many operations 
included both paratroopers and glider borne forces, they will be addressed below 
according to which force was the main effort for each specific action. 
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General Student and the Luftwaffe held a very different view of this truly 
irregular version of air power when compared to their army counterparts. Student 
viewed airborne forces as an extension of the bomber.208     
They had foreseen the time when there might be targets that had to 
be bombed, but which were too heavily defended for the bombers 
to get through to them. In these cases the Luftwaffe proposed to 
parachute in demolition parties some miles from the target, which 
they would then approach carefully and sabotage using equipment 
and explosives carried on them. They would then withdraw to open 
country and either prepare a landing strip, or select a piece of road 
for use as a landing strip, and be picked up by aeroplanes.209 
In Early 1940, Hitler was determined to invade Scandinavia, to preempt 
the British whom he thought were about to send forces there. This region was 
critical to both Germany and the Allies for its significant supply of iron ore. The 
successful simultaneous invasion of both Denmark and Norway relied heavily on 
surprise, resulting in a comprehensive plan where “for the first time in war 
parachute troops and air-landed troops were to be used together, the 
parachutists to seize the airfields, and the air landed units to consolidate and 
spread out from these bases.”210  Innovative at the time, airfield seizures are a 
standard ranger tactic today. A single battalion was allocated for the operation. In 
Norway, forces were to capture the airfields at both Oslo and Stavanger that 
would permit reinforcements both from the sea and air. In Denmark, forces were 
to capture two airfields located close together along with a vulnerable road bridge 
to assist invading forces. To achieve surprise, all the targets in both countries 
were to be attacked simultaneously. For the operation, the Luftwaffe allocated 
550 twin engine Ju-52s and many four engine Ju-90s.211 
The two Danish airfields were taken with ease by the 30-man platoon and 
within two hours the Luftwaffe was operating at the forward base. The 60 
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paratroopers tasked with capturing the bridge accomplished their mission in just 
10 minutes. The commander “used surprise as his only real weapon, relying on 
the early morning torpor and slow reactions of the Danish conscripts for his 
success.”212  In Norway, the objectives were not taken with such ease. The 
paratroopers landing on the first airfield near Stravanger were faced with poor 
weather and moderate resistance. After initially being scattered on the ground 
they secured the airfield long enough to be reinforced by the air-landed troops 
and had the surrounding area secured within two hours.213  The airfield near Oslo 
posed a greater challenge.   
Weather was poor and air defenses were heavy surrounding the Oslo 
airfield. The German airborne forces were delayed and met heavy resistance 
from the full mobilization ordered by the King. Messerschmitts provided strafing 
prior to the arrival of the Junkers with their air-landed forces. Then, in a true 
irregular use of air power, after running out of fuel, the flight commander of the 
Messerschmitts made “a typically brave and daring move. He landed his force 
and used them as machine gun support for the shattered Junkers to come in.”214  
The air-landed forces successfully forced the Norwegians to pull back from the 
airfield. The follow-on forces that arrived by air and sea in the days that followed 
ensured German control over both countries. The Norwegian campaign 
announced to the world that airborne operations were a real threat. Airborne 
troops struck a “decisive blow” and were immediately supported by “the swift 
arrival of reinforcements” via air-land.215 “For the first time in history no part of a 
defender’s country was safe from attack.”216 
When Hitler decided that it was time to take Holland, once again Student 
was chosen to lead the operation and “was given virtually a free hand in deciding 
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the uses of his airborne troops.”217 Although Student devised the plan for the 
Dutch campaign well before Hitler elected to take Norway and Denmark, he still 
elected not to alter the plan. The assigned mission was “seize the capital, 
neutralize the Government and take the Queen prisoner.”218 The strategy for the 
campaign was solid, but it was not executed as planned. The plan called for 
paratroopers to seize The Hague by landing directly on top of it. Other units 
would take key bridges and airfields in order to facilitate the advancement of 
ground and air-landed forces. One of these operations was the assault on Eben 
Emael which will be addressed in the next section on gliders. However, the Dutch 
knew what to expect after the Germans executed the Norwegian campaign so 
successfully. 
Instead of sending their reserves well forward, [the Dutch] held 
them back around the airfields, realizing that the airborne attack 
depended for its success on landing infantry in aircraft which had to 
make repeat trips. Had there been no advance warning it is 
possible that Student’s plan would have worked, but with the 
example of Norway to study, it was in jeopardy from the start.219 
The airborne troops were rounded up and chased away from the airfield, 
and when the air-landed units arrived they were shot up in the air and on the 
ground. Although the assault was thwarted in several locations, there was still 
some success. In Rotterdam, three parachute battalions, supported by 120 men 
landed on the river using 12 seaplanes, took a bridge critical in supporting 
German land based troops.220 In spite of the well-designed resistance, Holland 
would eventually capitulate after the German bombing of its cities. The Queen 
and her family, however, were able to escape to England and later Canada for 
safety. 
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The discussion about German airborne operations in WWII would not be 
complete without looking at Operation Mercury, the German effort to capture 
Crete. The airborne invasion of the Italian Island was the culmination of Hitler’s 
Balkan campaign to secure his southern flank while helping his ally Mussolini at 
the same time. The invasion was also another shining example of the use of 
General Kurt Student and his airborne forces. However, Crete was also a shining 
example of the temptation to regularize irregular forces by to placing them into 
conventional campaign situations.221 If any, this operation was the turning point 
where airborne operations became conventional. The German attacking force 
included 22,000 men, about half of which parachuted to the island in two waves 
using 500 Ju52 Junker aircraft.222 The other half was air-landed nearly eight 
hours after the initial wave. German casualties in Crete were much higher than 
expected. The German force was so large they were not able to rehearse the 
operation and most units were given less than three weeks to prepare. The force 
defending the island was considerable, “the Allied commander in Crete, had a 
force of some 42,000 men—British, Greeks, Australians, and New Zealanders—
for the most part in the fortified hill positions adjoining the airfields.”223 
Additionally, “German intelligence also made another serious error. They 
convinced themselves that the Cretans would be friendly, though they had no 
reason to think so, and indeed the Cretans were anything but. Almost 10,000 of 
them turned out carrying rifles to join the mainland Greek irregular units in 
defence [sic] of their homes.”224 While the Germans were ultimately successful in 
Crete, the cost was significant.  
There was no doubt that they had won, but the price had been 
frightening. Accustomed to quick, cheap victories from the airborne 
arm, the losses in Crete caused deep thought . . . Out of an 
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attacking force of 22,000 men about 5,000, one in four were dead . 
. . all the gliders and 170 Junkers transports were wrecked 
completely. About 50 other transports flew back to base but were 
too damaged to continue.225 
While extensive German successes with airborne operations accumulated, the 
Allied countries took notice. “Crete marked the beginning of British airborne 
thinking, it also marked the virtual end of the German . . . they were only ever to 
undertake minor airborne operations in the future.”226 By the time the 509th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army was used unsuccessfully in 
Operation Torch during the invasion of French North Africa in November 1942, 
airborne operations had grown significantly in both size and scope. The result is 
the non-customary, unconventional, ways and means became customary and 
conventional. An irregular capability is never static.     
2. Gliders 
“Take Fort Eben Emael,” was the order that the Führer gave to General 
Student.227 When Hitler approached Student about attacking Eben Emael, as an 
accomplished glider pilot himself, Student had been working on his “concept of 
three-dimensional warfare in which airborne troops could be inserted behind 
enemy lines and, using surprise and speed, could attack the enemy where he 
was least prepared.”228  Student’s concept was so well received by the Führer, 
that Hitler viewed the idea as his “new secret weapon.”229 Hitler became 
extremely fond of glider-borne operations. While critics might label this fondness 
as irrational or even contrarian in nature, there was a simple yet strategic 
necessity behind the German use of the gliders in WWII. Simply put, at the 
beginning of WWII, Germany had a very skilled cadre of glider pilots thanks to 
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the restrictions put in place by the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of WWI. 
In addition, the Nazi leadership was for the most part extremely knowledgeable 
about the advantages of glider borne operations.   
On June 28th, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles formally marked the 
conclusion of WWI. The treaty strictly limited the German capacity to prepare for 
or wage war. Particularly hampering to the German Luftwaffe were the 
restrictions which dismantled all military or naval air forces to include handing 
over all “complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being 
manufactured, repaired or assembled…dirigibles able to take the air, being 
manufactured, repaired or assembled…engines for aircraft…nacelles and 
fuselages…instruments for use on aircraft.”230  In summary, “military aviation was 
completely eradicated in Germany after World War I.” 231 However, since the 
Germans “retained political sovereignty in the air space over its homeland” they 
were able to circumvent these restrictions through a deliberate focus on civil 
aviation.232   
As an unintended consequence of the severe restrictions levied on 
German air forces by the Treaty of Versailles, German military pilots now 
sequestered in the civilian sector, became superbly talented in the operation of 
gliders. These gliders took advantage of a loophole in the treaty. Civilian glider 
aircraft were not restrained by the same restrictions and oversight that restricted 
the use of powered aircraft. After all, what use did non-powered aircraft have in 
war anyway?  Right?   
In retrospect, it is interesting to know how the special operations assault 
on the Fort at Eben Emael had such a significant strategic effect on warfare in 
WWII. After all, the raid at Eben Emael preceding the German invasion of 
Belgium was merely a distraction for the coup de main which was to involve 
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“driving three panzer corps through the Ardennes, across the Meuse, and deep 
into the heart of France.”233 A believable move into Belgium was the key to 
convincing the British and French that the Belgium thrust represented the primary 
German effort. The mobilization of British and French troops to counter the 
German breech of Belgium territory would theoretically leave the French flank 
vulnerable to the German push through the Ardennes. The fort was the “largest 
single fort of its day” sitting on the high ground (130 feet above the canal) with its 
many guns protecting not only the Albert Canal, but also the three bridges that 
offered the only routing across the canal and into Belgium.234 The plan of action 
started to take shape.   
A group of gliders, taking off at night behind their tow planes, would 
cast off before the frontier was reached, then split up into four 
detachments to land silently in the first light of dawn on the three 
bridges and on top of fort Eben-Emael; there would be an 
immediate violent attack with grenades, machine-guns, flame 
throwers and hollow charges to carry out the main mission within a 
quarter of an hour; finally, the assault parties would dig in on the 
spot and hold out until the ground troops arrived.235 
The aftermath of the 10 May 1940 German assault on Eben Emael is just 
as significant as the makeup of the force. “Few military campaigns fought by 
such a small number of men in such a short time have had such decisive effect. 
Imagination and conception was coupled to thoroughness in preparation and 
aggressiveness in execution.”236 The inclusion of the glider borne forces enabled 
the airborne forces to attack with surprise. The gliders were able to disconnect 
from the tow planes before reaching the border, enabling them to enter the 
airspace quietly with no audible signature. Unlike the traditional airborne forces 
spread over a large area, the gliders, carrying 9–10 personnel each were able to 
land on remarkably exact locations that concentrated the raiding forces in each of 
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the four detachments. The gliders were able to carry greater weights, enabling 
the German forces to bring more equipment than they would have been able to 
bring using traditional parachute operations. The planned assault force consisted 
of 365 personnel along with 2.5 tons of explosives. This package was delivered 
“into the heart of the enemy position” by 42 gliders.237 Other critical contributors 
to German success were intelligence, training and the cohesive nature of the 
attacking force. The German attackers “obtained blueprints from a German 
subcontractor who helped build the fort.”238 Detailed rehearsals were conducted 
with the entire force. Everyone operated on the same plan, the same information, 
and the same objectives whether flyers, infantry, or paratroopers resulting in a 
cohesive and fully organic and integrated raiding package. 
After his previous success at Eben Emael, it came as no surprise when 
Student was summoned to rescue Hitler’s friend and ally Benito “el Duce” 
Mussolini in the fall of 1943. Mussolini had been dismissed and ordered arrested 
by the King of Italy who Hitler feared would switch to side with the Allies. To help 
Student, the Führer selected Otto Skorzeny. Although Skorzeny had briefly been 
assigned to the Luftwaffe, he held numerous positions in areas of the military 
before being placed in change of a new commando unit formed by Hitler. In spite 
of several punishments and reprimands along the way, Skorzeny proved his 
mettle in numerous operations becoming almost “legendary.”239 Therefore, it was 
no surprise when Hitler selected Skorzeny to lead the group to rescue to 
Mussolini. Perhaps the Student/Skorzeny pairing was an airborne special 
operations match made in heaven, but the unique combination of glider borne 
attack and commando raiders proved more than adequate.   
Skorzeny subsequently went to great lengths confirming the location of the 
Italian dictator. Coming close several times, only to have Mussolini moved before 
an operation could be mounted. Skorzeny finally pinpointed his location at an 
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isolated hotel in Gran Sasso, Italy. With a single way up the mountain to the hotel 
in Gran Sasso, it quickly became a prime candidate for one of Student’s glider 
style raids. After surveying the target area in a German reconnaissance airplane 
at twenty-one thousand feet and taking several photographs of the area, 
Skorzeny decided that “a small triangular shaped meadow adjacent to the hotel 
would be the best, and possibly the only, place to land his commandos.”240 After 
pitching the final plan, Skorzeny received a reluctant approval from General 
Student even though the experts claimed that the high altitude would cause 
eighty percent of the gliders to crash.241 The plan was set using just twelve 
gliders loaded with nine men each for a total of 108 men. Of these, just 26 would 
actually be members of Skorzeny’s commando force, the remainder were 
sourced from the XI Air Corps under Student.242 The final addition to the plan 
was “‘convincing’ Gen. Ferdinando Soleti, a high-ranking Italian carabiniere, that 
he should accompany the Germans on the raid to prevent bloodshed. Skorzeny 
had received intelligence that some of General Soleti’s men were tasked with 
guarding Mussolini.”243 
The raid was executed on September 12, 1943 and was a huge success. 
Mussolini was safely in custody in less than four minutes without a single shot 
being fired.244 Skorzeny’s pre-mission intelligence had labeled that small 
triangular patch of grass as the landing zone but in actuality it was nothing more 
than a short, steep meadow littered with boulders.245 Despite this, the gliders all 
made a relatively safe landing with the exception of one that crashed killing or 
injuring all. “The surprise and speed with which Skorzeny’s commandos 
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assaulted the hotel, proved to be pivotal to the success of the mission.”246 
Skorzeny directed his soldiers to clear the boulders from the patch of grass 
outside the hotel and directed General Student’s personal aircraft, a Fieseler 
Storch aircraft to land there. In perhaps his most daring move, Skorzeny then 
loaded himself along with Mussolini and the pilot into the aircraft, a two-seat 
STOL aircraft, to personally ensure that el Duce made it back alive. Dangerously 
overweight, the aircraft barely made it airborne before the pilot flew both 
Skorzeny and Mussolini to safety.247     
In contrast to the overwhelming success of previous glider raids, on May 
25, 1944 Operation Rösselsprung (Knight’s Move) proved to be the less so. 
Riding on a wave of popularity from successful unconventional and high risk 
missions, once again Major Otto Skorzeny received an order directly from the 
Führer, this time directing him to “Get Tito, alive or dead.”248 Hitler had taken a 
very keen “interest in the operation to capture Tito. It was to be carried out on 25 
May, which was Tito’s official birthday.”249  Led by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the 
Bosnian Partisans had disrupted Hitler’s aspirations in the region for quite some 
time. Hitler’s interest in the Balkans was very strategic as a major source for 
natural resources. Since 1941, the “Balkans provided ‘50% of the petroleum, 
100% of the chrome, 60% of the bauxite and 21% of the copper’ for the German 
war machine.”250 While Hitler wanted to increase his support for the Eastern 
Front, the 14 German and 6 Bulgarian divisions committed to the Balkan are had 
become a drain on his available military resources.251 When Skorzeny arrived in 
Bosnia to begin gathering intelligence on Tito’s whereabouts, he was surprised to 
find that two other German organizations were already competing for intelligence 
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and looking to take action against Tito. Instead of collaboration, this formed a bit 
of rivalry between Skorzeny and the other two groups, the Brandenburgers and 
another separate reconnaissance and spy division of the Abwehr.   
When the final plan was set and the order for Operation Rösselsprung 
issued, Skorzeny would find himself sidelined by Field Marshal Maximilian 
Freiherr von Weichs. Weichs was the German Army Commander responsible for 
Yugoslavia and Albania, and had a vested interest the removal of Tito. 
Intelligence showed that Tito was in the town of Drvar, but intelligence was not 
clear on where in Drvar, Tito was.   
A heavy bombardment of Partisan positions in and around Drvar by 
Fliegerführer  Kroatien (Air Command Croatia) aircraft was to 
precede a parachute and glider assault by 500 SS Fallschirmjäger 
Battalion whose task it was to destroy Tito and his headquarters. 
Concurrently, XV Corps elements would converge on Drvar from all 
directions, in order to linkup with 500 SS on the same day, 25 May 
1944. Speed, shock and surprise were key for the paratroopers of 
500 SS to accomplish their mission.252  
Due to a limited number of gliders, the plan called for 654 troops to be lifted in on 
gliders during the initial assault. 220 more would parachute in five hours later.253 
In the end, the operation was not as successful as previous glider raids. 
The initial insertion went as planned. Once on the ground, the failure of 
intelligence was evident. Although they had come close to catching him, Tito was 
not where they had expected. After landing and finding their focus was not on 
Tito’s correct location, the ground commander’s plan was not flexible enough to 
adapt. Once on the ground, the glider-borne paratroopers were not able to adjust 
tactically to attack where Tito and his forces were located, thereby allowing him 
time to escape. “Parachute troops have their greatest flexibility of movement 
before dispatch from the aircraft. Once on the ground and executing their tasks, it 
is a relatively lengthy process to shift them to new objectives, especially when 
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engaged in a fight.”254  Furthermore, the second wave of 220 paratroopers was 
not well utilized. Their insertion location should have been shifted to complement 
the tactical situation on the ground, but the initial drop location was never altered. 
Tito, several members of his staff, and his dog were all able to escape their cave, 
slipping through floor and down along a steam away from the fighting.255 In the 
end, Operation Knight’s Move lacked the pinpoint intelligence, the tactical 
flexibility, and the intense training and rehearsals that we witnessed in the first 
two glider operations. Ultimately this operation suffered from a lack of the 
surprise, speed and repetition that William McRaven deems critical in successful 
mission accomplishment.256 Overall, the German losses in Operation 
Rösselsprung were minimal, and while they failed to capture or kill Tito, the 
Germans killed several thousand of the partisans, a significant blow to his 
force.257 In what was perhaps an unintended consequence of the German 
airborne operations, “to counter remaining German threats from the air, a Balkan 
Air Force [BAF] was created on June 1, just a week after the near fatal raid on 
Titio’s headquarters . . . the BAF consisted of about five hundred combat aircraft, 
nearly half of them fighters, which precluded any future airborne operations by 
the Germans.”258   
As one stands back and reflects on the German use of gliders as a special 
operations tool in WWII, a number of trends stand out, both good and bad. First, 
the use of gliders provided the raiding force with a precise insertion method that 
allowed commanders to place larger numbers of troops and equipment on a 
precise spot on the battlefield. This airborne method proved tactically superior to 
traditional paratrooper operations which often spread troops over a greater area. 
Traditional paratrooper methods often hampered the speed with which forces 
                                            
254 Eyre, “Operation Rösselsprung,” 40. 
255 Ridley, Tito: A Biography, 235. 
256 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 8. 
257 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 210.  
258 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 210. 
 70 
could gather in mass and attack the objective. Additionally, the glider payload 
enabled troops to carry more equipment than their paratrooper counterparts, 
allowing them to sustain operations without reinforcements for a longer period of 
time. While glider use eliminated the vulnerable drift time under the canopy of a 
parachute, the glider was a slow and barely maneuverable aircraft highly 
susceptible to enemy fire.   
Second, gliders offered a level of surprise that surpassed paratroop 
operations. Most aircraft used to drop paratroopers were loud, often warning 
opponents of the approaching troops. The gliders approached silently and often 
arrived on the objective before the enemy had been alerted of their presence. 
The tow aircraft were often able to release the gliders well beyond the limits of 
enemy surveillance or detection. In a tactic similar to the modern day High 
Altitude High Opening (HAHO) jumps, gliders were able to release in a 
permissible airspace and glide into enemy territory quietly. 
Third, the Germans placed airborne operations under the control of the 
Luftwaffe (air force). This method of control had both advantages and 
disadvantages. “The tactical use of German airborne troops was effective 
because of the close co-operation with the air arm in preparing, supporting and 
sustaining the air-landings.”259 In most cases, the air force leadership insured 
that both ground and air forces were aware of the plan of action and were fully 
involved in rehearsals. This created a well-integrated and extensively rehearsed 
raiding team. The down side of Luftwaffe leadership of airborne forces is a 
product of air leaders that may not be as knowledgeable and proficient in tactical 
ground maneuver. The exceptions in this case were the likes of General Student 
and Major Skorzeny who both appeared to have a good grasp of both air and 
ground operations. 
Finally, the successful integration of both air and land forces using glider 
tactics frequently led to both surprise and speed which were critical to gaining the 
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relative superiority which “exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, 
gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.”260 However, 
with a fairly high success rate in special operations, it is puzzling to note that 
after the conclusion of WWII, gliders were never again used extensively in 
combat. This is a trend that will repeat in this thesis, often a capability is 
extremely successful only to be discarded at the conclusion of the conflict. This 
pattern of disuse of gliders, in this case, and other forms of specialized air power 
as well, continues to recur throughout history. 
3. OSS 
As German forces overwhelmed numerous territories in WWII, not 
everyone fell in line to obey their Nazi occupiers. The partisan resistance 
movements began almost as soon as the Germans obtained power. This 
clandestine struggle of patriots was one of the most heroic achievements in 
World War II.261 Critical to those achievements was the use of air power to 
support the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The origins of the OSS trace back 
to the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) which were organized for partisan support in 1940 following “Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill’s order to rouse resistance against the German army 
in occupied countries and ‘set Europe ablaze.’’262 Predecessor to the modern 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the OSS was established via executive order 
from President Franklin Roosevelt in June, 1942 with former Army Colonel Bill 
Donovan in charge. Even though William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan’s first combat 
action was under General Pershing chasing the Mexican outlaw Poncho Villa, his 
 
 
                                            
260 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 4. 
261 Harris G. Warren, Special Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements 
1943–1945 (Air Historical Office: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1947), 1.  
262 John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II,” 
Studies in Intelligence, Vol 54, No 2 (June 2010), 2. 
 72 
most notable experience came during WWI after which he became the first 
person awarded our country’s four highest medals, including the Medal of 
Honor.263   
Using their “Jedburgh” teams, the OSS was able to influence the success 
of partisan movements by granting military aid. Air forces were called to “deliver 
thousands of tons of supplies to the patriots, to infiltrate espionage agents and 
other personnel, to undertake hazardous landing missions far behind enemy 
lines, and to drop billions of leaflets over Europe.”264 Labeled the 
“Carpetbaggers,” these crews flew missions into occupied Europe from bases in 
both Britain and North Africa. These “special operations” were flown with 
specially modified B-17 bombers followed by B-25 bombers and C-47 transports 
before gaining highly modified all black B-24 bombers.   
By the summer of 1944, the Carpetbaggers had expanded to four 
squadrons with 64 B-24s and five C-47s . . . [which] were used 
primarily to land at clandestine rough-filed landing zones behind 
Germans lines in France to insert and recover OSS teams.265 
While the analysis of this truly special operation could fill an entire tome on 
its own, there are several important lessons. The Carpetbagger air forces that 
flew the missions into Europe were hand selected for involvement with the OSS. 
They were experienced, well trained and truly an irregular force. While their 
aircraft were not the newest technologies, they were specially modified for the 
missions. Of particular importance was the relationship between the aircrews and 
the forces they were supporting, “The closest liaison existed between the secret 
agencies and the air forces, and the success of the entire program of special 
operations depended upon full cooperation.”266 Among others, these lessons 
made this one of the earliest examples of an organized special operations air 
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force. Along with the Chindit air forces, the Carpetbaggers form the roots of 
modern day special operations air forces. 
4. Chindits 
Few, if any, army commanders have had such a significant impact on the 
development of air power in irregular warfare as British Major General Orde 
Wingate. It was from Wingate’s role in the WWII campaign against the Japanese 
in Burma that the 1st Air Commando Group traces its origin.267   General Wingate 
proved his resolve during irregular campaigns in both Africa and the Middle East 
before being brought to Burma. Wingate’s use of long range penetration tactics, 
using small units to launch deep strikes against one’s adversaries, was indicative 
of the tactics used by T.E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt.268 But it is also 
interesting to note that Wingate was a distant blood relative of Lawrence,269 
which perhaps helps to explain his interest in both Arab culture/language as well 
as irregular tactics of warfare. General Wingate, however, “went on much further, 
for he demonstrated that these methods could also be employed against slippery 
irregular forces, not only conventional formations.”270 Wingate’s first Chindit 
offensive received very little air support. While it was only moderately effective 
and suffered approximately 30 percent casualties, “it was the only successful 
offensive action in the China-Burma–India theater during the 1942–43 dry 
season.”271 Nevertheless, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was 
impressed with Wingate and his theory of long-range penetration groups. As a 
result, Churchill invited Wingate to board the Queen Mary for a trip to Quebec for 
the Quadrant Conference. It was at the Quadrant conference in Quebec that 
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Wingate met Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt was not as impressed like Churchill 
was.272,273 “But General H. H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air 
Forces, was deeply drawn to Wingate’s concept of long-range penetration 
operations and became intent on providing the next expedition—for all this high 
level attention meant there would be one—with better air support.”274 
General Arnold selected Lieutenant Colonels Phil Cochran and John 
Alison, making them co-commanders of the U.S. Army Air Corps Classified 
Project Nine. The classified unit was later called 1 Air Command Force and then 
Number 1 Air Commando Group.275 Arnold’s initiating guidance to Cochran and 
Alison included, “Wingate has made innovations in ground warfare; I want some 
in the air. Wingate’s troops walked into Burma. From now on I want them to fly in 
and I want them to fly out. The U.S. unit to be formed for this mission will have 
first priority on any equipment necessary to the job.”276 
If there was ever an irregular air force, this was it. The unit deployed with 
about 600 people and 300 airplanes. They received a squadron of P-51A fighter 
aircraft, a squadron of B-25 Mitchell bombers, C-47 transports, and 100 CG4A 
gliders that had just come into the inventory. They also employed L-5’s, UC-64 
Norseman transports and L-1’s, all smaller transports for medical evacuations 
and resupply missions to austere landing areas not suitable for larger aircraft. 
Some of the first helicopters ever to go into combat were also part of the Number 
1 Air Commando Group. In addition to some of the best aircraft and equipment, 
Cochran and Alison took the best people, both pilots and support personnel.277 
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The Chindit air forces filled every mission set for Wingate: counterair, interdiction, 
reconnaissance, transport (air invasion and resupply), and close air support.278  
We assumed that our responsibilities were: to keep the enemy air 
force off General Wingate’s back; to create diversions and disrupt 
enemy communications; to plan the air assault and manage the 
airfields; to plan and execute the evacuation of wounded; and to 
provide all logistical support we could with the aircraft under our 
control.279 
That is quite simply what the irregular air forces did. A typical scenario would be 
executed using a combination of gliders and C-47s. An advance team of Chindits 
and engineers would be inserted into a jungle clearing via gliders. The mission 
for this team would be to hold the area while constructing a landing zone large 
enough to enable the rest of the ground forces to be air-landed via C-47s.280 It is 
curious to note that Wingate initially had to be persuaded to allow Cochran and 
Alison to include gliders in the force package, a capability that had yet to be 
proven in that venue.281 Operation Thursday in March 1944 was a great example 
of actual employment of these tactics. During the initial glider assault, 539 men 
and 30,000 pounds of equipment were infiltrated onto Broadway landing zone. 
Once the airstrip had been completed that night, 62 C-47 sorties were flown in!282 
Over the course of the remaining operation, Wingate’s troops were constantly 
supported by aerial resupply via C-47s and L-5s, medical evacuation via UC-64s 
and other light airplanes, as well as close air support/interdiction via P-51As and 
B-25Hs.283 Over the few short days of Operation Thursday, in addition to 
thousands of troops and tons of equipment, Wingate received 1360 pack animals 
transported by both glider and C-47.284 
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The effect the dedicated air support had on Wingate’s soldiers was highly 
beneficial, and definitive to their success on the battlefield. Perhaps the most 
significant benefit came from the prospect of being medevac’d if wounded in 
action, a sharp contrast to the grim realities of the previous Chindit expedition. 
The effect this reassurance had on morale was immeasurable.285 Air commandos 
were also given the freedom to think outside the box when employing their 
aircraft in unconventional ways. One such technique was to tear 
telephone/telegraph poles up out of the ground through the use of a cable and 
weight hung from the bomb rack of P-51 aircraft.286 The success of Operation 
Thursday can be measured in part by the sheer volume of the metrics in the 
operation:  860,000 pounds of supplies (310,000 delivered via glider); 1,500 
casualties medevac’d; 50 enemy aircraft demolished, all within less than one 
month.287 
Perhaps no other case in this study will provide such a concise and 
successful example of a truly irregular ground force mated with air forces 
designed solely to support the land commander. The success of the Chindit 
operations in Burma is obvious. “More than thirty Japanese unit commanders 
who fought in Burma, when interviewed after the war, said, “the raiding force 
[Chindits] greatly affected Army operations and eventually led to the total 
abandonment of Northern Burma.”288 With limited success in his first campaign, 
the addition of air forces adequately complimented Wingate’s tactics for much 
greater success in the follow-on operation. “Wingate’s tactics were substantially 
those of guerrilla; yet because he was able to put in so many men in such a short 
time, it approached a regular operation.”289 This was no regular operation from 
the air but rather an example of a force that was tailor made to support the 
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ground commander for a truly strategic outcome. The air forces remained under 
the leadership of airmen, yet “were completely integrated into the ground 
commander’s operation and [they] took an active part in planning the 
campaign.”290 
5. Cargo Cults 
In perhaps the most unusual effect of air power, on numerous South 
Pacific Islands air power has taken the role of religion. The ‘Cargo Cults’ as they 
are known, “sprang up in the villages in the South Pacific during WWII, when 
hundreds of thousands of American troops poured into the islands from the skies 
and seas.”291 With the American troops came all sorts of material items that 
vastly improved the quality of life on these Island villages. These religions, many 
still in existence, pray that Americans will return and bring with them “radios, 
TV’s, trucks, boats, watches, iceboxes, medicine, Coca-Cola and many 
wonderful things.”292 Some Cargo Cults are traced back to the colonial periods; 
they “exhibited belief in the imminence of a new age of blessing to be initiated by 
the arrival of a special ‘cargo’ of goods from supernatural sources. The belief was 
derived from the observation by local residents of the delivery of supplies to 
colonial officials.”293 These religions believe that by prayer and ritualistic 
activities, the cargo will again return to their lands. They clear and maintain 
landing strips and create bamboo planes and landing towers to bring the cargo 
back. They often march and hold military ceremonies all for the same goal, 
bringing the cargo back.294 While somewhat trivial that modern day primitive 
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culture could worship American cargo and the aircraft that transport it, this 
vignette uncovers the real power held by air forces and the resources that they 
are able to deliver.   
B. COLONIAL WARS 
During the period between WWII and Korea, there was little involvement 
of U.S. special operations air units. In fact, the Air Commando units themselves 
were split up after WWII ended in 1945.295 However, unconventional air power 
was still used by the Philippine Air Force (PAF) assisted through the U.S. advisor 
Major-General Edward G. Lansdale. With the addition of the AT-6, the PAF’s 
complement of aircraft was quite similar to that used to assist Wingate, namely 
C-47s, P-51s, and L-5s. These aircraft conducted a variety of operations, 
including psychological warfare with leaflets and loudspeakers.296 Despite this 
lack of U.S. enthusiasm for unconventional air power, other nations developed 
similar capabilities and utilized them during this period of colonial wars. Of note 
are the French conflict in Algeria and the British conflict in Malaya. 
1. French Colonial Wars – Algeria 
The French first landed in Algeria in 1830 in an attempt to stop Algerian 
piracy on the Mediterranean and subsequently many Frenchmen migrated to 
Algeria where they became a large portion of the population. By the end of WWII, 
Algeria was the “crown jewel of the French colonial empire . . . thought of not as 
a colony but a part of metropolitan France.”297  In fact, during WWI and WWII 
over 150,000 Algerians died fighting with the French Army.298 French rule over 
Algeria was relatively stable until 1940. Most unrest could be attributed to political 
movements, many revolutionary, and later after 1945 some Communist. 
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However, on May 8, 1945, VE (Victory in Europe) Day, the first real rebellion 
occurred in the town of Setif. The rebellion sparked anti-French riots across 
Algeria. The rebellious trends would continue intermittently until persistence 
finally resulted in Algerian independence from France in 1961. 
At first, the French treated Algeria like an uprising or a civil war and less of 
a resistance. As the conflict progressed, the French employed increasingly harsh 
tactics that only further fueled the resistance. While the French developed many 
uses of air power in what was essentially a policing action in Algeria, the most 
significant contribution to air power in this example of irregular warfare was their 
use of helicopters. The French “employed helicopters in Algeria on a far larger 
scale and in more varied ways than any armed force was to do before the 
American intervention in Vietnam.”299 The terrain was very different in Algeria 
which would distinguish the use of helicopters greatly from the American use 
later in Vietnam. Vietnam was covered in lush vegetation making helicopter 
landings often difficult, giving enemy force much cover for ambush and from 
overhead reconnaissance. In Algeria the terrain was mostly flat, in plateaus or 
desert. With the exception of the hills on the coast and the central mountains, 
much of the terrain was level without cover, making surveillance ideal. The 
helicopter was extremely versatile in this terrain. 
They utilized them not just for evacuating casualties but also as 
gunships and as assault vehicles for carrying troops right into the 
battle. They made great use of photo-reconnaissance aircraft and 
of radar . . . The helicopter enabled the French to become more 
mobile than the guerilla whose main means of transport was on 
foot. The helicopters could easily stage surprise raids, landing 
troops within a village and rounding up the inhabitants before they 
had any idea that they were threatened.300 
The French rapidly increased their military presence until the late 1950s 
when they had approximately 350,000 Army and 40,000 Air Force personnel in 
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country.301 In addition to a large contingent of helicopters, the French employed a 
number of other aircraft in Algeria. Following WWII, they had many newer more 
modern aircraft like the F-86 Sabrejet, but they were determined not suitable for 
the conditions faced in counterinsurgency warfare.302 Instead, the French air 
force utilized many legacy aircraft from WWII including the C-47 and an 
American trainer, the T-6. The T-6 was chosen because it was slow, sturdy, 
cheap, could takeoff/land on austere strips, carry an armament, had a long loiter 
time, and could fly to observe the terrain closely.303 By January 1959, the French 
had close to 1100 aircraft in Algeria, of which 222 were helicopters.304 The use of 
air power in Algeria was so extensive that in addition to the three major air bases 
in Oran, Algiers, and Bilda, in the eastern part of the Sahara alone, there were 
200 runways suitable for light aircraft by the end of 1959.305 
The French seem to have benefited very much from a close relationship 
between ground and air forces that “enabled air support to be provided very 
rapidly for the ground troops.”306 They used this relationship to establish 
“barrages” which would equate to the modern day quick reaction forces (QRF). 
The barrages were stationed in the eastern/western areas of the country and 
would be airlifted by aircraft or helicopter to answer alarms.307 
 In the end, the French did a lot of things right militarily in Algeria. Their 
pioneering and successful use of the helicopter would not be soon repeated, 
even in Vietnam. Their close coordination with ground forces would prove to be 
critical in their tactical successes as was their massive deployment of aircraft and 
airmen in a supporting role. Unfortunately, the conflict ended up in grand political 
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failure, and the French gave up their colonial possession. “Algeria is a classic 
case of winning the battles and losing the war.”308 
2. British Colonial Wars – Malaya 
During 1948, a communist-supported insurgency arose in Malaya, which 
at the time was a British colony. A battle for the “hearts and minds” of the people 
ensued and the British made extensive use of air power for the first time in 
peripheral conflict.309 At the heart of the insurgency was the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), an indigenous organization founded by members of the Malayan 
People’s Anti-Japanese Army, a militant organization trained an armed by the 
British during WWII.310 Rather than try to overcome the British through 
conventional means, the insurgents employed “a classic Maoist guerilla strategy” 
to which the British successfully responded through asymmetric means of their 
own, i.e., not with overwhelming artillery and fire power.311 
The phrase “hearts and minds” was coined by the British during the 
Malayan conflict and was the key descriptive of how they approached this 
campaign. The RAF entered Malaya still believing that aircraft could play a 
dominant role in offensive operations, an extension of air control. They soon 
learned that air power applied indiscriminately would merely destroy the 
livelihood of the Malayan people. In the words of Major-General Richard 
Clutterbuck, a British commander during Malaya, “air power is not an end in itself 
in counterinsurgency. It can contribute only by supporting other agencies – 
police, army, and government services.”312 With this strategy in mind, the British 
made extensive use of precision bombing for fire support and air mobility for 
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troop and supply movements. Air support was “essential” in securing success for 
the British across both the physical and demographic geography of the Malayan 
peninsula.313 
Precision bombing through jungle foliage is no small feat, and yet the 
British devised a couple of techniques to improve its efficacy. The first technique 
was to actually send RAF personnel out on patrols with their counterparts on the 
ground.314 This enabled aircrews to experience first-hand the difficulties of 
surviving, navigating, and hunting guerillas in the dense jungle environment and 
led to the development of the next improvement. With an appreciation of the 
jungle operating environment, the RAF developed a method to employ ground 
radar guided weapons directed towards known enemy encampments. This 
system was first emplaced 5,000 yards from the target, but later advances put 
patrols as close as just 15 yards outside the target “fixing its precise grid 
reference.”315 
Throughout the Malayan Emergency, despite the increased and effective 
use of precision bombing, “it was the infantryman with his rifle on patrol that 
accounted for the vast majority of enemy kills.”316 This infantryman depended 
upon air power to support him throughout his patrols and this was accomplished 
through a combination of airdrop and airland sorties. Airdrops were executed as 
low as 200 feet to drop zones surround by hazardous terrain and marked by just 
a single balloon rising through the dense jungle canopy. The general tactic was 
to make “small and frequent, rather than large and occasional, drops,” 
resupplying a team along its route of travel rather than a single large drop.317 
Despite success with airdrop, airland became favored since it eliminated the 
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necessary expense of parachutes. This is where the capabilities of fixed-wing 
STOL aircraft, and the Scottish Aviation Pioneer in particular, really shined. 
These aircraft could carry four or five passengers, or 800 pounds of cargo and 
still land and takeoff in as little as 150 yards. This ability coupled with the speed 
and low maintenance when compared to helicopters often made STOL resupply 
the method of choice.318 However, as technology advanced, so would the use of 
helicopters and they too would become integral to success in Malaya. 
When first introduced into the theater, the payload and lift capacity of the 
underpowered Westland Dragonfly was quite limited compared to the fixed-wing 
assets available. However, with the introduction of the Whirlwind in 1953, 
helicopter use rapidly expanded.319 Like the STOL fixed-wing, the helicopter was 
a morale booster as well. Now patrols could cut a landing zone with chain saws 
and explosives to receive a medevac chopper rather than face an extended 
evacuation by foot on a stretcher.320 
The helicopter was not without its disadvantages though. The distinctive 
sound of its rotor blades made surprise almost unobtainable when compared to 
the near silence of gliders and STOL aircraft. However, even this challenge was 
overcome when the Special Air Service (SAS) adapted the tree-jumping 
techniques of American firefighters for use in the Malayan jungle. The concept for 
this insertion was to drop soldiers from high above the jungle floor. The 
helicopters would not be out of earshot of the target, but high enough where their 
destination would be indeterminate. After jumping from the aircraft, the men 
would then lower themselves through the jungle canopy as far as 200 feet using 
webbing. This technique was successfully used on multiple assaults with 
surprisingly few casualties.321 
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Psychological operations (PSYOPS) were also conducted through 
extensive use aircraft, both rotary and fixed-wing, for dropping leaflets and 
carrying loudspeakers. The RAF carried out massive propaganda drives to 
convince the insurgents to surrender, using immense numbers of leaflets.322 After 
learning that many guerillas were forbidden by their commanders to read the 
leaflet, the RAF started using low flying aircraft with loudspeakers, “Some 70 
percent of the guerillas who surrendered said that their decision to do so had 
been influenced by the ‘sky shouters.’”323 Finally, both STOL and helicopters was 
the “vital service in the ‘hearts-and-minds’ campaign by bringing government 
services to remote areas.”324 These flexible modes of transport enabled 
government officials to access areas that would have otherwise been denied. 
Despite these successes, British aircraft procurement throughout the 
1940s and into the 1960s was focused on jet powered, technologically advanced 
aircraft to replace piston-driven aircraft. However, it was these supposedly 
antiquated aircraft that were the foundation for the success not just in Malaya, 
but also in other peripheral conflicts in the “mountainous forests of Kenya” and 
“narrow wadis of the Arabian Peninsula.”325 Similar to lessons learned by the 
French in Algeria, RAF officers experienced the advantages of vintage aircraft in 
a counterinsurgency and the need for “slow speed, long loiter time, and pinpoint 
accuracy in counter-guerilla operations.”326 While the RAF learned some of the 
same technological lessons we’ve found in other cases, they also learned that in 
a counterinsurgency, political considerations are often as important or more 
important than military ones. While the case study once again highlighted the 
extreme importance of close coordination between air and ground forces, the 
Malayan case study clearly highlighted the importance of closely integrated 
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battlefield mobility. In the end, the British were successful in quelling the 
insurgency in Malaya. While the RAF played a vital role, its true effectiveness 
was found in close coordination with ground forces.  
C. KOREAN WAR 
The U.S. military was not adequately prepared for Korea. Post World War 
II, U.S. air power theory was dominated by nuclear and strategic bombing 
doctrine. Both air and ground forces faced rapid force reductions. The USAAF in 
particular was rapidly demobilized in the months following WWII. Personnel 
strength was reduced from over 2.5 million military and civilian personnel to less 
than 500,000 during 1947. The number of aircraft in service dropped to a force of 
just 25,000 aircraft from over 70,000 at its peak. Out of these 25,000 airframes, 
just 4,750 were actually combat ready and these were scattered throughout the 
world. By the end of 1946, the USAAF had only two combat ready groups.327 
Irregular capabilities developed by the Carpetbaggers and the Number 1 Air 
Commando Group were lost when they were both disbanded and 
decommissioned following WWII. “In the U.S. Air Force, as in the RAF, far 
greater importance and priority was given to ‘strategic’ air than to ‘tactical’ air.”328 
This philosophy, coupled with the belief that Army ground commanders lacked 
the required skills for planning air support, led to the Air Force decision to abolish 
“all joint boards charged with writing doctrine.”329 What rose up to the top was the 
focus on nuclear and strategic bombing and the creation of Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) in 1946 would lay the foundation of theory, doctrine, and 
strategy which remains deep at the core of the USAF today. Curtis E. LeMay was 
appointed as Commander in Chief of SAC in 1948 with the dark cloud of the 
Soviet Union’s rise looming on the horizon. LeMay would serve in SAC for almost 
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nine years, leaving the command to become the Vice Chief of Staff and later 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force.330 LeMay’s strategic mindset would set the tone for 
air force doctrine for years to come. 
It should come as no surprise that the world (the U.S. in particular) was 
caught off guard and unprepared, on June 25, 1950 when the first wave of 
60,000 North Korean troops stormed across the 38th Parallel before overrunning 
South Korean capital of Seoul four days later.331 As the U.S. and South Korean 
forces were pushed back the perimeter established around the southern coastal 
town of Pusan, it became painfully evident that the U.S. military was unprepared. 
The newly established U.S. Air Force was caught with a problem that couldn’t be 
solved with nuclear weapons even if delivered by the brand new Boeing B-52 
Stratofortress that was under development at the time.332 This tide was changed, 
however, with General Douglas MacArthur’s Operation Chromite, the amphibious 
landing of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon to pierce the North Korean line of 
communication between Seoul and Pusan.   
The Korean War saw little use of air power in irregular ways and none of 
the previous Air Commando units were reactivated.333 There were two American 
airborne operations in Korea, both by the Army’s 187th Regimental Combat 
Team in October 1950 and March 1951.334 While both operations were large 
scale conventional operations by conventional forces, they did include two 
notable firsts. The use of the Air Force Fairchild C-119 marked the first time 
paratroopers were dropped from a tail-loading aircraft.335  This change 
substantially reduced aircraft loading and exit times allowing a much closer 
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grouping of paratroopers on the ground. Korea also marked the first time “[large] 
quantities of heavy support weapons and vehicles had been parachuted in one 
operation.”336  
Among the largely conventional operations of the Korean War were 
several isolated irregular uses of air power. During WWII, the U.S. trained more 
than a quarter million pilots, many of whom remained in the Guard or Reserve. 
These pilots who were referred to as “retreads” brought significant combat 
experience to Korea.337 Brigadier General Harry “Heinie” Aderholt, the officer 
often credited with being the first modern day Air Commando, was one such 
retread. Aderholt flew B-17s and C-47s in North Africa and Italy during WWII.338 
After a period of time flying conventional airlift in Korea via the C-47, Aderholt 
was recruited to establish a special missions detachment with around a dozen 
pilots and six planes to supporting a “highly classified project involving 
clandestine operations deep inside North Korea.”339 “The other use of airborne 
troops in Korea was the dropping of small parties of sabotage troops who cut 
railways or shot up designated enemy troop centres (sic) on much the same lines 
as the SAS had done in the Western Desert or the SOE had done in France.”340 
Missions included dropping agents far behind enemy lines, resupply drops, 
emergency medical evacuation, psychological operations like loudspeaker 
broadcasts and leaflet drops, and monitoring intelligence signals and reports sent 
by agents in the field.341  For a capability that would be considered irregular even 
today, the C-47s were modified to hold two 75 gallon napalm bombs under the 
belly of the transport to drop bombs on lucrative targets found after dropping 
agents from the aircraft.342 
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Similar to the events that transpired in WWII, air forces created a very 
versatile and functional irregular capability using available technologies in the 
midst of a conflict. The air forces were extremely capable and effective in their 
close relationship held with those they were supporting. However, in a 
troublesome trend that continues to the present day, the Korean irregular forces 
were deactivated in 1956 much like they were at the conclusion of WWII.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The time period encapsulated by this chapter included two very distinct 
conflicts where air power was successfully applied to irregular warfare: WWII and 
Korea. Many argue that during WWII, air power began to achieve its full potential. 
While the regular use of air power was extensive, during this conflict the irregular 
use of air power was prevalent as well. In Korea, despite a focus on nuclear 
weapons development and strategic bombing, an irregular air capability was built 
and employed with much success. At the conclusion of both conflicts, however, 
irregular air forces were dismantled in favor of shrinking manpower and budget 
authorizations as well as the realignment to conventionalize the force. In both 
cases, the disbanded irregular air forces would put the U.S. at an opening 
disadvantage when the next conflict ensued.    
 89 
V. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: FROM THE 
VIETNAM WAR TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 
During World War II, the irregular use of air power was unprecedented. 
While the Korean Conflict itself created a significant dearth of irregular air forces, 
it was also cast under the shadow of nuclear war. With the nuclear threat on the 
horizon, the culture of military forces was one of restraint for fear of massive 
nuclear confrontation. However, as conflict brewed throughout Southeast Asia in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, air power would once again emerge as a 
significant contributor towards irregular efforts throughout the region. The 
numerous small wars and raids of this time period saw not only vast irregular 
conflicts, but also a focus on the coup de main to an extent not seen since WWII. 
But in the Vietnam era, U.S. air forces would once again be hampered by the 
strategic ideals of nuclear warfare. Unfortunately, once these conflicts drew to a 
close, the familiar pattern of air power disuse was evident once more.  
A. VIETNAM 
After the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Vietnam was 
divided into two nations. Although the U.S. maintained a presence in South 
Vietnam as early as 1950, U.S. involvement was not significant until late 1960 
with the release of President Kennedy’s counterinsurgency plan. Kennedy 
increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam from 700 to 
approximately 16,000.343 It was Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense for 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who after the Kennedy assassination coined 
the term flexible response. Flexible response was to render a “balanced 
combination of conventional forces available that would provide alternatives to 
deal with aggression . . . the amount of force used by the United States should 
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always be commensurate with the threat.”344  Combined with the post Korea 
nuclear focus, flexible response yielded a very conventional mentality in the U.S. 
Air Force.  
The core of our security planning lies in the maintenance of an 
effective capability to prosecute successfully a general war . . . In 
the broad spectrum of conflict called limited war, a variety of 
responses may be desirable, ranging all the way from a show of 
force through the delivery of nuclear weapons.345  
The views of the air force at the time were perhaps best expressed by General 
Curtis E. LeMay, commander of Strategic Air Command from 1948–1957 and 
later AF Chief of Staff: 
‘Protracted War’ passed with the advent of the nuclear age. If we 
are to be successful in preventing war today, we must recognize 
the radically changed dimension in today’s warfare—the dimension 
of time. Today, decisive force is already in existence compressed in 
nuclear weapons stockpiles. It can be applied across the length and 
breadth of an enemy nation in a few hours, or in a few days at the 
most by long-range jet bombers.346 
The Vietnam War was far from usual. It was a protracted irregular conflict that 
debunked many of the myths that were linked to nuclear weapons. “There were 
no front lines. The enemy could be anywhere and everywhere, and was often 
indistinguishable from the native population.”347 In a trend that would be repeated 
later in Iraq and Afghanistan a purely irregular conflict was mated with largely 
conventional forces. Even though the air force approached the conflict with a 
largely conventional force, steps were also taken to fill the gaps in the 
conventional force to meet irregular needs.  
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United States air support in the region began in earnest towards the end 
of 1960 with several AT-6 Texans followed by pilots to fly the Laotian skies “on 
their behalf” and Air Commandos to actually train the fledgling Lao Air Force.348 
Shortly thereafter, the CIA’s air effort began as well. Although the CIA had been 
providing covert support on the ground since 1955, the air effort began around 
April 1961 when a Hmong major in the Royal Lao Army, Vang Pao, was recruited 
to create what would become “the most effective irregular fighting force in Laos” 
with over 40,000 guerrilla fighters. Pao’s troops were supported by the CIA’s 
covert air force of STOL aircraft, Air America, and if a pilot was shot down over 
Laos his “only hope of salvation was an Air America H-34” helicopter.349 In 
Vietnam, as Lieutenant General David Burchinal stated, “We were using them—
the Vietnamese—selling them the airplanes and training them to fly them. Our 
involvement was not overtly in combat at that point [the early 1960s], only with 
our Military Assistance Advisory Group.”350 
1. Jungle Jim and Farm Gate 
Recognizing the challenge at hand, President Kennedy directed his staff, 
and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in particular, to look for solutions.351 
Kennedy’s directive had a profound impact on the Air Force’s approach to the 
counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia. Until this point, “U.S. armed forces were 
trained and equipped to fight a major land war on the mainland of Europe, with 
the air force ready to deliver nuclear weapons into the heart of enemy 
territory.”352 This was a direct result of dismantling much of the special operations 
capability following WWII and failing to maintain a force dedicated to irregular 
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warfare. Only after “direct prodding” did the Air Force establish the 4400th 
Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) and the subsequent Special Air 
Warfare Center.353  
The concept of operations for the [4400th] was to train U.S. Air 
Force crews in aircraft suitable for counterinsurgency; prepare 
these aircraft for transfer to friendly foreign air forces; provide 
training to foreign personnel on operations and maintenance of 
these aircraft; and finally to develop  tactics for employment of 
these aircraft in countering insurgency.354 
The 4400th was an all-volunteer force, 124 officers and 228 enlisted in all. 
Aircraft assigned included 16 C-47s, eight B-26s, and eight T-28s.355 Much like 
what was done during WWII and Korea, many of the aircraft were specially 
modified.  
The T-28 trainers were modified as a ground attack aircraft with the 
addition of armor plating, racks for bombs and rockets, plus two 
fixed forward firing .50 caliber machine guns . . . the modified SC-
47 had twice the normal fuel capacity of the normal C-47, was 
strengthened for operations from unimproved airstrips, and was 
equipped for rocket assisted takeoffs.356 
These Jungle Jim elements, as they were also known as, deployed as part of the 
Farm Gate project which was begun in the early 1960s to support the 
development of the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).357,358 “While the 
remainder of the conventional U.S. Air Force developed new jet aircraft and 
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continued a campaign of aerial counterinsurgency against an enemy who was 
becoming increasingly adept at his craft and more competent at defeating aerial 
threats.”359  
The Farm Gate project continued to grow throughout the early 1960s and 
although American pilots were in the region to ostensibly train their VNAF 
counterparts, U.S. aviators “were soon flying their aircraft in combat, with the 
proviso that a Vietnamese observer flew in the back seat.”360 During that first 
year in combat, Farm Gate pilots developed tactics, techniques and procedures 
for the employment of their modified aircraft “operating from minimal-condition, 
tactical airstrips, and the C-47s and T-28s from dirt runways.”361 
March 1962 led to continued growth within the command with the creation 
of the 1st Air Commando Group at Hurlburt Field. With this growth, the Air 
Commandos continued to obtain and modify existing aircraft to meet the needs of 
each specific mission. Just one example of this was fitting “external wing racks to 
F-51 Mustangs” to support additional armaments.362 General LeMay, himself, 
recognized air power’s contributions to irregular warfare outside of concentrated 
firepower and the success of the program in general.363 However, despite the 
Chief of Staff’s remarks supporting this in April 1962, little change was seen in 
long-standing Air Force doctrine as irregular warfare continued to be viewed as a 
“lesser, rather than fundamentally different, form of warfare.”364 By the end of 
1962, Farm Gate accrued over 4,000 sorties expending over 500,000 pieces of 
ordnance resulting in over 3,300 enemy casualties and over 4,000 structures 
destroyed or damaged all in support of the South Vietnamese government. 
These results were not without casualties among the Farm Gate crews. 
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Nevertheless, “in 1963 the Air Commandos were to suffer more casualties due to 
their own defective aircraft than to enemy fire.”365 
2. Ranch Hand 
Air Commando innovation did not stop with Farm Gate. Operation Ranch 
Hand was born out of “a joint American/South Vietnamese Combat Development 
and Test Center, tasked with learning and improving counterinsurgency 
techniques and tactics.”366 The operation was originally intended to eliminate 
vegetation as sources of cover and concealment, but was expanded to include 
food sources used by the enemy as well.367 Ranch Hand made use of C-123 
Providers modified with a spray system to deliver defoliant via air. Of the several 
defoliants used, Agent Orange was by far the most common.368 Although fewer 
than 6,000 acres were destroyed in 1962, the program grew rapidly and over 1.5 
million acres were destroyed during the program’s peak in 1967.369 The risks of 
Dioxin (the suspected hazardous chemical in Agent Orange) aside, the Ranch 
Hand flights themselves were far from risk free. In one ten-year period of low-
level flying over the jungle Ranch Hand crews “sustained well over 7,000 hits.” 
One aircraft alone survived over 800 rounds. Ranch Hands actions were 
rewarded with five Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards, two with valor, and two 
Presidential Unit Citations.370  
The Vietnam War was a period of many other special operations 
innovations. Among these innovative operations are Waterpump, Spooky, Project 
Duck Hook, and Operation Kingpin (Son Tay). Although a few will be touched on 
here, the majority were not in support of irregular warfare. 
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3. Spooky 
In 1966, SOF air forces again continued adapting existing aircraft and 
technology as they altered the battlespace with innovation to introduce the AC-47 
“Spooky” gunship.371 Based on very successful test results in 1965, the initial 
purchase order included 26 airframes.372 The Spooky was followed by both the 
AC-130 Spectre and AC-119G/Ks. Once again, special operations aviators 
developed TTPs for effectively employing their weapon system literally on the fly. 
Crews developed methods to account for slant range, airspeed, wind, and gun 
recoil. Minigun accuracy was such that 400 rounds could be placed in a 31.5 foot 
circle with just one four-second burst of fire at 4,500 feet slant range.373 Together 
these platforms revolutionized “on-call” combat air support. Their massive fire 
power struck fear in the hearts of the enemy. The Viet Cong even issued “orders 
not to attack the Dragon, as weapons were useless and it would only infuriate the 
monster.”374 As a testimony to the lasting contribution of the gunship concept, the 
AC-130 Spectre H/U platforms have seen extensive use in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the next generation AC-130J is currently in production.  
4. C-7 – Assault Airlift 
The C-7 Caribou, manufactured by de Havilland as the DHC-4, was one of 
the most successful aircraft in a line of machines designed to tackle the rough 
field STOL operations (STOL-RF). “The C-7 possessed a unique combination of 
modest speed, economy of operation, and [STOL-RF] abilities that gave it 
offsetting value in the counterinsurgency operations of the Vietnam War.” 375 The 
Caribou exceeded rotary lift performance considerably in its ability to carry heavy 
loads over great distances. When CH-47s might be limited to just 200 nautical 
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miles, a Caribou would be able to carry the same load for 700 nautical miles.376 
Another significant advantage of the Caribou was its ability to land on runways 
which could be cleared meeting less restrictive standards than those required by 
its larger cousins the C-123 Provider and C-130 Hercules. These two advantages 
made the Caribou “enormously valuable” throughout the Vietnam experience,377 
at least until the Air Force “forced the army to give up the twin-engined 
Caribou.378 
The Caribou, along with the C-123 Provider, was the backbone of this 
class of “assault airlifters,” although this was not necessarily because the 
Caribou was the best aircraft available for the job. As great a performer the 
Caribou was, aircraft with better performance, greater useful load and shorter 
takeoff distances, were being developed. However, the C-7 and C-123 were 
adopted in favor of others largely due to inertia within the DoD: 
The main barriers to acquisition of these aircraft have been the 
absence of a strong community of advocates within the Air Force 
and DoD and the differences between the Army’s and Air Force’s 
visions of what such aircraft should be and should do in light of 
shifting national defense strategies.379 
Despite lessons learned and requirements voiced during more recent 
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, these barriers still exist to this day. A 
prime example is the continued conflict between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air 
Force to field “a flexible fleet of smaller transports” versus “diversions of 
resources away from other core missions,” and an inability field an effective 
assault airlifter once the last C-7 was retired in the 1985.380 
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5. Foreign Internal Defense 
Foreign internal defense (FID) is important on several levels. First and 
foremost, the foundational doctrine statement of FID recognized in AFDD3-22 
Foreign Internal Defense highlights this importance; “FID efforts are most 
successful when they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military 
personnel and equipment.”381 Owen and Mueller assert that FID is important on 
two major levels. “First, it allows the United States to support states with advice, 
assistance, and technologies that they probably could not acquire on their own 
and that, second, it reduces or at least delays the need for direct U.S. 
involvement against insurgencies where it is effective.”382 According to current 
USAF doctrine, FID encompasses seven major activities:  Facilitate Transfer of 
U.S. Defense Articles and Services; Assess Foreign Military Aviation 
Capabilities; Train Foreign Military Forces; Advise Foreign Military Forces and 
Government Agencies; Assist Foreign Aviation Forces in Mission Execution; 
Facilitate Force Integration for Multinational Operations; Provide Direct Support 
to Host Countries.383 Waterpump was but one example of FID in action during 
the Vietnam War. 
Waterpump was the nickname for Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing 
that was deployed to train Laotian and Thai pilots on March 5, 1964. In this early 
FID mission, 66 men achieved “what a regular air force unit would have required 
350 men to accomplish. Sixteen C-47 pilots, twenty-six Thai T-28 pilots, nine Lao 
T-28 pilots and a dozen Air American T-28 pilots were trained, plus various 
maintenance personnel.”384 As we have witnessed in many of our vignettes, 
small SOF units are often able to accomplish much, despite their small numbers. 
As the program continued to succeed, Waterpump was expanded to provide 
medical assistance to Thailand and Laos as well, reaching as many as 96,000 
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Thais in one six-month span.385 By 1966, Air Force special operations had 
reached its peak with over 6,000 people and 550 aircraft deployed throughout 
nine countries.386 
Project Duck Hook was another FID mission starting in 1964 that trained 
38 Nationalist Chinese and 22 South Vietnamese C-123 airmen. “The training 
emphasised [sic] night low-level and bad-weather missions in mountainous 
terrain, utilising [sic] three specially configured aircraft.”387 This program was the 
first Big Safari project led by Lockheed Aircraft Services and included configuring 
the six C-123Bs with electronic countermeasures and a Doppler navigation 
system.388 
Throughout the Vietnam War, FID, when combined with airlift in particular, 
was a major component of the overall strategy. Literally hundreds of C-47s, C-
123s and C-130s were supplied to the South Vietnamese. “Light planes” and C-
123s were transferred to Laos and Cambodia.389 Despite the importance and 
success of foreign internal defense efforts, “the Air Force has taken a minimal 
approach to providing airlift support to governments conducting 
counterinsurgencies.”390 So much so, that FID has all but dropped off of the Air 
Force Special Operations Command’s list of priorities and the AFSOC squadron 
dedicated to FID is divesting itself of rotary-wing assets. This decision was made 
despite the fact that “in the past three decades, U.S. transfers of aircraft to 
countries engaged in counterinsurgencies have emphasized helicopters.”391 
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6. Civil Air Transport – Air America 
It seems strange to think that the roots of Air America stretch all the way 
back to China. In 1937 Claire Chennault was invited to China by the wife of 
Chiang Kai Shek “to take on the job of training and organizing the Chinese Air 
Force on a three month contract at a thousand dollars a month.”392 By 1938, the 
Japanese controlled much of China while Chennault’s group of pilots, the Flying 
Tigers, lacked the aircraft to make much of a difference.  
It was not until 1941 that the U.S. realized the vital importance of 
keeping China in the war. Chennault saw his chance to form a real 
air force, using American fighter planes and pilots. He was allotted 
one hundred P-40s, already rejected by the British as too obsolete 
for the war in Europe, and had his plan approved to form an 
American Volunteer group to fly them.393 
 After WWII, Chennault remained in China forming the company Civil Air 
Transport (CAT) that flew commercial operations all over China. By 1949 the CIA 
was offering cash advances for operations against the rising Chinese 
communists.394 Eventually the CIA purchased CAT outright. “Chennault never let 
on that CAT was thereafter anything but a private airline hauling freight and 
passengers around Asia.”395 Later as the air arm of the CIA, Air America ran their 
air operations in Korea and later Vietnam.  
After much experience in Korea, it was an obvious choice that Air America 
would operate in Vietnam. As early as 1953, CAT was operating with the French 
as they tried to maintain their colonial possession.396 Although “the French air 
force did not provide low-level fighter escorts,” CAT pilots flew airdrop missions 
against the Vietminh into Dienbienphu twice daily.397  
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There was always close coordination between CAT (CIA) and the U.S. Air 
Force as many CAT pilots were in the AF. In 1959, CAT was officially renamed 
Air America, and Heine Aderholt was selected to command the squadron based 
out of Okinawa, Japan that would be responsible for Laos and Thailand.398 Air 
America aircraft and crews were used to fill a gap in air power capabilities. This is 
a trend that will repeat itself in OIF/OEF. “This secret war in difficult terrain 
demanded a particular type of aircraft, and AA acquired a bewildering array of 
special purpose planes. The most essential, apart from helicopters, were the 
short takeoff and landing planes known among the pilots as STOL.”399 AA 
missions were very diverse throughout Laos and Vietnam. They mostly flew a 
variety of STOL aircraft into crude landing strips on a flattened mountain top or a 
clearing in the trees. Of all of the STOL aircraft used for these missions, the 
Pilatus Porter was the star. They would deliver supplies or ammunition, and pick 
up passengers or wounded. They often did resupply airdrops. They were even 
known to drop napalm from the aircraft, “Hot soup [homemade napalm] was 
dropped from two hundred feet, making the plane a sitting target, but it was a 
very effective weapon. Double thermite grenades were strapped onto the fifty-
gallon drums, which were then loaded onto pallets in pairs and pushed out the 
back of the plane.”400 In a testament to how far these aircraft and their crews 
were pushed, Porter losses from other than enemy fires were deemed 
unacceptable. Bird Air, another CIA contract air operator, asked Pilatus to assist 
in the investigation. After the Pilatus chief pilot flew to 16 different landing zones 
with Bird Air’s chief pilot, he declared: 
There is nothing wrong with your planes, your pilots, your 
techniques or your maintenance. What’s wrong is that out of our 16 
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designed for. The others were so short, so steep, so tricky or so 
crooked that it is only a matter of time before an accident 
happens.401  
Throughout Vietnam, Air Force special operators supported their ground 
counterparts, both American and Vietnamese. Birddog pilots lived amongst U.S. 
Army Special Forces providing forward air control.402 Commandos trained foreign 
pilots in true FID style. However, once President Johnson ordered the shift to “a 
massive bombing campaign” in the form of Operation Rolling Thunder, the 
counterinsurgency, and air power’s role in it particularly, came to an end.403 
Following the Vietnam War, Americans became obsessed with firepower and 
technology. For every problem, if the answer did not lay in nuclear deterrence, 
the answer could be found in conventional overwhelming firepower delivered via 
the air. This is confirmed in a survey of professional air power journals of the 
period. Besides just a couple of articles, “the Air Force seemed either supremely 
uninterested in the subject or assumed that, in terms of airpower, protracted 
revolutionary warfare was just conventional warfare writ small.”404 Despite these 
efforts abroad, and those at home by the Special Air Warfare Center to educate 
leaders and incorporate insurgency and counterinsurgency into emerging 
doctrine manuals, a “scant two pages” of lip service was indicative of the true 
doctrinal emphasis.405 Once again, the U.S. Air Force remained ensconced in the 
doctrine of nuclear and strategic bombing. 
Following the Vietnam War, Air Force special operations found itself in a 
rapid decline. “By 1979 only one air force special operations wing was left, with 
its squadrons composed of AC-130A Spectre gunships, MC-130E Combat 
Talons, and CH-3E Jolly Green and UH-1N Huey helicopters.”406 This was one of 
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the lowest points in American special operations air power, a claim that would 
become evident later during Operation Eagle Claw, the failed Iranian hostage 
rescue attempt also known as Desert One. 
7. Air Mobile Forces 
Perhaps the most innovative use of air power in IW during the Vietnam 
War was by the Army, not the Air Force. Not only was the use of heli-borne 
forces innovative, it was done in a massive scale. In fact, during the Vietnam War 
with its large heli-borne force, the U.S. Army had the world’s third largest air 
force, trailing only the U.S. Air Force and the air force of the Soviet Union.407 
While the first helicopters to be used in combat were with the Number 1 Air 
Commando Group in Burma,408 the French later used a rotary wing heavy force 
in Algeria with success. At the tactical level, the U.S. Army built on French 
experiences and fundamentally changed how ground units operate. This rotary 
wing force completely innovated battlefield mobility. However, this fundamentally 
irregular and innovative form of battlefield mobility would be a failure. 
When the Army introduced the Air Mobile Division to Vietnam in 1965, 
they envisioned a platform that could “fly over enemy held territory to land large 
bodies of troops in the same way as the parachute units.”409 The innovative use 
of helicopters as an air assault technique, “transformed the war. They rescued 
columns which had been ambushed, evacuated casualties and ‘downed’ airmen, 
carried reconnaissance and protected outposts.”410 The Bell UH-1 Huey was the 
workhorse, carrying ten armed men or their equivalent weight in cargo. In the 
Army’s view, a helicopter air-mobile force, although an innovative concept, was 
largely seen as a means to support conventional operations versus a 
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counterinsurgency.411 The large air assault forces forged a capability for 
battlefield mobility that filled an airlift/air assault gap in air force capabilities.  
During the conflict, there were innovations to the basic heli-borne 
capability that demonstrated its real utility. Heavy lift CH-47 Chinook helicopters 
capable of carrying 40 armed men or their equivalent weight in cargo, were 
developed and fielded.412 Helicopters were fitted with machine guns and rocket 
racks; the AH-1 Cobra was also developed as a Huey-based helicopter gunship. 
The helicopter gunship was a fairly effective close air support capability at a time 
when the Air Force and Army were competing with each other on the 
development of close air support capabilities. 
Amidst all the innovation and fanfare for the air-mobile division, it was still 
an IW failure. Even though the U.S. forces flew 37 million helicopter sorties 
during the course of the war, compared with only 1.24 million fixed wing 
sorties,413 the Army failed to utilize the capability as a part of an IW strategy. The 
helicopter air assault came to characterize the large conventional army almost as 
soon as it was introduced. During the conflict, the U.S. lost a total of 4,587 
helicopters414 and failed to realize the full potential of the capability. In the years 
following Vietnam, helicopters would prove more valuable in supporting IW.  
B. ISRAELI OPERATIONS 
1. Operation Jonathan:  Entebbe 
On July 4, 1976, after several terrifying days of captivity at the hands of 
terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Israeli 
commandos rescued 106 Israeli and non-Israeli Jews. The operation had been 
planned in less than a week and was a great success, demonstrating Israeli 
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resolve.415 Air power in the form of the venerable C-130 was integral to the 
operation. Jonathan Netanyahu was the mastermind behind the plan and this 
operation would ensure that he would go down in history as an Israeli hero. 
Netanyahu’s plan was to employ C-130s to transport Israeli commandos, 
false-flagged vehicles, and Buffalo armored personnel carriers along with a 
medical team and other personnel.416 The raid was carried out with exceptional 
precision. “Four C-130s flew in radio silence for 2,000 miles at low and medium 
level, through violent African storms, arriving 30 seconds behind schedule and 
prepared to land on a blacked-out runway.”417 The first C-130 landed six minutes 
ahead of the remaining three in hopes of deceiving the Ugandans and terrorists 
with the false-flagged, official-looking vehicles. The remaining C-130s then 
landed to deliver the rest of the supporting forces. The deception proved effective 
and the element of surprise remained on the Israelis’ side. Unfortunately, 
Netanyahu was mortally wounded during the initial assault on the old terminal.418 
Despite losing Netanyahu and suffering several other casualties as well, 
the operation was an overall success. The C-130s had successfully evaded 
detection during the route from Israel to Uganda and landed under the cover of 
darkness, taking the enemy by total surprise. Within just 51 minutes of the first 
aircraft landing, 106 hostages had been rescued and left Entebbe aboard the first 
departing C-130.419 
2. Operation Babylon 
The abilities of the Israeli Air Force were once again demonstrated on 
June 7, 1981, when Israeli F-16s flew an unprecedented low-level infiltration into 
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Iraq. Their mission was to destroy the Osirak nuclear reactor just 12 miles 
southeast of Baghdad. The Israeli pilots had trained for close to a year, 
developing tactics to avoid radar detection, both ground and airborne, and 
training to employ their “dumb” bombs with pinpoint accuracy.420 On the night of 
execution, “eight F-16s escorted by six F-15s flew 635 miles through Saudi 
Arabian and Jordanian airspace 100 feet above the desert. They achieved such 
complete surprise in their destruction of the installation that Iraq was unaware 
who was responsible until the Israeli government announce the success.”421 This 
operation is an excellent example of how meticulous training can have a direct 
effect on mission outcome. Much of what is known about the operation is based 
on conjecture but the results speak for themselves; the Israeli crews all returned 
home without a single loss. Although Operation Babylon was at the time and 
remains cloaked in secrecy, planning began as early 1979 and culminated that 
night in June when Israeli air forces were successful in dealing a serious setback 
to Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions.422  
In this operation, the forces used were conventional F-16s; however, they 
trained repeatedly and specifically for this mission, making this operation 
somewhat special and certainly outside the realm of regular, conventional 
conflict. Operation Babylon is also an example of how, beginning in the late 
1970s and continuing through the Persian Gulf War and even into today, 
technically advanced firepower delivered by air forces has become the force of 
choice. 
C. OPEARATION EL DORADO CANYON 
Operation El Dorado Canyon was, in many ways, the Americans’ version 
of Operation Babylon. The U.S. task force had to overcome several similar 
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challenges, particularly long flight times to reach the target. In the Libyan case, 
the U.S. was denied overflight by both France and Spain and was forced to route 
around the south into the Mediterranean, roughly doubling the required flight 
distance.423 In contrast to the Israelis, the American strike package was 
enormous:  24 F-111Fs, five EF-111As, a combination of 28 KC-10s and KC-
135s, plus 70 sea-based assets as well. This gorilla package infiltrated 2500 
nautical miles in radio silence, penetrated the Libyan air defenses, and struck 
three separate target areas with just one aircraft lost. The raid itself lasted 
approximately 11 minutes.424 
Although Muammar al-Gaddafi escaped death, El Dorado Canyon 
demonstrated the tactical effectiveness of air power in less than total war. In the 
case of El Dorado Canyon, air strikes were the only military option “ever seriously 
considered” by President Reagan and his staff.425 This progression in the view of 
air power’s efficacy would shift policy and doctrine for years to come. As Dennis 
Drew predicted: 
 Airpower will likely be the weapon of choice to enforce 
counterproliferation and counterterrorist policies for at least three 
reasons. First, airpower will often be the only military means 
capable of striking at the heart of the problem. Second, air strikes 
generally are over with quickly, creating less exposure and risk to 
the participants. . . . The third reason that will make airpower the 
weapon of choice in future is time. . . . Airpower, of all the military 
forces, is the most time sensitive in terms of both force preparation 
and mission execution.426 
D. CONGO, ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA 
Although the American Volunteer Group was disbanded on July 4, 1942, 
the use of mercenary pilots would continue throughout several peripheral 
conflicts. One such pilot was Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, “a Swedish 
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aristocrat who made mercenary history of a sort by flying only on behalf of 
underdogs.”427 In an odd twist of fate, von Rosen’s aunt became the wife of the 
Air Marshall of the Third Reich, Hermann Wilhelm Göring, but the Count would 
choose to support the plight of those less fortunate.428  
Von Rosen’s mercenary career began prior to WWII when he supported 
the Ethiopian resistance against Mussolini’s forces. Backed by British intelligence 
agents, the Count flew numerous missions delivering both medicines and other 
supplies to the Ethiopian resistance.429 Von Rosen continued to support 
underdogs when the Soviet Union invaded Finland. However, when his 
relationship with Göring resulted in his arrest by first the British (after rescuing a 
Dutch DC-3 from the German assault on Schipol Airport) and then the Gestapo, 
von Rosen sat out the rest of the War in Sweden.430 
Following the War, von Rosen returned to Ethiopia where he assisted in 
building their air force until 1956 and when events began to heat up in the Congo 
in 1960, the Count found himself involved there as well.431 In order to support his 
rebellion in Katanga and its attempt to secede from Congo, Moise Tshombe hired 
mercenary pilots to strike at the United Nations supported Congo forces. 
Tshombe with his force 200 mercenaries delayed the advance of the 10,000 
strong U.N. force.432 During this period, von Rosen found himself supporting the 
United Nations side as the chief for Transair’s Congo operations. He narrowly 
escaped death when he was back home in Sweden for business instead of flying 
the U.N. Secretary General on the night his aircraft inexplicably crashed.433 
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Von Rosen was certainly not the only foreign pilot contributing to 
revolutionary efforts throughout Africa. Running guns around the Congo, Nigeria 
and the breakaway state of Biafra became a means for pilots willing to not ask 
questions to make a tidy profit. Henry Warton, an American, was just one of 
these pilots. Super Constellations, DC-6s, and DC-4s were favored for their 
inexpensive acquisition cost. Flights were generally made at night to avoid the 
Nigerian Air Force pilots who refused to fly at night.434   
E. COLONIAL WARS 
The United States and Israel are not the only two nations employing air 
power during this period. The French and British had colonial wars of their own to 
fight in an irregular fashion. Each chose distinctive ways to approach the problem 
set in each of their regions of conflict. 
1. British Colonial Wars – Borneo, Aden, Dhofar 
Following the conclusion of the Malaya and Kenyan conflicts in 1960, the 
British entered a brief period of respite from peripheral insurgencies. However, 
this rest would be short-lived as insurgencies arose in Borneo and Aden.435 At 
this same time, the British were mirroring the shift in U.S. policy to nuclear 
deterrence as the backbone for its force structure. Driven by hard economic 
times, the British government was searching for the most fiscally efficient 
defense solution. According to Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Defence in 
1957, that solution was nuclear deterrence.436 This fundamental shift in focus, as 
described in the 1957 White Paper, “meant the replacement of aircraft with 
strategic missiles, and reliance for dealing with external threats placed on nuclear 
weapons. . . . Little room was left for allocations for replacement aircraft or 
nonnuclear contingencies.”437 
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Unfortunately, despite their efforts to avoid irregular conflict, the British 
became embroiled within Borneo as Malaya attempted to annex Singapore along 
with Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. When rebels seized a Shell Oil Company 
facility in Seria, the British responded with the Queen’s Own Highlanders 
infiltrated via assault airlifters. A STOL Blackburn Beverley aircraft airlanded 90 
personnel into a grass landing strip adjacent to the Shell facility while five Twin 
Pioneers brought in 60 additional men to the opposite side. Combined against 
the rebels, these forces made short work of the resistance and rescued the 
hostages in less than 24 hours.438 Throughout the duration of the conflict, the 
British mimicked their success in Malaya using helicopters and STOL aircraft. 
These tactics effectively multiplied their end-strength, enabling the British to 
counter an insurgent force that always surpassed the size of their own forces.439  
 The British also made extensive use of STOL Beverleys, Argosy cargo 
aircraft and Belvedere helicopters during operations in southern Arabia in the 
mid-1960s. This operation was a turning point for British colonial operations. 
After 30 of the RAF running police actions in the region, ground forces were 
increased and command over counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
operations was given to the British Army.440 Because of the rough terrain, 
helicopter support became an essential component to operations in the region, 
although flights were plagued by bad weather, performance and mission 
limitations. One example of this occurred during Operation Nutcracker. 
Hampered by weather, the insertion force was delayed and came under enemy 
fire as well. Mission restrictions prevented the hulking Belvederes from operating 
under enemy fire and the insertion was essentially placed on hold with men on 
the ground in harm’s way. This delay was finally only resolved after the decision 
to resume operations went up to the highest levels of RAF command in the 
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region.441 Ultimately, the British would streamline their command and control 
structure and successfully expanded helicopter operations throughout the region.  
Success during the British campaign in Dhofar “also rested on the tactical 
mobility of the British and federation forces.”442 The helicopter was particularly 
effective in this venue and was used to deliver assault forces on target, keep 
them supplied and evacuate their casualties.443  
Within the South Arabia campaign, just as in Malaya and Kenya, “the light 
aircraft and especially the helicopters, were thus invaluable in maintaining troop 
morale.”444 Ultimately, “air power had proved a winning factor in a lost war – a 
loss that was in no way attributable to the military. . . . Britain had placed itself in 
the impossible situation of trying to maintain strategic presence in a region from 
which it had pledged to withdraw in the near future.”445  
Britain’s experience throughout this period of peripheral conflict 
demonstrated the absolute utility of the helicopter. Helicopters became the 
backbone for logistics and support of fielded forces and the British campaign 
exhibited the need for solid helicopter support.446  
2. French Colonial Wars – Mauritania, Chad, Libya 
The French experience during colonial wars in Chad, Libya and other 
African nations demonstrated a noticeable shift in doctrine and strategy. 
Previously, air power played a central role as the executer of control from the air. 
However, in the late 1970s, this shifted to “an increasing reliance on the air force 
to project firepower”447 The British implemented a model of air policing using 
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aircraft, and the helicopter in particular, in a supporting role. The French built 
their force around a foundation of strike aircraft. This reliance, coupled with 
economics, fostered the development of multi-role aircraft such as the Mirage 
and Jaguar, both backbones of the French Air Force (FAF) during this time. 
French airlift assets were “extremely limited”448 which certainly played a role in 
this shift to a strike mindset as well. Despite this, the FAF was not without its own 
foray into air advising during the conflict between Mauritania and the Polisario 
guerrillas.  
The French supported the Mauritanians with 70 training and equipment 
advisors along with 20 aviation specialists. The Mauritanians utilized several 
aircraft configured for COIN operations, specifically Britten-Norman Defenders 
and Reims F337 Super Skymasters in addition to FAF Transalls and 
Noratlases.449 This effort, however, would not prove to be the norm throughout 
the region. 
The remainder of the 1970s and 1980s saw continued reliance on Jaguars 
and Mirages to project firepower in Chad and Libya. Although the French made 
increased use of tactical airlift as their capabilities expanded, the general theme 
throughout this period is one of conventional assets supporting an irregular 
conflict. The longer this conflicts persisted, as more troops were deployed, the 
more conventionalized the conflicts became.  
F. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 
The First Gulf War showcased the incredible capabilities of conventional 
air power in a major combat operation. The air campaign plan was straight out of 
Warden’s playbook. Focused on strategically paralyzing the Iraqi leadership from 
the start, and lasting only weeks instead of months, the campaign was designed 
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to specifically target Saddam Hussein’s regime.450 General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, the Central Command Commander, harbored certain distrust for 
special operations forces. Thus, it was no surprise that an irregular warfare effort 
utilizing the “Kuwaiti resistance within Kuwait was resoundingly rejected.”451  In 
fact, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, “special operations across the 
border into Iraq or Kuwait could only be undertaken with his personal 
approval.”452 Despite these restrictions, SOF was able to still contribute to the 
war effort namely in the form of FID and special reconnaissance missions.453 
Special operations air power, however, mostly provided support for direct action 
missions and CSAR. Perhaps the best summation of how the U.S. Air Force 
emerged from the Gulf War is how General Charles Horner describes it:  “new 
era warfare.”454 Any mention of special operations, ground or air based, is 
noticeably absent in Horner’s paper and indicative of a strategic conventional air 
power focus dominating doctrine once more. 
G. KOSOVO 
After reaching its “apotheosis” during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
American air power was faced with new challenges precipitated by the fall of the 
Soviet Union.455 Attempting to capitalize on the perceived omnipotence of 
combat air power, NATO launched Operation Allied Force. The intent of NATO’s 
campaign was “to protect ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo 
from Serb aggression” as well as put an end to the ethnic cleansing which was 
occurring.456 Air operations were limited in both size and scope. While the NATO 
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commander, General Wesley Clark, wanted to expand the operation with “more 
air resources, and a ground campaign capability as well,” NATO allies insisted on 
a “gradualist approach” and he was denied such support by the Clinton 
administration.457 
Despite these challenges, there was some use of special operations 
forces during Operation Allied Force. The 7th Special Operations Squadron from 
RAF Mildenhall, UK conducted the largest PSYOP leaflet campaign since WWII. 
These crews flew 52 missions in just 79 days, dropping over 101 million leaflets. 
Success of the campaign was measured by local news reports from the drop 
targets.458 Ultimately, the Kosovo campaign would be considered another 
example of omnipotence of combat air power thoroughly relegating air support 
for irregular operations to the back burner once again. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The era encompassing the Vietnam War through Kosovo was one that 
started out with a promising growth in irregular air power innovation. However, 
once the Vietnam War became largely conventionalized, air power once again 
fell into disuse in regards to irregular warfare. The Air Force was “dominated by 
‘bomber generals’ for generations, from the very first Chief of Staff, General Carl 
A. Spaatz, in September 1947, down through the ninth chief, General David C. 
Jones, in 1974.”459 Despite lessons learned during Malaya and efforts in the early 
years of Vietnam, air power could not overcome this inertia. 
As demonstrated by the British in Malaya, there are effective 
counterinsurgent strategies, and airpower can play a significant 
role. The importance of airpower may go far beyond that achieved 
by the British because so many of the problems they faced have 
been overcome by technology. However, even the most powerful 
and sophisticated airpower employment will come to naught if it is 
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not applied as part of a comprehensive military/nonmilitary strategy 
designed to combat the peculiarities of Maoist-based 
insurgencies.460 
This lesson was lost on leadership during this era and reinforced by 
conventional, and at least in the eyes of the Air Force, air power led, success in 
both the Gulf War and Kosovo.  
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VI. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE – FROM 9/11 TO 
THE PRESENT 
Relatively speaking, the history of air power is short in comparison to other 
forms of warfare. Within that relatively short history, the modern period from 
September 11, 2001 to the present is distinct. What makes this period distinct is 
the unique marriage between large conventional militaries and high tech, 
precision technology mounted against irregular enemies.   
In many cases where air power is used in an irregular manner, the mission 
or capabilities are also classified. Many of the vignettes discussed in previous 
chapters were written based off of accounts and reports that had been 
declassified in the years that followed. Case studies like the WWII Carpetbagger 
support of the OSS Jedburgh teams in Europe and U.S. Army Air Forces 
Classified Project Nine to support Orde Wingate’s Chindits are both prime 
examples. Even in the current operational environment, rich with media and free 
flowing information, there are undoubtedly classified examples of the irregular 
use of air power waiting to be discussed in the years to come.   
This chapter will focus on the unclassified examples, cases where air 
power has once again been used in irregular warfare. Since September 11, 
2001, many militaries have found themselves continuously operating in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. For the U.S. military, this time period was characterized by 
extremely high operations tempos, but matched with increasing (until recently) 
budgets for both people and equipment. 
A. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
The attacks that targeted the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and White 
House on September 11, 2001 initiated a sequence of events which included the 
end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime 
in Iraq and the death of Osama bin Laden, during all of which air power played a 
significant role.  
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1. 9/11 to Anaconda 
Shortly after 9/11, U.S. Army Colonel John Mulholland, the commander of 
the Fifth Special Forces Group, gathered his troops to give a one sentence 
briefing, “Gentlemen, you have been selected to infiltrate Afghanistan.”461 Under 
those marching orders, starting on October 19, Task Force Dagger began 
infiltrating teams of Army Special Forces (SF) soldiers and Air Force combat 
controllers (CCT) into Afghanistan via Army MH-47 Chinook and AFSOC MH-53J 
Pave Low helicopters.462,463 Landing zones were marked by small Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) teams who infiltrated Afghanistan beginning on 
September 26. The CIA’s mission was to contact members of the Northern 
Alliance and they brought with them large amounts of currency to fund the 
operation.464 Each SF team was comprised of an Operational Detachment Alpha 
(ODA), normally 12 men, and one or two Air Force CCT.465 
This was something of a first, perhaps a milestone in Army/Air Force 
cooperation. Pairing SF and CCT essentially positioned an AF liaison with each 
ODA and provided almost unparalleled coordination at the tactical level. “These 
Army SOF troops, with their attached Air Force terminal attack controllers, would 
provide the first eyes on target for enabling what eventually became a 
remarkably successful U.S. exercise in air-ground cooperation.”466 While the AF 
command and control still resided at the Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia, AF CCTs provided an 
effective liaison between the supported ground forces and the airborne assets 
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along with their command and control. The principle responsibility of these teams 
was to call in air strikes against Taliban forces, especially those in contact with 
friendly forces. 
The Afghans watched in wonder as the Special Forces soldiers set 
up their secret weapon, a dark gray box called a laser target 
designator, and pointed its lens toward the Soviet-made tanks and 
artillery. Its laser marked the target and the range finder calculated 
the distance. The men on the ground called on the satellite 
communications to the unseen pilots in the sky and to their 
intermediaries, who were sitting in Saudi Arabia thousands of miles 
to the south.467  
The support provided by air assets fulfilled several roles. “Supplies were 
air-dropped when weather permitted, and jet fighters were placed on alert to 
bomb targets as the men on the ground called for them.”468 Additionally, air 
power was used in humanitarian roles; to counter bin Laden’s propaganda, the 
U.S. demonstrated its friendliness toward the Afghani population by air-dropping 
humanitarian daily rations.469 
The successful integration of SOF with air power and the Northern 
Alliance, was a huge success. In a short time, Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul, and 
Kandahar all fell, demoralizing the Taliban and effectively ending their rule.470 
“The Taliban fled in the face of the binational cavalry and the awesome power of 
U.S. air support. No one had ever imagined that fewer than one hundred Special 
Forces soldiers and an indigenous militia could overthrow a government so 
quickly.”471 By early 2002, the clear success of SOF in an unconventional setting 
yielded to conventional forces that began to take charge of the overall military 
effort.472  
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2. Anaconda to Present 
The beginning of OEF saw conventional air forces used to support 
irregular ground forces. The air missions were largely conventional, but their 
support to irregular ground forces was notable. In contrast, the large scale 
introduction of conventional troops to Afghanistan, brought with it changes to the 
tactical impact air power had on the battlefield. In the first several months of 
OEF, the Taliban presented coalition forces with targets that were very 
conventional. With their defeat in numerous major Afghan cities and finally in 
Operation Anaconda, the Taliban settled for a guerrilla and insurgent style of 
warfare which mated nicely with Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda style 
attacks. “Al Qaeda forces proved far more elusive than the Taliban, and the U.S. 
achieved less-decisive results against them. The formula for success against the 
Taliban, i.e., indigenous forces supported by air power, produced disappointing 
results against al Qaeda.”473  
In March 2002, Operation Anaconda placed both conventional and SOF 
forces on the battlefield along with Afghan forces in the Shah-i Kot Valley. 
Located in the mountains to the west of Khowst, the Shah-i Kot Valley was the 
suspected encampment of both Taliban and al Qaeda forces. The lessons 
learned in the previous months were all but forgotten, when the Combined Joint 
Task Force was assigned to the 10th Mountain Division. “Operation Anaconda 
was the first large-scale conventional operation involving U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan.”474 In fact, Operation Anaconda marked the end of OEF for much of 
the Army’s 5th SF Group.475 
The plan for Anaconda was a version of the traditional “hammer and anvil” 
strategy which uses a mobile unit (hammer) to smash the opposing force up 
against a larger stationary force (anvil). In this case, the Afghan forces under Zia 
Lodin, paired with SOF elements, would sweep through the valley forcing the 
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militants up against the wall created by U.S. forces, mainly the soldiers from the 
101st Airborne Division who would air assault into the valley via rotary wing lift. 
The operation did not go according to plan. U.S. and Afghan forces met 
opposition much stronger than the 200 fighters predicted. The forces from the 
101st came under heavy fire and the Afghan forces retreated after an AC-130 
gunship inadvertently attacked their lead element.476 Even though the CJTF 
leadership neglected to address the need for CAS in their planning, the 
opposition was ultimately overcome by air strikes, the heaviest of the war.477 
While not necessarily an irregular use of air power, the Operation 
Anaconda vignette yields a number of poignant lessons. First, this case could be 
used to argue against the rationale that more is always better. We found this 
logic false when large numbers of conventional troops were introduced to 
Vietnam and the lesson repeated itself in Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. 
More troops do not guarantee success. Perhaps this is what the great irregular 
warfare leader T.E. Lawrence meant when he said, “the smaller the unit, the 
better its performance.”478 Second, coordination between services is critical. In 
Anaconda the air component was not addressed at any level of planning. In the 
end, it was CAS that was decisive. Last, there were friendly fire incidents that 
could have been prevented with better coordination. The benefits of using CCT in 
coordination with SOF cannot be overstated, yet there is still a layer of separation 
between the supported forces and the supporting forces. As long as there is a 
layer between the two, air power may not be at its most effective. 
As forces in Afghanistan grew more conventionalized, additional lessons 
were learned regarding the makeup of the force. Many conventional force 
strategies for irregular warfare center around the idea that IW is a lesser form of 
conflict. A lesser form of conflict insinuates that it should be easier to counter and 
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that a force outfitted for conventional conflict is also outfitted for irregular conflict. 
Unfortunately, “while surgical air strikes can take out command and control 
centers, oil production facilities, and so forth, they cannot extinguish an 
international extremist Muslim conspiracy that seems to support, actively or 
passively, the terrorist movement.”479 When Taliban and al Qaeda resorted to 
insurgency and guerrilla hit and run tactics it highlighted certain gaps in the 
conventional force. When specifically applied to air forces, many of these 
conventional force gaps for irregular warfare were repeated in Iraq as well. 
In 2010, at the request of the USAF, RAND produced a monograph 
entitled, Courses of Action for Enhancing U.S. Air Force “Irregular Warfare” 
Capabilities, “to assist U.S. Air Force leadership in choosing ways to enhance Air 
Force capabilities and capacities for irregular warfare (IW).”480 The project looked 
at ongoing operations (at the time) in both Iraq and Afghanistan and detailed 
shortfalls emerging from operations that should be addressed. After more than 
ten years of continuous combat operations, these shortfalls were generated from 
irregular demands that the conventional force was either unable or unwilling to 
meet.  
First, the RAND report recommends that the USAF develop and procure 
light cargo aircraft. The previous vignettes of this thesis are peppered with 
examples where a light cargo aircraft capable of operating on small austere 
landing zones has been critical to irregular warfare operations. 
The Air Force could consider operating a transferable light cargo 
aircraft (aircraft in the 3,000- to 6,000-pound payload range) to help 
Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce and extend governance to remote 
and/or undergoverned regions with locally unobtrusive platforms 
(the more unobtrusive U.S. presence becomes, the better for the 
legitimacy of the local government in the eyes of the population). 
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These aircraft could support distributed U.S. and partner military 
operations, including resupply and medical evacuation.481 
This gap in air force capabilities has become evident with the expansion of 
contract air forces. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the contract air 
business exploded. Companies such as DynCorp International, Avenge Inc, 
Flightworks Inc, and Presidential Airways have all reaped the benefit of the 
increased requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
as well as combat airland and airdrop platforms that the air force cannot meet 
with its current assets. Second, the RAND report recommends the AF provide 
transferable, counterinsurgency-dedicated close air support and armed 
overwatch platform. 
The USAF is considering fielding a to-be-determined OA-X 
counterinsurgency-dedicated CAS platform that would provide light 
attack and ISR capability in support of U.S. and partner ground 
forces, but that could also be transferred as needed to the Iraqi and 
Afghan air arms. Such a dedicated counterinsurgency platform 
would help ensure persistent presence and engagement with Iraqi 
and Afghan partners while lowering operating costs and reducing 
the excessive flying-hour demands for high-performance aircraft 
such as the F-16. Transferability would depend on the platform’s 
flexibility, sustainability, ease of maintenance, and interoperability 
with U.S. and Coalition forces.482  
Once again, the current force is lacking in this area. A small tactical CAS platform 
that is closely coordinated with the supported force, is indispensible.   The small 
low cost platform is easy to field and provides the ground forces with the 
overwatch, longer station times, and tactical firepower desired. Last, the RAND 
report recommends the AF add more combat aviation advisors. 
First, as the Iraqi Air Force and Afghan Air Corps continue to 
expand, there will be an increasing need for advanced tactical 
training that enables Iraqi and Afghan rotary- and fixed-wing 
aircrews to conduct sophisticated air-ground operations. This is an 
area in which combat aviation advisors excel and to which they 
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bring specialized training skills. Thus, the demand for combat 
aviation advisors can be expected to grow.483  
Several attempts were made to field such a platform, but contracting issues and 
a lack of buy-in from Air Force leadership has led these half-hearted attempts to 
failure. Additionally, despite this report combat aviation advising remains one of 
AFSOC’s lowest priorities and support, especially rotary-wing, has actually been 
cut rather than expanded. 
B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
In March 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, there was no 
question what the force would look like. With the conflict in Afghanistan two years 
old, conventional forces were already taking foot in theater. With the “Left Hook” 
of Desert Storm still a distant memory for planners, the plans for “Shock and 
Awe” were formulated. Air Force leaders still had visions of Colonel John 
Warden’s Five Ring model and strategic paralysis which patterned much of their 
planning. “Unlike Afghanistan [until March 2002], Iraq would be fought mostly 
with conventional forces, but the Pentagon’s civilian leadership pressed for it to 
be fought as innovatively as possible”484 While operations in Iraq were largely 
addressed with conventional forces, the threat evolved. There was a distinct 
change in the flavor of the opposition in May 2003. On May 1, 2003 on board the 
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and against the backdrop of a large banner 
stating “Mission Accomplished,” the President of the United States, George W. 
Bush, announced “major combat operations in Iraq had ended.”485 It was after 
that point that that nature of the opposition changed from a conventional 
opponent to an active insurgency. 
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1. Regime Change 
In the short period of combat operations that preceded the “Mission 
Accomplished” announcement, air power was used in a very conventional way. 
Conventional forces were used to destroy or cripple conventional targets. Unlike 
Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein was the target in 2003. Regime change was a 
priority. But much like Desert Storm, Iraqi Scud missiles were a serious concern. 
As a result, many of the Army SF ODA teams that were so successful in 
Afghanistan were asked to operate in Iraq. “Their success in Afghanistan had led 
the conventional military to appreciate what they could do.”486 The plan to 
prevent Scud launches was simple, find the Scuds and call in air power to 
destroy them. SF accomplished a similar mission during Desert Storm from 
which they learned several lessons. Among these was the fact “that the Scuds 
could not be identified and stopped by air power alone and that the ground force 
had to be mobile, stealthy, and large enough to cover all the territory from which 
missiles might be fired.”487 Conventional air forces in the form of F-16s, A-10s 
and B-52s were “on call in the western desert twenty-four hours a day. If Special 
Forces spotted a target or got into trouble, they would call on their friends in the 
sky. A fleet dedicated to the western desert was vital for the quick reaction 
needed to prevent missile launches.”488 While the regime fell rather quickly, a 
rather obvious result of conventional military dominance, combat operations were 
far from over. 
2. Ugly Baby 
Operation Ugly Baby was the brainchild of Colonel Charlie Cleveland, the 
commander of the 10th Special Forces Group in early 2003 at the beginning of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Hampered by diplomatic concerns with the Turks, 
Cleveland was forced to devise a method to infiltrate his 5,200-man task force 
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into northern Iraq. However, with six MC-130H Combat Talon IIs, Task Force 
Viking successfully performed what has been called “longest infiltration by 
Combat Talons into enemy territory in special operations history.” 489 The aircraft 
were forced to fly low level by virtue of flying at emergency/wartime max weights, 
airframe performance and weather conditions.490 Flying extended low levels, 
blacked out, against a sophisticated integrated air defense network is the one 
mission above all others which Combat Talons and their crews are specifically 
designed to execute. Utilizing this high level of equipment and personal skill, of 
the six, only one aircraft received debilitating damage from enemy fire and was 
forced to divert to Incirlik, Turkey.491 The team successfully infiltrated over 200 
operators and task force personnel. The following day, the Turks opened up their 
airspace to allow the remaining personnel to be flown in directly from their 
forward staging base in Romania.492 
Ugly Baby remains as an excellent example of using air power platforms 
for their intended design and purpose. Combat Talons were designed with this 
type of mission in mind, and they excel where other “slick” C-130s or tactical 
airlifters would fail. Unfortunately, these platforms also fell into disuse when they 
began performing missions that could be accomplished by a less sophisticated 
airframe at a much-reduced operating cost. 
3. Insurgency 
Once major combat operations were “concluded” in Iraq in May 2003, the 
United States was confronted with an unexpected insurgency. In what became a 
“war of convoy ambushes and car bombs,” the insurgent forces focused on 
asymmetric tactics.493 The pressure felt by the convoys transporting troop 
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supplies overland led to a development of an intratheater air network. Although 
airlift could not relieve even a majority of the supply transportation needs of the 
massive conventional ground force, any amount of convoy reduction lessened 
the significant risk-to-life of the overland supply routes.494 
Throughout the insurgency period of the Iraq War, mostly conventional air, 
and ground, assets were used to support the counterinsurgency efforts. F-16s, F-
15s, F/A-18s, A-10s, and AC-130s, along with helicopter gunships, provided the 
majority of close air support to both Special Forces units and conventional 
ground units engaging insurgents on the ground.495 In this manner, high 
technology, multi-role assets with high operating costs were often utilized to 
conduct missions outside of their original design. There is certain amount of 
innovation and flexibility clearly visible here. What is not visible is a legitimate 
attempt over the 11 years since 9/11 to find a cost effective solution for 
supporting fires needs in support of ground troops conducting counterinsurgency 
operations. Unlike Vietnam, there was no drive to modify existing low-tech 
aircraft or design new aircraft to specifically meet the counterinsurgents need for 
fire support. Perhaps this is really no surprise since, in the Iraq insurgency at 
least, the fight was met by unconventional and conventional ground units 
conducting what could be called hyper-conventional direct action operations. 
Another example of how low-intensity conflict, irregular warfare, and 
unconventional warfare are still viewed by the defense establishment as simply 
lessor forms of major or high-intensity conflict. 
On the ISR support side of things, however, there was some innovation. In 
this case, currently available, low-tech aircraft were modified to provide ISR to 
the counterinsurgent. AFSOC’s U-28 program and the Liberty Program that 
converted Pilatus PC-6s and King Air 350s, respectively, into highly capable ISR 
platforms are excellent examples of adapting to the needs of the current conflict. 
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Much like in Afghanistan, this was also an area of large growth in the use of 
civilian contract air support. 
C. OTHER USES 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
Extensive airborne surveillance in powered aircraft dates back to WWI. 
Before that, lighter-than-air balloons were used to spy on enemy movements in 
the American Civil War. As a result, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance is nothing new. Immediately following 9/11, ISR experienced 
incredible growth. Prior to 9/11 ISR certainly existed, but it was largely reserved 
for strategic and operational level missions. Today most ground force 
commanders will not consider even leaving a forward operating base on a 
tactical mission without some sort of ISR platform providing them cover from 
overhead. This incredible demand for ISR has led to a booming defense industry 
developing unmanned aerial vehicles from as small as an insect to larger than 
many manned aircraft. Off-the-shelf manned aircraft have also been modified to 
fill the ISR gap and provide increased utility with a man, or men, overhead. The 
Liberty and U-28 programs were the most notable manned programs. The most 
recognized unmanned program would likely be the MQ-1 Predator. 
The MQ-1 Predator armed with two Hellfire missiles was employed 
for the first time in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom. It 
loitered at relatively low altitude over target areas without risk to a 
pilot while providing fairly high-quality streaming video and a 
modest attack capability. It transmitted reconnaissance data to 
various command posts and higher headquarters and also to at 
least one aerial platform, the AC-130 gunship. It became extremely 
useful against time-sensitive targets, such as Taliban and al Qaeda 
leadership. When available, it gave excellent coverage of unit-level 
engagements, for example, the engagement at Roberts Ridge 
[Operation Anaconda]. This combat debut suggested the immense 
potential for UAVs over the battlefield, but it also revealed some 





focus attention on events within Predator’s very narrow field of 
vision because of their fascination with the video, thereby affecting 
priorities.496 
ISR capabilities are also no longer limited to Air Force units. With a myriad of 
small tactical UAVs available to them, during both OIF and OEF, ground 
commanders were able to control their own eyes and ears. These UAVs are 
launched and controlled from the battlefield providing the commander with 
tailored information on demand.     
2. Drone Strikes 
Back during WWI, when powered aircraft were used for surveillance, it 
wasn’t long before airmen realized that they could inflict serious damage on the 
enemy by dropping ordnance from the air. So it should come as no surprise that 
the obvious progression from unmanned ISR is to establish an offensive 
capability. It was after WWII in 1945 that General of the Army Air Forces Hap 
Arnold made the following prediction in his report to the Secretary of War, “We 
must look at the future of aerial warfare in the light of the following considerations 
. . . Improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion, and electronics control will 
enable unmanned devices to transport means of destruction to targets at 
distances up to many thousands of miles.”497 
With the welcome addition of an offensive capability, UAVs were able to 
“remain on station for a long time, enabling the elusive goal of instantaneous 
attack by finding a target, matching it with a weapon, shooting the weapon, and 
observing the resultant effects.”498 This was the true innovation of the UAV, the 
multi-role adaptation. 
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3. The Raid to Capture/Kill bin Laden 
From the surface it appears that the raid to capture/kill Osama bin Laden 
was an excellent case of the irregular use of air power in irregular warfare. There 
have been several periodical articles indicating that the raid was carried out by 
Special Operations Forces using air power both as a means of air assault (heli-
borne) on the objective compound and for ISR to gather target data before, 
during, and after the raid. Perhaps the most in-depth source of information on the 
raid lies in the recently published book, No Easy Day.499  While this raid belongs 
in an in-depth study of air power in irregular warfare, the lack of verifiable data 
along with the security concerns for the literature, this thesis will not study the 
raid in depth. In a manner similar to previous vignettes, this case study will likely 
benefit from future declassification of records pertaining to the raid. 
4. Operation Jaque 
In an irregular use of air power not yet discussed in this thesis, the 
Colombian Operation Jaque used Colombian military members and two 
Colombian MI-17 helicopters both disguised to represent a humanitarian mission 
in the successful rescue of hostages held by the Revolutionary Forces of 
Colombia (FARC). Operation Jaque, which has also been referred to as 
Operation Check or Checkmate in English, is a unique vignette. Its irregular 
value lies in the covert manner in which air power was used, a distinction held by 
no other vignette in this thesis. The Joint Publication 1-02 defines a covert 
operation as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the 
identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.”500 In contrast, most special 
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operations fall under the definition of a clandestine operation which is clearly 
defined in the Joint Publication. 
An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental 
departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or 
concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert 
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the 
operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. 
In special operations, an activity may be both covert and 
clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations 
and intelligence-related activities.501 
After intercepting communications between the leadership and FARC 
members holding the hostages, a plan was set in place. Surveillance assets were 
able to determine the location of the hostages and a message was sent to jailers 
indicating that the hostages would be moved to a new location via helicopter. In a 
brilliant use of cover, the Colombian Army painted their helicopters to resemble a 
humanitarian mission earlier in the year from Venezuela.502  
13 members of the Colombian Army, unarmed, played the role of 
crewmembers, medics, and news reporters. . . After twenty two 
minutes on the ground, 15 hostages boarded the [helicopter] under 
the custody of their jailer who for years ran their lives with an iron 
fist. Once on board and airborne, the Colombian military posing as 
aircrew and cameramen subdued the jailer along with one other 
insurgent.503  
The result was the rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, three American 
contractors, and 13 Colombian military members without a single shot being 
fired. Ingrid Betancourt was a Colombian politician and activist captured while 
running for president and held for over 6 years. The three American contractors 
were employees of the Northrop Grumman Corporation. During a 
reconnaissance mission looking for coca fields and drug-processing labs owned 
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by the FARC, they experienced an engine failure and crash landed their Cessna 
Caravan in a Colombian jungle.504 They were held for over 5 years. 
The role air power played in Operation Jaque was not significant because 
of the aircraft or the type of flying. The hostage rescue was notable because air 
power was used covertly to deceive the FARC into placing the hostages on the 
helicopter. This vignette offers a prime example of how a covert air capability can 
be used innovatively to achieve decisive results.    
D. CONCLUSION 
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the United States 
demonstrated the great flexibility of its conventional air power forces. Special 
Forces and CIA teams in Afghanistan were constantly supported by air, through 
aerial resupply and highly effective close air support. This was a successful 
demonstration of how a largely conventional, centrally controlled air force could 
effectively support an irregular warfare operation. While a testament to the 
flexibility and skill of modern day airmen, this was largely an example of 
conventional air power using conventional tactics in support of an unconventional 
mission on the ground.  
The initial success of air power paired with SOF in the initial stages of 
OEF has threatened the Air Force with a false sense of security much like 
nuclear weapons did at the conclusion of WWII. Although there have been 
several cases of innovation and development of new weapon systems, 
specifically militarized ISR platforms. Many more high tech/high operating cost 
aircraft were multi-role’d. Several of these aircraft serve as the backbone of our 
combat air force (CAF) and we have put years of needless wear and tear on 
them by pushing them into a multi-role simply to prove their relevance and to 
keep them in the fight. These are flying hours above and beyond the scheduled 
service life for many of these airframes.  
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This one-size-fits-all approach to air power is a very tempting proposal for 
the organization for air forces. This mentality is even more pronounced in a time 
of fiscal austerity that often occurs in a post war drawdown. The missions in 
Afghanistan and later Iraq quickly conventionalized as more and more forces 
were deployed into the respective theaters of operations. Although both Iraq and 
Afghanistan are irregular wars, air power was used, in both theaters, in a 
conventional manner against irregular opponents. While the Air Force once again 
performed well, it was for the most part, not engaged in irregular warfare.  
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VII. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: ANALYSIS 
Air power was anything but conventional during its introduction to the 
battlefield from the first military aircraft in 1908 to the start of WWII in 1939. 
Through intrepid experimentation and trials by fire on the battlefield, airmen 
developed and revolutionized the tactics, techniques, and procedures for 
employing air power. As armies, and insurgents, discovered their utility, aircraft 
played a significant role in numerous irregular and small wars around the world. 
This early use of air power saw airmen as pioneers during insurgencies, 
mercenaries of the air, and even as advisors to foreign air forces during the 
Interwar Years. The British and other colonial powers would utilize the strategy of 
air control until the collapse of their empires. It could be argued that it was the air 
control mission that saved the RAF between the world wars. Even as the use of 
aircraft became accepted and somewhat conventionalized during the course of 
WWI, airmen continued to fly on the cutting edge, conducting the first special 
operations night infiltration and exfiltration behind enemy lines. The technological 
advance of the aircraft, and the airmen exploring their employment in irregular 
warfare, would revolutionize how wars, both large and small, would be fought for 
years to come. 
This thesis took a very tactical-level approach to looking at air power in 
irregular warfare. As with many irregular conflicts, however, tactical-level 
operations can have vast operational and strategic implications. As a series of 
key vignettes was considered, a number of themes emerged. The value of this 
research lies in the ability to connect themes to results (both positive and 





Since the inception of warfare, there has been a significant effort to make 
war as short and decisive as possible. This concept has shaped the development 
of technology, strategy and tactics throughout the modern Western world.505 
When related to irregular warfare, this trend produces the large conventional 
forces that are applied to irregular conflict. When met with even minimal success, 
this trend has only reinforced the misnomer of a one-size-fits-all approach to 
conflict.  
Since its inception, the United States Air Force has struggled to claim its 
identity while establishing both its relevancy and legitimacy as a separate 
service. From battling with the Army over the use of helicopters in Vietnam to 
development of a new light cargo aircraft today, the Air Force has constantly 
fought to maintain its legitimacy and relevancy as the primary air service. 
Throughout history, this fight has been founded on the unique strategic utility of 
air power to reach beyond an enemy’s forward line of troops and strike deep 
within his territory. This concept reaches clear back to WWI where RAF pioneer 
Hugh Trenchard believed that the “outer air battle both on the main battle front 
and on its periphery was the key to success in the Tactical Level inner air battle 
to keep the enemy air force at arm’s length.”506 This translates, in today’s 
vernacular, to holding any target on the globe constantly at risk. The strategic 
bombardment doctrine developed by the ACTS during the Interwar Years was 
firmly rooted with the advent of the atomic bomb and the rising threat of the Cold 
War. The Air Force was “dominated by ‘bomber generals’ for generations, from 
the very first Chief of Staff, General Carl A. Spaatz, in September 1947, down 
through the ninth chief, General David C. Jones, in 1974.”507  
Following the Vietnam War, Americans became obsessed with firepower 
and technology. For every problem, if the answer did not lie in nuclear 
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deterrence, the answer could be found in overwhelming conventional firepower 
delivered from the air. This is confirmed in a survey of professional air power 
journals of the period. Besides just a couple of articles, “the Air Force seemed 
either supremely uninterested in the subject or assumed that, in terms of 
airpower, protracted revolutionary warfare was just conventional warfare writ 
small.”508 Despite these efforts abroad, and those at home by the Special Air 
Warfare Center to educate leaders and incorporate insurgency and 
counterinsurgency into emerging doctrine manuals, a “scant two pages” of lip 
service was indicative of the true doctrinal emphasis.509 Once again, the U.S. Air 
Force remained ensconced in the doctrine of nuclear and strategic bombing. 
The French experience during colonial wars in Chad, Libya and other 
African nations demonstrated a noticeable shift in doctrine and strategy. 
Previously, air power played a central role as the agent of control from the air. 
However, in the late 1970s, this shifted to “an increasing reliance on the air force 
to project firepower”510 The British implemented a model using aircraft, and the 
helicopter in particular, in a supporting role; ground forces resumed primary 
responsibility for operations. The French built their force around a foundation of 
strike aircraft. This reliance, coupled with economics, fostered the development 
of multi-role aircraft such as the Mirage and Jaguar, both backbones of the FAF 
during this time. French airlift assets were “extremely limited”511 which certainly 
played a role in this shift to a strike mindset as well. 
Ultimately, success in counterinsurgency is not solely based on military 
might, and especially cannot be achieved by strategic bombing or even precision 
strike alone. 
As demonstrated by the British in Malaya, there are effective 
counterinsurgent strategies, and airpower can play a significant 
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role. The importance of airpower may go far beyond that achieved 
by the British because so many of the problems they faced have 
been overcome by technology. However, even the most powerful 
and sophisticated airpower employment will come to naught if it is 
not applied as part of a comprehensive military/nonmilitary strategy 
designed to combat the peculiarities of Maoist-based 
insurgencies.512 
This lesson was lost on leadership during this era and was reinforced by 
conventional, and at least in the eyes of the Air Force, air power led, success in 
both the Gulf War and Kosovo. 
Operations Babylon and El Dorado Canyon were two military actions 
operations that clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of air power in a situation 
that was less than total war. In the case of El Dorado Canyon, air strikes were 
the only military option “ever seriously considered” by President Reagan and his 
staff.513 This progression in the view of air power’s efficacy and reliance on 
technology would shift policy and doctrine for years to come. As Dennis Drew 
predicted: 
 Airpower will likely be the weapon of choice to enforce 
counterproliferation and counterterrorist policies for at least three 
reasons. First, airpower will often be the only military means 
capable of striking at the heart of the problem. Second, air strikes 
generally are over with quickly, creating less exposure and risk to 
the participants. . . . The third reason that will make airpower the 
weapon of choice in future is time. . . . Airpower, of all the military 
forces, is the most time sensitive in terms of both force preparation 
and mission execution.514 
The success of air power in the initial stages of OEF further imbued the Air 
Force with a false sense of security, much like nuclear weapons did at the 
conclusion of WWII. The one-size-fits-all approach to air power is a very tempting 
proposal for the organization for air forces. The draw of this mentality is even 
more pronounced in a time of fiscal austerity that often occurs in a post-war 
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drawdown. The missions in Afghanistan and later Iraq were quickly 
conventionalized as more and more forces were deployed into the respective 
theaters of operations. While the Air Force once again performed well, it rarely 
engaged in irregular warfare, nor was it an irregular force. 
B. STRATEGY 
One of the most frequently repeated historical patterns has been the 
tendency of air forces to develop an effective irregular force during a conflict, only 
to deactivate the force at the conclusion of hostilities, placing them at an perilous 
opening disadvantage at the outset of the next conflict. This vicious and 
detrimental trend has repeated itself at the conclusion of every major conflict 
since the end of WWII.  
WWII saw tremendous gains for air power. The 1st Air commando Group’s 
success in Burma convinced General Arnold to activate two additional groups 
later in WWII, only to have them disbanded during the postwar demobilization.515  
At the initiation of hostilities in Korea, the U.S. was caught off guard with a 
pressing need for an irregular air capability. With a force molded around nuclear 
deterrence, the U.S. was unprepared. While none of the previous Air Commando 
units were reactivated,516 the air forces created a very versatile and functional 
irregular capability using available technologies in the midst of a conflict. The air 
forces were extremely capable and effective as they supported clandestine 
missions into North Korea. However, in a troublesome trend that would repeat 
again after Vietnam, the Korean irregular forces were deactivated in 1956 much 
like they were at the conclusion of WWII.  
 Initially ushered in and championed by the Kennedy administration, the 
Vietnam era brought the prospect of promising innovation and growth of irregular 
air power. However, once the Vietnam War became largely conventionalized, the 
irregular air power capability reverted to the a pattern of disuse. Despite lessons 
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learned during Malaya and efforts in the early years of Vietnam, air power could 
not overcome the inertia of bomber-focused doctrine. Following the Vietnam War, 
Air Force special operations found itself in a rapid decline. “By 1979 only one air 
force special operations wing was left, with its squadrons composed of AC-130A 
Spectre gunships, MC-130E Combat Talons, and CH-3E Jolly Green and UH-1N 
Huey helicopters.”517 As a hollow force, this was one of the lowest points in 
American special operations air power history. This claim would later become 
evident during Operation Eagle Claw, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt. 
Also known as Desert One, Eagle Claw spurred the reorganization that was 
responsible for much of the joint climate of the mainstream military as well as 
SOF that exists today. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
1. Air-to-Ground Coordination 
By far the most common theme represented in the effective use of air 
power in irregular warfare lies in the nature of the relationship between the 
ground forces and the air forces. In vignette after vignette, we noticed that the 
closer the coordination between ground and air elements, the greater the chance 
of success in irregular warfare.  
Perhaps the clearest example saw the Germans placing airborne forces 
under the control of the Luftwaffe during WWII. In a force organization that might 
seem backwards to most, the cohesiveness of this force structure later proved 
critical to the success of several German airborne (and glider-borne) operations. 
Placing airborne forces under the control of the Luftwaffe “ensured the minimum 
of friction between the providers of the transport fleet and the men who would 
use them.”518  
The formation of the Number 1 Air Commando Group to support Orde 
Wingate’s Chindit forces in Burma provides the quintessential example of close 
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coordination between air and ground forces. With limited success in his first 
campaign, the addition of air forces adequately complemented Wingate’s tactics, 
achieving much greater success in the follow-on operation. The air forces 
remained under the leadership of airmen, yet “were completely integrated into 
the ground commander’s operation and [they] took an active part in planning the 
campaign.”519 Perhaps no other case in this study provides such a concise and 
successful example of a truly irregular ground force mated with air forces tailor- 
made to support the ground commander for a truly strategic outcome.  
During WWII the close relationship between the Number 1 Air Commando 
Group and Wingate’s Chindits was absolutely critical to their success. The 
Carpetbaggers had a similar relationship with the OSS in Europe during WWII. 
“The closest liaison existed between the secret agencies and the air forces, and 
the success of the entire program of special operations depended upon full 
cooperation.”520 The partisans who were operating behind enemy lines and 
dependent on the OSS for survival developed a close relationship for both 
planning and execution with the air forces.  
During Vietnam, Air Force special operators also shared a close 
relationship with their supported ground counterparts, both American and 
Vietnamese. Birddog pilots lived amongst U.S. Army Special Forces providing 
forward air control.521 Commandos trained foreign pilots in true FID style. 
However, once President Johnson ordered the shift to “a massive bombing 
campaign” in the form of Operation Rolling Thunder, the counterinsurgency, and 
air power’s role in it particularly, virtually came to an end.522  
There is another obvious, yet fundamental lesson that can be learned from 
Vietnam that was recently repeated during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The Army’s Air Mobile Division achieved the most fundamental goal of air-to–
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ground coordination: a near seamless interface between the air and ground 
components. Air forces often have different perspectives, speak different 
languages, or just have different concerns, goals, and interests than their ground 
counterparts. These differences can cause friction points and result in operations 
that are not streamlined and coordinated. These issues can contribute to 
situations like the poor interoperability of Operation Eagle Claw in Iran in 1980 or 
more recently issues that arose during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 
2002. The bottom line is that Army aviation units are organic to the ground 
commander, making them an easily cohesive and more integrated member of 
any joint force from the start. The goal of the Air Force should always be to foster 
a near-organic working relationship with the supported forces. 
Shortly after 9/11 the Army sent its SF ODA teams to Afghanistan, 
integrating an AF CCT with each team. This was somewhat of a first, perhaps a 
milestone in Army/Air Force cooperation. Pairing SF and CCT essentially 
positioned an AF liaison with each ODA and provided almost unparalleled 
coordination at the tactical level. “These Army SOF troops, with their attached Air 
Force terminal attack controllers, would provide the first eyes on target for 
enabling what eventually became a remarkably successful U.S. exercise in air-
ground cooperation.”523 OEF saw conventional air forces used to support irregular 
ground forces in air missions that were largely conventional. The AF liason 
embedded with SF had its limitations however. The combat aircrews still lacked 
face-to-face relationships with ground forces and their ultimate authority was still 
located at PSAB in Saudi Arabia. Out of logistical necessity, many of the special 
operations aircrews were also geographically separated from the ground troops 
they supported. AFSOC crews daily flew over 15-hour resupply missions to 
Afghanistan from their base of operations within the European theater. 
The large-scale introduction of conventional troops to Afghanistan, 
brought with it changes to the tactical impact air power had on the battlefield. The 
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culminating event was quite possibly Operation Anaconda. In Anaconda the air 
component was not addressed at any level of planning. In the end, it was CAS 
that was decisive. Last, there were friendly fire incidents that could have been 
prevented with better coordination. The benefits of using CCT in coordination 
with SOF cannot be overstated, yet there is still a layer of separation between the 
supported forces and the supporting forces. As long as there is a layer between 
the two, air power may not be at its most effective. 
2. Contract Air 
Shortly after the dawn of aviation, nations struggled to learn how to best 
integrate air forces into their overall war strategies. As a result, many nations 
were forced to employ mercenaries to make up for the shortfall in the irregular 
capabilities of their own forces. These shortfalls were not solely limited to the 
early days of aviation. Mercenary pilots and contract aviation were prevalent 
throughout conflict on the African continent during the 1950s till today. The 
operations of Air America and Bird Air within the context of the Vietnam War 
solidified the importance of contract air when conducting irregular warfare. With a 
largely conventional air force in theater, the expansion of contract air forces was 
necessary to meet air/ground support requirements. The three American 
contractors that were rescued in Operation Jaque were employees of the 
Northrop Grumman Corporation. They were on a mission the government was 
either unable or unwilling to execute directly. The bottom line is that often 
contract air firms are used to fill gaps in the irregular capabilities of conventional 
air forces. 
 These trends continued in Iraq and Afghanistan as the contract air 
business exploded. Companies such as DynCorp International, Avenge Inc, 
Flightworks Inc, and Presidential Airways have all reaped the benefit of the 
increased requirements for ISR as well as combat airland and airdrop platforms 
that the air force cannot meet with its current force. 
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D. TECHNOLOGY 
The use of technology in air power is often strange and contradictory. The 
importance of harmonizing weapons and doctrine is a lesson from as far back as 
the Great War, if not further. While it seems retroussé to discuss situations where 
low technology is better than high technology, this is a lesson in air power that is 
still not learned today. In IW, more isn’t always better; low-tech is sometimes 
more effective. Both high-tech and low-tech have their place in IW. The key is to 
know which technology is called for and to apply it appropriately. In order to be 
employed properly, air power must be capable of flexing to the demands of the 
current conflict and technology is a key component to this flexibility. Today this 
flexibility is often manifested in converted aircraft executing multiple missions 
disparate from the intent of their original design. The ability to execute some 
missions is partially compromised in order to create/sustain the ability to conduct 
others. This modern interpretation of flexibility is based on technology rather than 
tactics and often means a less than ideal match between mission set and aircraft. 
In addition, unnecessary wear and tear is placed on airframes that must be relied 
upon to be operational for many years to come. Expensive to operate, 3rd and 4th 
generation fighters are now often used to execute missions which could be 
accomplished by simpler airframes with lower procurement, training and 
operating expenses. The unfortunate consequence is that large conventional 
multi-role forces are often applied to a very narrow irregular mission with limited 
success. 
1. Low Technology 
SOF are generally known for using the latest gadgets and technologies. 
Similarly, the AF has been the perennial force associated with new and high 
technologies. With that in mind, the air power used in IW is often the exact 
opposite. A very common trend among the vignettes in this thesis is existing, low 
technology used with great success in IW. The Air Force has a tendency to 
create new platforms to address emerging threats. The study of IW in this thesis 
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points to the opposite; legacy aircraft and technologies that are usually modified 
for use in the current irregular conflict with great success. 
During WWI, dirigibles were used by both sides. Germany was particularly 
fond of Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin’s rigid dirigibles, using them for bombing 
missions across the English Channel almost nightly. While dirigibles marked a 
significant innovation, the existence of lighter-than-air balloons pre-dates the first 
powered flight by over a century, as they can be traced back to flight in the late 
1700’s.524 Today, almost a century later there are periodic calls for fielding of 
dirigibles in Afghanistan. While still a relatively old technology, in the permissive 
air environment of Afghanistan, the dirigible is a tempting option for ISR with its 
extremely long loiter times. 
Perhaps the greatest testament to the use of low-tech air power was the 
use of gliders by the Germans in WWII. Based on restrictions put in place by the 
Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of WWI, Germany had a very skilled cadre 
of glider pilots. Thus, out of strategic necessity, the Germans relied heavily on 
glider-borne raids that proved to be a concentrated and decisive technique for air 
assault. While gliders preceded the first powered flight in late 1903, they received 
little attention in the years that would follow. As a validation of the low 
technological solution to an air assault, following German successes, the Allies 
developed and used glider-borne forces throughout WWII. Gliders proved 
valuable for the silent manner in which they surprised the enemy by delivering a 
concentrated assault force. However, with a fairly high success rate in special 
operations, it is puzzling to note that after the conclusion of WWII, gliders were 
never again used extensively in combat.  
As a further testament to low technology air power, this trend continued 
with the Douglas C-47 Skytrain. Designed as a cargo aircraft based on the 
Douglas DC-3 airliner, the C-47 has played a role in countless conflicts since its 
delivery to the Army Air Forces in 1941. The C-47 had a reinforced floor, cargo 
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door and was modified to tow gliders making it a very useful aircraft in WWII.525 
Flown by every branch of the U.S. military and all the Allies during WWII, it could 
carry a Jeep or 6000 pounds of cargo or 28 soldiers in full combat gear.526 
Additionally, the aircraft was given greater than 22 designations to include the 
AC-47D gunship during Vietnam.527 
The C-47 was used widely in irregular warfare supporting both Orde 
Wingate’s Chindit forces in Burma as well as the OSS in Europe. Following 
WWII, the C-47 was used by the French in Algeria, a truly irregular conflict. While 
not necessarily an irregular use covered in this thesis, the C-47 was the 
backbone of the Berlin Airlift in 1945. What sealed the Skytrain in air power and 
IW history was its selection over newer, more expensive and higher technological 
airplanes for use in both Korea and Vietnam. During the Korean War, the C-47 
was used by Heinie Aderholt’s special mission detachment for clandestine 
operations deep inside North Korea.528 Later during the conflict, the C-47 was 
modified to hold two 75 gallon napalm bombs under the belly of the transport to 
drop bombs on lucrative targets found after dropping agents from the aircraft.529  
The North Koreans also made use of low-tech aircraft in their airborne IW 
force. In their case it was the AN-2 Colt, a wood and fabric biplane capable of 
hauling up to 12 passengers. The Colt was, and still is, uniquely suited as an IW 
platform. As a STOL aircraft, the Colt was designed to fly low and slow. This 
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detect on even modern radar systems. The AN-2 can infiltrate North Korean 
paratroopers behind enemy lines throughout the entire South Korean 
peninsula.530 
Nearly two decades later, sixteen C-47’s were used by Jungle Jim 
elements of the 4400th CCTS in Vietnam where they were modified for twice the 
normal fuel capacity, strengthened for operations on unimproved landing zones, 
and equipped for rocket assisted takeoffs.531 They were later used extensively by 
the CIA’s Air America. It is also curious to note that until recently, AFSOC’s 6th 
SOS maintained the FID capability to operate and train foreign forces in the C-
47.  
The history of the C-47 in irregular warfare is particularly enlightening, as it 
clearly demonstrates the vital need for a versatile light/medium lift cargo 
capability as an important component of an effective IW air force. This gives 
specific validation of the previously discussed RAND report which recommended 
that the USAF develop and procure light cargo aircraft in the 3,000- to 6,000-
pound payload range.532 This would fill the air force IW capability gap that has 
become evident during operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The positive contribution of a small, often legacy and low-cost tactical 
close air support platforms is another low-tech trend in the IW vignettes of this 
thesis. After the conclusion of WWII, the French had a fleet of newer and more 
modern aircraft such as the F-86 Sabrejet. When these aircraft were found 
unsuitable for the intended counterinsurgency operations, the French Air Force 
turned to WWII legacy aircraft including the T-6. As a slow, sturdy, and cheap 
aircraft that could takeoff/land on austere strips the T-6 was ideal for the 
environment.  
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British aircraft procurement throughout the 1940s and into the 1960s, like 
the French, was also focused on jet powered, technologically advanced aircraft 
to replace piston-driven aircraft. However, it was these supposedly antiquated 
aircraft that were the foundation for the success not just in Malaya, but also in 
other peripheral conflicts in the “mountainous forests of Kenya” and “narrow 
wadis of the Arabian Peninsula.”533 Similar to lessons learned by the French in 
Algeria, RAF officers also experienced the advantages of vintage aircraft in a 
counterinsurgency. In turn, they too, recognized the need for “slow speed, long 
loiter time, and pinpoint accuracy in counter-guerilla operations.”534 
Use of legacy aircraft continued in Vietnam. Toward the end of 1960, the 
U.S. supported the Lao Air Force with AT-6 Texans. Later the Jungle Jim 
elements made use of another modified trainer, the T-28. These examples lend 
further credence to the RAND report’s recommendation for a counterinsurgency-
dedicated close air support and armed overwatch platform, an asset that the 
current force is lacking. A small tactical CAS platform that is closely coordinated 
with the supported force is indispensible. The small low cost platform is easy to 
field and provides the ground forces with the overwatch, longer station times, and 
tactical firepower desired while relieving pressure on the strained combat air 
force fleet. Several recent attempts have been made to field such a platform, but 
contracting issues and a lack of full support/buy-in from Air Force leadership has 
led these half-hearted attempts to failure. 
The examples above that identify the need for legacy, low cost platforms 
also highlight the need for combat aviation advisors. Low cost aircraft (fixed and 
rotary wing) are often given to partner nations as a part of the train, advise and 
assist mission. In 1937, when Claire Chennault was invited to China to train and 
organize the Chinese Air Force, he took on a classic FID role. By 1941, in 
December of which America entered WWII, the U.S. gave Chennault’s Flying 
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Tigers, one hundred legacy P-40s in an effort to keep China in the war.535 The 
role of combat FID during Vietnam could not be overstated. Jungle Jim elements, 
as well as operations like Farm Gate, Ranch Hand, Waterpump, and Duck Hook 
were all quintessential FID missions in Laos and Vietnam. Thousands of sorties 
were flown and hundreds or aircraft were given to the air forces trained by U.S. 
combat aviation aviators. Once again, the same RAND report discussed above, 
supported this theory and highlighted the need for combat aviation advisors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The report also indicated that the demand for combat 
aviation advisors in both nations would increase significantly.536 One can also 
reasonably project these ideas on the extensive global effort against 
insurgencies and terrorism. Despite this report, combat aviation advising remains 
one of AFSOC’s lowest priorities and support for the program, especially rotary-
wing, has actually been cut rather than expanded.   
2. High Technology 
While not as obvious as other trends in our analysis, high technology has 
also had an impact on air power in IW. More often than not, when high 
technology is applied to IW, conventional forces and increases in manpower, 
supplies, equipment and national oversight all come concurrently. To put it 
bluntly, high technology comes hand-in-hand with large increases in the size and 
scale of forces and conflict. These increases are rarely beneficial to irregular 
warfare and potentially mask the true impact of technology on IW.  
Perhaps the most poignant case was in Vietnam where the Army 
developed a truly innovative counterinsurgency (COIN) capability in its air-mobile 
force. While this technology held the potential to dramatically enhance COIN 
activities, it was quickly enveloped by the conventional Army who viewed it as a 
means to support conventional operations versus a counterinsurgency.537 Despite 
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this conventionalization, the large air assault forces forged a capability for 
battlefield mobility that “transformed the war.”538 The helicopter was also integral 
to the successful British campaign in Dhofar as it was used to deliver assault 
forces on target, keep them supplied and evacuate their casualties.539 Britain’s 
experience throughout this period of peripheral conflict demonstrated the 
absolute utility of the helicopter. Helicopters became the backbone for logistics 
and support of fielded forces and the British campaign exhibited the need for 
solid helicopter support.540 
Operation Ugly Baby was an excellent example of using high technology 
air power platforms for their intended design and purpose. Combat Talons were 
designed with this type of mission in mind, and they excel where other “slick” C-
130s or tactical airlifters would fail. Unfortunately, these platforms also fell into 
disuse when they began performing missions that could be accomplished by a 
less sophisticated airframe at a much-reduced operating cost. In this case a 
weapons system designed to be multi-role began to execute a mission set that 
could be conducted by a less capable platform, at a much-reduced cost. 
The most notable modern example of high technology applied to IW lies 
with the use of manned and unmanned overwatch and platforms. While the 
platforms are not always high cost, the additional ISR capable technology is. 
Initially, low-tech aircraft were procured and modified to provide ISR to the 
counterinsurgent. AFSOC’s U-28 program and the Liberty Program that 
converted Pilatus PC-6s and King Air 350s, respectively, into highly capable ISR 
platforms are excellent examples of adapting to the needs of the current conflict. 
Prior to 9/11 ISR certainly existed, but it was largely reserved for strategic and 
operational level missions. Today most ground force commanders will not even 
consider leaving a forward operating base on a tactical mission without some sort 
of ISR platform providing them cover from overhead. What initially began as a 
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high technology asset easily applied to IW, morphed into a capability adopted 
and often dominated by conventional forces. These same arguments could be 
applied to UAVs with the capabilities to both watch and strike targets.  
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VIII. AIR POWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: CONCLUSION 
One theme of this thesis was that conventional air power is strategic. Few 
would argue with that simple assertion. Yet the role of air power in IW is 
predominantly tactical and in IW, tactical-level operations often have vast 
operational and strategic impacts. Barely a century old, the history of powered 
flight is short compared with the storied history of other forms of warfare. Yet, this 
history of air power is still rich with lessons that are applicable to modern day. Air 
power has transformed the manner in which war will be fought for centuries to 
come. Since an opponent’s forces can now be held at risk from an air force, this 
component must be accounted for when planning a campaign, whether 
conventional or irregular. Air superiority, or at least the ability to operate in the air 
with impunity, is critical for success on the ground to occur.  
Several significant points were discovered in this thesis. 
1. Prevailing doctrine has promoted a one-size–fits-all mentality that 
more often than not results in conventional forces being applied to 
inefficiently to irregular conflicts.   
2. Air forces have found the need to develop effective irregular air 
forces amidst conflict only to deactivate the force at the conclusion 
of the hostilities, placing them at a perilous opening disadvantage 
at the outset of the next conflict. 
3.  The closer the coordination (training, planning, operations, etc.) 
between tactical level ground and air elements of irregular forces, 
the greater the chances of success. 
4. Gaps in irregular air power capabilities frequently drive the 
extensive use of contract air forces in irregular warfare. 
5. Legacy, low technology aircraft are frequently more effective in IW 
than their modern, high technology counterparts. 
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6. Vital capabilities of an effective IW air capability include a low cost, 
light/medium lift cargo capability and a small, low cost tactical close 
air support capability, both supported by a robust contingent of 
combat aviation advisors. 
7. While there are cases where high technology has a significant 
positive and innovative effect on IW, these cases are frequently 
accompanied by large conventional forces that conventionalize 
and/or misuse the capability.   
Within that history are vast differences between conventional and irregular 
air power forces and missions (both real and perceived). These forces and 
missions are not, however, mutually exclusive. Most conventional air forces can 
be applied to both conventional and irregular missions. Likewise, most irregular 
air forces can also be applied to both irregular and conventional missions. The 
utility of both types of air forces is obvious from the discussion in this thesis. 
What should also be clear is that the roots of both conventional and irregular air 
power theory are similar. These capabilities were born from the same theorists, 
the same technologies, and the same conflicts. The differences between 
conventional and irregular air power theory lie in the forces and the missions 
themselves. Conventional forces will always be more effective in conventional 
conflicts just as irregular forces will always be more effective in irregular conflicts. 
Thus, the true utility of air power in IW lies in matching the right forces to the right 
missions. A dedicated IW air capability with forces specifically trained and utilized 
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